"library of congress, 



I FORCE COLLECTION.] 



J UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. J 



TO 



DR WARE'S LETTERS 



TO 



^UNITARIANS AND CALVINISTS 



BY LEONARD/WOODS, D. D. 

ABBOT PROF. OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN THEOL. SEM., ANDOVER. 



'7 



ANDOVER 

PUBLISHED BY FLAGG AND GOULD. 
1821. 




CONTENTS. 

INTRODUCTION, p. 4 9. 

CHAPTER I. 9—41. 

Dr. Ware's opinions and reasoning with respect to the human charac- 
ter, examined. — Man's character judged by a wrong standard, 12. 
— Basis of Dr. Ware's reasoning, 13. — His first argument, from the 
characteristics of early life, examined, 18. — Second, from the in- 
terest taken in children, 26. — Third, from the repulsiveness of the 
doctrine of depravity, 27. — Fourth, from the commands, precepts, 
&c. 29. — Fifth, from representations of Scripture, 34. 

CHAPTER II. 41—47. 
Result of observation and experience, as to original depravity. 

CHAPTER III. 47—61. 

Human depravity native. — Examples of the proper use of words and 
phrases employed in stating this doctrine, 48. — Whether the words 
natural, native, &c. are applicable to human depravity, 51. — De- 
pravity found in all men of every generation, 52. — Appears early, 

52. — Cannot be traced to any change, subsequently to man's birth, 

53. — Operates spontaneously, 57. — Hard to be eradicated, 58. — 
An infant will certainly be a sinner, 58. — Argument from Scrip- 
ture referred to, 60. — Summary, 61. 

CHAPTER IV. 62—35. 

Objections to depravity, 62. Unitarian mode of reasoning un- 

philosophical, 62. — Proper mode of reasoning, 65. — Moral de- 
pravity not inconsistent with the divine perfections, 78 — 85. 

CHAPTER V. 85—113. 

Native depravity not inconsistent with moral agency. — What con- 
stitutes moral agency, 86. — Men sinners as soon as moral agents, 
87. — Difficulties attending Dr. Ware's theory, 90. — No more in- 
consistent to suppose man inclined to sin at first, than afterwards, 



Jv 



CONTENTS. 



100. — Man culpable for defects of character, however acquired, 
100. — Difficulties attend both theories. — Influence of bad example 
108. — How far the circumstances of Adam's sin invalidates the ar- 
gument of the Orthodox, 110. 

CHAPTER VI. 113—128. 
Manner in which Dr. Ware confutes scripture arguments. — Argument 
from Gen. vi. p. 113. — Principle involved in Dr. Ware's reasoning, 
and its consequences, 116. — The Bible accounts for it, that some 
are holy, while the generality are sinful, 126. — The worst men 
selected as specimens of human nature, 127. 

CHAPTER VII. 128—140. 
Dr. Ware's reply to the argument from John iii. 3 5 Rom. v. 12 ; 
and Ephes. ii. 3. 

CHAPTER VIII. 140—149. 
The doctrine of man's native depravity of great practical importance. 

CHAPTER IX. 149—198. 
On the doctrine of election. — Uncandid representation of the doctrine, 
150. — Proper view of it, I51.-The controversy respects the divine 
administration, 155 — Mistakes corrected, 156.— Objections consid- 
ered, 158.- — No injustice in distinguishing grace, 159. — Dr.Ware's 
theory attended with as great difficulties as the Orthodox, 164. — 
Fact confirms the doctrine, 169. — The divine purpose ensures the 

influence of motives, 171. Makes men moral agents, 173.— 

Extracts from Wesley, 1 74.— Difficulties attending the denial of 
the doctrine, 175. — Argument from John xvii. p. 176. — Ephes. i. 
3 — 11. p. 182. — The supposition that communities only are elected, 
183.— Rom. ix. p. 193. 

CHAPTER X. 198—216. 
Atonement. — Doctrine of redemption, as held by Dr. Ware, 198. — 
Five objections to his scheme, 199 — 208. — Remarks on figurative 
language, &c. 209. 

CHAPTER XI. 216—228. 

Dr. Ware's objections to Divine influence, considered, 216 — 220. — 
Moral influence of the two systems compared, 220. 



INTRODUCTION. 



When I wrote the Letters to Unitarians, I meant 
to treat the subjects of the present controversy so ex- 
plicitly, and to extend my remarks to such a length, that 
I might, in any case, have a full apology for declining 
a rejoinder. I then had, and have still many and 
weighty reasons against being a party in any religious 
controversy. In the first place, it is not the way in 
which 1 have generally supposed I could best labour for 
the promotion of the cause of Christ. The duties im- 
posed upon me by my office are sufficiently extensive 
and important, to occupy all my time and my powers of 
action ; sufficiently diversified, abundantly to satisfy my 
love of variety ; and so congenial to my inclinations, as to 
afford all the enjoyment which can be expected by any 
man, oppressed with the cares of public life and the 
imperfections of human nature. But for my reluc- 
tance to engage in controversy, I have had another rea- 
son. In the regular course of my official duty, though I 
have much to do with all the controverted subjects of 
religion, and though I never impose any restraints upon 
the freedom of discussion, but those of decency ; it has 
still cost me no effort, to keep my mind free from agita- 
tion. But as to public religious controversy, I have ob- 
served its unhappy influence upon so many men of dis- 
tinguished excellence ; I have seen that it has so often 
marred the best natural temper; that it has so often oc- 
casioned the offensive boast of victory, or that which is 
no less offensive, the sullen mortification of defeat ; that 
2 



6 



it has so often injured the beauty of men's characters, 
cooled the ardour of their piety, and detracted much 
from their comfort, or at least from the comfort of their 
friends, that I have earnestly wished to avoid the dan- 
ger. I have wished also, if possible, to avoid the suffer- 
ings of controversy ; the unhappiness of being exposed 
to the charge of bigotry or party spirit, of ambition or 
meanness, of arrogance or imbecility ; the unhappiness 
of being reproached or despised by my opposers, or the 
greater unhappiness of feeling any disposition to re- 
proach or despise them. Besides, I have thought, that, 
at least so far as I was concerned, truth and piety might 
be more successfully promoted by more silent, gentle 
means. I have feared that an attempt even to advance 
the cause of pure religion, in a controversial way, would 
kindle a fire which would endanger the most precious 
interests of the church, and which Christians, possessing 
the strongest attachment to Christ, and blessed with the 
largest portion of his spirit, might in vain try to ex- 
tinguish. 

These and other like considerations may seem tri- 
fling to men on both sides, who cherish a disputa- 
tious spirit, who pant for the noise and strife of contro- 
versy, and who have never soberly considered the evils 
likely to result from it. But in my mind, such consid- 
erations, as I have suggested, are of no ordinary impor- 
tance ; and for a long time they produced in me a reso- 
lution against controversy, which, till of late, I thought 
could never be overcome. But as it is, I must now go 
forward, hoping to derive benefit to myself from 
the kind and amiable temper of my opponent, and no 
less benefit to my cause, from the frankness with which 
he declares his opinions, and the zeal with which he 
attacks mine. 



7 



I do not come to this task with an expectation of 
producing, generally, any material change in the views 
of confirmed Unitarians. I should be a poor proficient 
in the science of the human mind, could I not foresee, 
that my arguments will be likely to appear as inconclu- 
sive to them, as theirs do to me. My age and experi- 
ence have somewhat cooled the ardour of feeling, which 
might once have led me to indulge different expectations, 
and to think that my opponents and all others might easily 
be convinced of the truth of my opinions. I have lived 
long enough to learn, that arguments have a different 
weight in the judgment of different men, and that some- 
thing besides argument is concerned in controversy. In 
the present case, the facts, which are the principles of 
reasoning, are different ; just as might be the case with 
two philosophers, who, making use of instruments not 
agreeing together, or using the same instruments in very 
different ways, might come to a different judgment re- 
specting the phenomena of light, or any other material 
substance ; in consequence of which, both of them might 
reason correctly on the ground of what they had discov- 
ered to be the properties of that substance, and yet be 
conducted to different and opposite conclusions. In the 
controversy respecting depravity, the facts, which are 
admitted by the two parties, as the foundations of their 
respective systems, are not the same ; nor is the method 
of ascertaining what facts really exist, the same. Now 
it is very natural for us to suppose, that the habits of 
thinking, and feeling, and judging, which have led men to 
embrace the Unitarian creed in regard to this subject, 
will give them but a poor opinion of our arguments. If 
we were exactly in their case, we presume our judg- 
ment would be like theirs. Did not our own experi- 
ence, — did not a faithful comparison of our heart and 



8 



life with the rule of duty, fully convince us of the fact* 
that our own nature is the subject of an original, deep- 
rooted corruption ; no external evidence could easily in- 
duce us to believe the fact in relation to others. 

It may be asked then, what good I hope to accom- 
plish by pursuing this controversy ? One good purpose, 
perhaps the principal one, which I hope to effect, is, to 
satisfy the serious friends of orthodoxy, that, after all 
the attacks which have been made upon their reli- 
gion, it rests on an immoveable basis ; that it has as 
much solid argument to support it, as they have ever 
supposed. I hope also to convince those who, not being 
yet settled in their belief, are candidly inquiring, what is 
truth, that the system of orthodoxy, at least in its prin- 
cipal features, so far corresponds with the word of God, 
and with sound experience, and that its moral tendency 
is in so high a degree salutary, that they ought to make 
many a serious pause, before they reject it. And finally, 
I should be glad to do something towards convincing can- 
did Unitarians of that, which has indeed always been suf- 
ficiently proved, that those who embrace the scheme of 
orthodoxy, do not necessarily resign all claims to manly 
strength of understanding, nor show themselves enemies 
to freedom and fairness of investigation. 

There are many passages, of a taking plausibility, in 
Dr. Ware's Letters, against which a charge of incor- 
rectness might easily be sustained, but which, as they 
relate to matters of small consequence in the controver- 
sy, I shall pass over with little or no attention. I say 
this to guard my readers against supposing, that my si- 
lence on any part of the Letters is to be interpreted as 
a sign of approbation. My purpose is to fix on the main 
points of the controversy, and to dwell upon those argu- 
ments, on which all who will bring themselves to patient 



9 



and thorough inquiry, must lay the greatest stress. If 
we can defend the general principles which have gov- 
erned our reasoning ; if we can, by legitimate arguments, 
support the chief doctrines of our system, and vindicate 
them from the chief objections of opposers, the work is 
done. Let the strength of the foundation be made to 
appear, and we shall not doubt the building will stand. 
And as to the scheme which we feel it to be our duty 
to oppose, — if we can succeed in taking away its foun- 
dation, we shall deem it sufficient, without either mak- 
ing a violent attack upon the superstructure to hasten 
its fall, or standing by to exult in its ruins. 



CHAPTER I. 

To prepare the way for an useful investigation of 
the subject of human depravity, I shall present in one 
connected view the opinions which Dr. Ware has ad- 
vanced in different parts of his third Letter. 

" I insist," he says, " that the account usually given 
of human wickedness is exaggerated." — " Men are not 
the mere brutes and fiends it would make them. There 
is much good as well as evil in the human character;" 
(meaning the natural character.) " As much as there 
is of wickedness and vice, there is far more of virtue and 
goodness." — "If we take a fair and full view, we shall find 
that in by far the greatest part of human beings, the 
just, and kind, and benevolent dispositions prevail beyond 
measure over the opposite ; and that even in the worst 
men, good feelings and principles are predominant, and 
they probably perform in the course of their lives many 
more good than bad actions ; as the greatest liar does, 
by the constitution of his nature, doubtless speak many 



10 



truths to every lie he utters." — " Man is by nature — or as 
he is born into the world, innocent and pure ; free from 
all moral corruption, as well as destitute of all positive 
holiness ; and until he has formed a character either 
good or bad, an object of the divine complacency and fa- 
vour." — 6< He is by nature no more inclined to vice than 
to virtue." — " In early life, we see no proofs of deprav- 
ity, of malignity, of inclination to evil in preference to 
good." — " What I have stated I am persuaded is the gen- 
eral character, until the disposition and tendency of na- 
ture has been changed by education, example, and cir- 
cumstances." — " 1 know not a single mark of early de- 
pravity common to children in general, which may not 
be fairly traced to causes which imply no degree of de- 
pravity, and no fault of character or disposition." — " No 
man, I am persuaded, was ever led by personal observa- 
tion and experience to the thought of an original deprav- 
ity of human nature." — " Young children," (he means in 
their natural state,) " are what men are to become by 
regeneration." — " Those now born into the world in 
christian lands, are, as the Ephesians were after their 
conversion to Christianity, saved by the grace of God, 
quickened, raised from the dead, made nigh by the blood of 
Christ, fellow citizens with the saints, of the household of 
God" — " All this language was applied to the Ephesians 
universally after their conversion, and all of it is as ap- 
plicable universally now to those who are Christians by 
birth, as distinguished from those who are heathen by 
birth." 

The scheme more briefly is this. Man is born into 
the world free from corruption of nature, or pro- 
pensity to evil. We see no proofs of depravity in 
childhood, no proofs of inclination to evil rather than 
good. All who are now born into the world in Christian 



11 



lands are saints, saved by grace, as the converted Ephe- 
sians were. Every mark of depravity common to child- 
ren may be traced to causes which imply no depravity 
at all. Even in the worst of men good feelings and 
principles are predominant. 

It may be useless for me to stop here to express the 
astonishment that good men must generally feel, at such 
a description of the human character. For myself, while 
I have the Bible, and my own heart, and the world be- 
fore my eyes, it is as impossible for me to admit the 
truth of the system above stated, as the truth of a 
system of philosophy which denies the principle of 
gravitation ; and for the same reason. 

Dr. Ware says he is persuaded, that "no man was ever 
led by personal observation or experience to the thought 
of an original depravity of human nature." I have no 
doubt he has such a persuasion ; but it is a little 
remarkable that he should have it, when by conversing 
either with authors, or with living Christians, he might 
so easily have discovered its contrariety to fact. Thou- 
sands and millions of enlightened Christians have declar- 
ed, and multitudes of them in writing, that personal ob- 
servation and experience have led them to believe in 
the moral depravation of man, or in his native propen- 
sity to evil. They have said it when they have had no 
motive to say it, but the strength of their own conviction. 
They have said it in their most solemn devotions ; and 
they have said it most frequently, and felt it most deep- 
ly, when the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in 
the face of Jesus Christ has shone in their hearts with the 
greatest clearness. And I will add what has been re- 
marked by many writers, that those who have most 
carefully studied human nature, even among pagans, have 
acknowledged, and that in very strong terms, an inward 



12 



depravation and corruption of man, rendering the mind 
averse to good and inclining it to evil. 

In reflecting on this subject, I am led to inquire how 
it can be accounted for, that any man of sober judgment 
should entertain such views respecting the human char- 
acter. Now so far as reasoning is concerned, I am sat- 
isfied, that the principal errour in the scheme of Unita- 
rians and Pelagians generally, lies in this, that they judge 
of marts character by a wrong standard. This contro- 
versy respects man, not as an animal or intellectual be- 
ing, nor as a member of domestic or civil society, but as 
a subject of God's moral government. Viewed in this 
light, he is required to conform to the moral law. This 
is the only rule of duty, the only standard of right feel- 
ing and right action. If we would know whether any 
subject of God's moral government is holy or sinful, or 
in what degree he is so, we must compare his moral 
character with the divine law. So far as he is conform- 
ed to that law, he is holy. So far as he is not conform- 
ed, he is sinful. And as we are taught, that love to God 
and love to man is the sum of what the law requires; 
it is perfectly safe, and often very convenient in our rea- 
soning, to make use of this summary of the law, as stand- 
ing for the whole. This then being our rule of judg- 
ment, what will be our conclusion respecting the moral 
character exhibited by human beings in early life ? Let 
the inquiry relate to the first character they exhibit, as 
moral agents ; so that we may not unnecessarily perplex 
the subject, at the outset, by looking after the moral af- 
fections or actions of men, either before they are moral 
agents, or before the divine commands can be applied 
to them. Is it the general character of men, that, 
as soon as the divine law is declared to them, they are 
disposed cordially to obey it ? We will not so shape 



13 



the inquiry, that it shall relate merely to exemption from 
sin. The real question is, whether holy love to God 
and man is the first moral affection which human be- 
ings generally exercise, after they become moral agents 
and are expressly informed what God requires of them. 
Keeping this point distinctly in view, let us now proceed 
to examine 

The reasoning by which Dr. Ware supports his opin- 
ion respecting the human character. 

The reasoning of Dr. Ware on this subject is indeed 
plausible, being founded upon those natural qualities of 
the youthful mind, which are honoured with the names 
of virtue, and universally regarded as amiable and use- 
ful. He says, " innocence, simplicity, and purity are the 
characteristics of early life." — 44 Veracity, kindness, good- 
will, flow from the natural feelings." — " How early does 
the infant discover affection, attachment, gratitude to 
those from whom it receives kindness." These are 
charming names, and I am very sensible that charming 
qualities of human nature are denoted by them. And 
charming too are the complexion and features of a 
beautiful child, the sprightliness of its temper, and the 
activity of its limbs. But do any or all of these consti- 
tute conformity to the moral law ? Do they render a 
child holy? 

But Dr. Ware, with a view to consistency, will pro- 
bably say, he does not mention the lovely qualities which 
are characteristic of early life, as a proof of moral virtue, 
or holiness, because the infant child has not yet actually 
formed a character, either good or bad, and so is nei- 
ther holy nor unholy. But although this would have an 
appearance of consistency in one respect, it would, in 
another respect, involve the writer in a great inconsis- 
tency. For if this is his meaning, how is it possible to 
3 



14 



make his remarks, p. 26, apposite to his subject ? His 
subject is man's moral character. He had just be- 
fore been charging the Orthodox with giving an exagge- 
rated description of human nature, inasmuch as they do 
not take proper notice of what is " virtuous, and kind, and 
amiable, and good ;" — words all denoting moral quali- 
ties. After thus distinctly bringing forward his subject* 
that is, human nature in respect to its moral qualities, he 
says,"our most correct ideas of human nature will be drawn 
from the characteristics of infancy, and the earliest indi- 
cations of disposition, tendency, and character in the in- 
fant mind." Forgetting what he ventures to say in 
other places, that men by their natural birth receive no 
moral character, and have none, before they are born 
again, he here speaks of the indications of character in 
the infant mind. 

Let us give this language a fair examination, and see 
whether any sense whatever that can be put upon it, 
will make the writer who uses it consistent with him- 
self. — When he speaks of the indications of character in 
the infant mind, I ask what character is meant ? Is it 
the character which belongs to man, as a moral agent, 
or in relation to a moral law ? Then it would seem the 
infant mind has such a character, and that character 
must be either good or bad, holy or unholy ; which 
would be contrary to Dr. Ware's statements, p. 20, 41, 
and elsewhere. But if he does not mean the moral 
character of man, or his character as a moral agent ; 
then his observations, p. 26, do not relate at all to the 
subject of controversy, For the only point at issue is, 
what is man's nature or character, as a moral agent, 
and in relation to a moral law ? I ask then again, has 
the infant really a character in this respect ? If so, 
that character must be either holy or unholy ; and then 



15 



what becomes of Dr. Ware's favourite position, that in- 
fants are both free from moral corruption and destitute 
of holiness, and that they have no moral character, 
either good or bad, before they are born again? On 
the other hand, if it is a fact, as he maintains, that in- 
fants have no moral character; then the characteris- 
tics of infancy which he enumerates, p. 26, can nowise re- 
late to moral character, i. e. they can nowise relate to 
the subject under consideration ; and so far as this sub- 
ject is concerned, he might just as well mention a fair 
complexion or beautiful countenance, as 64 innocence, 
simplicity, and purity." 

It may, however, be said, that 44 the characteristics 
of infancy, and the earliest indications of disposition, ten- 
dency, and character in the infant mind," though the in- 
fant mind does not yet possess a moral character, may 
still help us in some other way, to " correct ideas of hu- 
man nature." Dr. Ware will not say that these charac- 
teristics of infancy prove the nature of man to be holy by 
proving that holiness really belongs to the infant's mind ; 
for, as remarked before, this would be contrary to one 
of his main points. How then does his reasoning stand ? 
Does he mean to say, that those things, which are char- 
acteristics of human nature at a period when moral 
character does not exist, that is, that those properties of 
infancy which cannot be indications of any moral charac- 
ter at the time, are true indications of that moral charac- 
ter which subsequently exists ? But this again would 
involve his reasoning in difficulty, because, according to 
his views, mankind after becoming moral agents, are not 
thus innocent, and pure, and free from inclination to sin. 

But as I wish to do full justice to my opponent, and 
as far possible to give to his words the very sense which 
he meant to express, I must say, that his language and 



16 



his reasoning plainly imply, that human beings, at that 
period of infancy to which he refers, do really possess a 
moral character. What he has written in different pla- 
ces, taken together, evidently show that this is his opin- 
ion. He says, p, 26, " we draw our most correct ideas 
of human nature from the characteristics of infancy, and 
from the earliest indications of disposition, tendency, and 
character in the infant mind." Among these character- 
istics of infancy, he mentions " innocence, simplicity, and 
purity ;" which he doubtless means we should under- 
stand to be moral qualities. And a little below, after 
speaking of an infant as an object of interest to those 
about it, he asks, " Would it be so if it appeared to pos- 
sess nothing good, and no tendency to good?" evident- 
ly implying that it does possess something good. In an- 
other place, he represents men as becoming " reasona- 
ble, accountable beings, by their natural birth." If they 
are accountable beings, they are moral agents, and must 
have moral dispositions. He says too, still more plainly, 
p. 31, that young children have a " good disposition;" 
" that they are what men become by regeneration ;" 
that they " are objects of the Saviour's complacency," 
and " proper objects of imitation." From these very 
plain, unequivocal declarations of Dr. Ware I cannot 
but infer what his real opinion is, namely, that by their 
natural birth men become moral, accountable beings, 
and have a moral disposition or character which is 
good ; good or holy in such a sense, as to entitle them 
to the Saviour's complacency, and make them heirs 
of his kingdom. I am compelled to think this is the 
position he would maintain, though in several places he 
seems to slide away to another side of his system, and 
asserts that men by nature have no moral character, 
and are equally distant from holiness and from sin, and 



17 



equally without any natural tendency to one or the 
other. 

Before proceeding to a direct examination of Dr. 
Ware's arguments in support of his opinion respecting 
human nature, I will make one remark. If my position, 
that men are by their birth morally corrupt is thought 
to be absurd, on account of their being incapable, at 
first, of possessing any character, good or bad ; the posi- 
tion of Dr. Ware is in this respect equally absurd. For 
if men, as they come into the world, — if infants, are ca- 
pable of being "pure" they are capable of being impure. 
If they are capable of having a good disposition, or 
" tendency to good," they are capable of a bad disposi- 
tion, or a tendency to evil. If they are capable of such 
a character as will render them "objects of divine com- 
placency," they are equally capable of such a charac- 
ter as will render them objects of divine displeasure. 
It is Dr. Ware's opinion, p. 21, that man is by nature as 
capable of vice as of virtue. I should hope therefore 
that neither he, nor any one who embraces his opinions, 
will ever again allege the incapacity of infants to be the 
subjects of moral corruption, as an objection against the 
doctrine of native depravity. 

When I say that many plain and unequivocal decla- 
rations of Dr. Ware and the general current of his rea- 
soning prove that he believes man by nature the sub- 
ject of real virtue or holiness, I would not willingly 
oblige myself to show, that he has nowhere written any 
thing contrary to this. For in commenting on John iii. 
3, 6, he does indeed represent that " men receive by their 
natural birth only human nature ; that they receive no 
moral character, but only the faculties and powers in 
the exercise of which a moral character is to be form- 
ed ; and that the formation of a moral character, (he 



18 



does not say whether good or bad,) introduces them in- 
to a new state of being, and may be called a new birth ; 
and in p. 42, he seems to think the implication of the 
passage is, " that men do not possess by birth that char- 
acter of personal holiness, which is necessary to their 
being Christians." It may be easier for Dr. Ware, than 
for me, to reconcile these representations with the pas- 
sages to which I have before referred. 

Let us now see, by what particular arguments he 
supports the opinion, that men are by nature not only 
free from moral corruption, but inclined to virtue. 

He first argues from the innocence, simplicity, and pw- 
rity of early life, and from the veracity, kindness, good-will, 
attachment and gratitude, which flow from the natural feel- 
ings of children. 

To guard against being imposed upon by names, let 
us here inquire what is that innocence, simplicity, purity, 
&c. which are in reality characteristic of the infant mind? 

The word innocence, when applied to men in regard 
to moral character, signifies freedom from moral defile- 
ment, or guilt. But when applied to other things, it 
commonly denotes that they are harmless, or free from 
a tendency to do hurt. In this sense a dove and a lamb 
are said to be innocent, if I mistake not, this is gener- 
ally the meaning of the word, when applied to infant 
children. It is in regard to this kind of innocence, that 
they are so often compared to lambs and doves. 

Simplicity, when applied to rational beings, properly 
signifies artlessness, freedom from cunning or deceit. 
Infants and young children may have simplicity in this 
sense, merely because they are incapable of subtilty or 
cunning, or because they have had no temptation to 
learn any deceitful arts. 

In what sense Dr. Ware uses the word purity it is 



19 



not easy for me to determine. If he uses it in that high 
moral sense, in which our Saviour uses it when he says, 
i; blessed are the pure in heart," and so means to assert 
as a general truth, that moral purity or holiness is a 
characteristic of early life ; I would not repeat in my 
reply what has already been suggested, as to the con- 
trariety of this to other representations in his Letters ; 
but would direct the reader's attention a moment to 
the shape which his reasoning assumes. 

He undertakes to prove the truth of a disputed doc- 
trine respecting human nature ; i. e. that man is not the 
subject of innate corruption ; and as a proof of this, he 
urges the purity which characterizes early life. Now 
if he uses the word purity as synonymous with holiness, 
he is chargeable with begging the question. But if he 
uses the word in an inferior sense, not including moral 
purity or holiness ; then how can it prove that man is 
not morally depraved ? But it may be he uses the word 
merely to denote freedom from particular forms of vice 
which show themselves in the world ; or he may use it 
comparatively, and mean only that children are not yet 
tainted with those gross iniquities to which they are af- 
terwards exposed. To either of these views of the sub- 
ject we should fully agree. 

And what are we to suppose Dr. Ware means by 
the attachment, the kindness, the gratitude, which show 
themselves in little children? Does he mean any thing 
which has the nature of moral virtue or holiness? If so, 
his reasoning is faulty in the same way as before. But 
if he does not consider the attachment and gratitude, 
which are characteristics of infancy, and which, accord- 
ing to several passages in his Letters, precede the form- 
ation of any moral character, as having a moral nature ; 
then I think he must regard them much in the same 



20 



light, as he would those natural instincts, appetites and 
passions, the existence and exercise of which are not at 
all connected with moral character, and imply neither 
holiness nor sin. 

We see now how the argument stands, and are pre- 
pared to examine how forcible and conclusive it is. 
The abovementioned characteristics of the infant 
mind are insisted upon, as a proof, and a most im- 
portant proof, that man is by nature free from moral 
depravity. I maintain, that they do not prove it. 

I say, first, what several passages in Dr. Ware's Let- 
ters will bear me out in saying, that none of " the char- 
acteristics of infancy," none of those things which kt flow 
from the natural feelings," can, in reality, be of the na- 
ture of moral virtue, and so none of them can make 
known the moral disposition or character of the mind, 
as the fruit makes known the tree. Take the inno- 
cence, the attachment, the gratitude, and other obvious 
characteristics of little children, just as they are. What 
do they prove, as to moral character ? Nothing. They 
neither prove the existence of holiness, nor freedom from 
sin. If you would have conclusive evidence of this, look 
at the numberless instances, in which characteristics of 
the same nature, and often higher in degree, are found 
actually to exist in those, who live in the violation of 
the first and great command. Do we not often find 
youth, especially in well educated families, possessed of 
all those amiable qualities, which Dr. Ware mentions as 
proofs of freedom from moral evil ? Do we not see a 
sweetness and tenderness of disposition, which keep them 
at the greatest distance from doing any thing to injure 
a fellow creature ? And do we not see too either a 
power of conscience, or a delicate sense of what is de- 
cent and honourable, which leads them to abhor every 



21 



open vice ? This is called innocence. But is not inno- 
cence of this sort often associated with forge tfulness of 
God, and the neglect of all the peculiar duties of reli- 
gion ? Let multitudes, blooming in all the attractive 
loveliness of youthful innocence, measure their moral af- 
fections and character by that holy law, in which God 
asserts his rightful claims, requiring them to love him 
with all the heart, and to worship him in spirit and in 
truth; and will they not find themselves guilty before 
God, and be compelled to say, as the Apostle did, " I 
was alive without the law once ; but when the com- 
mandment came, sin revived, and I died ?" In the la- 
mentable instances of this kind, which constantly occur, 
we see that what is called youthful innocence actually 
consists with that alienation of heart from God, which 
is treated in the Scriptures, as the greatest of sins, and* 
indeed as the foundation and sum of all moral evil. How 
then can Dr. Ware make it an evidence of freedom from 
moral evil ? If it may consist with moral evil in youth, why 
not in childhood ? But the argument is stronger than this. 
If what is called innocence actually consists with a high 
degree of moral evil in youth ; much more may it con- 
sist with a smaller degree of the same in early child- 
hood. 

I reason in the same way respecting the other 
characteristics of early life, mentioned by Dr. Ware. 
How does the "simplicity" or artlessness of children 
prove, that they are not morally corrupt ? They may 
be simple, unsuspicious, and artless, because they have 
had no opportunities or temptations to become other- 
wise. They may have what is sometimes denominated 
purity ; that is, they may be free from the contamination 
of those vices, which are stamped with a visible and dis- 
graceful grossness, because they have not been expos- 
4 



22 



ed to that contamination, or because a regard to 
reputation, or the power of conscience has been a 
salutary restraint ; and yet divine truth may decide, that 
" they have not the love of God in their hearts." Nor 
is that disposition to speak the truth, which appears in 
children, any proof that they are free from depravity. 
They may speak the truth, because it is the way to ob- 
tain the gratification of their desires. When they are 
hungry, they may speak the truth, and say, we are hun- 
gry, because it is the way to get food. Whatever may 
be their wants, they may speak the truth, and tell their 
friends what their wants are, because this is the way to 
get a supply. We well know that honesty is the best 
policy ; and children may begin to learn this, while very 
young. But does speaking the truth from any such 
principle prove that they are not depraved ? Dr. Ware 
supplies us with a very satisfactory answer. " The great- 
est liar," he says, "does by the constitution of his nature, 
doubtless speak many truths to every lie he utters." 
He is the greatest liar; and this surely is saying that he 
is the subject of no ordinary degree of depravity. But 
in perfect consistency with all this depravity, he finds 
motives to speak many truths to one lie. Since then 
there are so many motives to speak the truth in those 
who are morally depraved, and since a prevailing habit 
of speaking the truth does, in the case mentioned by 
Dr. Ware, consist with that shocking degree of deprav- 
ity which is found in the greatest liar ; it is perfectly 
plain, that merely speaking the truth can never prove 
either men or children to be free from depravity. 

" How early," says Dr. Ware, " does the infant dis- 
cover affection, attachment, and gratitude to those from 
whom it receives kindness !" If, as he thinks, this is an 
evidence of freedom from sin in children, why not in 



23 



men ? But on this point, he who knew what was in man, 
guards us against mistake. " If ye love them who love 
you, what reward have ye ? Do not even the publican? 
the same ?" 

The amiable characteristics of early life are made 
so important a topic of argument by Dr. Ware, that it 
may be proper to follow him a little farther. What he 
says p. 28, as to the original freedom of children from 
cruelty, their tenderness, compassion &c. is, I doubt not, 
generally correct. I allow, that children do not natural- 
ly take pleasure in giving pain to insects, or any other 
sensitive beings, and that, when they do mischief, it is 
not generally from the love of mischief, as the real mo- 
tive, but from the love of action and strong excite r^ent, 
or some other similar cause. But what does this prove, 
as to the existence of depravity ? Men, as well as chil- 
dren, and men who live without God, who disregard the 
obligations of his law, and exhibit a character at the ut- 
most distance from holiness, may still have no disposition 
to cruelty, but may be tender, sympathetic, pitiful. But 
can this prove that they are free from moral depravity? 
No more than speaking the truth can prove " the greatest 
liar" free from depravity. 

In regard to all the particulars above noticed, the 
plain truth is, that, in order to qualify human beings for 
the state in which they are destined to live, and for the 
relations they are to sustain, God has given them a va- 
riety of natural appetites and natural affections, which, 
though capable of being made auxiliaries to virtue, and 
conducive to the ends of benevolence, have not, in them- 
selves, any thing of the nature of holiness, but are per- 
fectly distinct from it, and may be cultivated to a high 
degree in those, in whom moral principle is prostrated. 
The infidel may have them all ; and so may the man 



24 



who idolizes the world; and so may the profane swear- 
er, the duellist, and the ambitious conqueror. This is 
the case with all the lovely characteristics of early life, 
which Dr. Ware makes so prominent in his delineation 
of human nature. Be it so that his delineation is 
just, — that human beings in early life, and in many instan- 
ces afterwards, do possess all the sweetness of the nat- 
ural affections. It does not follow from this, that either 
children or men are free from moral depravity. The 
natural affections, which in a considerable degree show 
themselves even in irrational animals, are indeed not on- 
ly blameless, but amiable and useful ; and forever to be 
admired is the wisdom and the goodness of that Being, 
who has endued us with them. And any one who should 
assert these natural affections to be any part of human 
depravity, or any indication of a depraved nature, would 
mistake as grossly, as if he should assert a man's senses 
or limbs to be a part of depravity. But no less obvious 
is the mistake of the man, who considers them as a proof 
of freedom from depravity. They prove neither the 
one nor the other. Their existence and operation, sim- 
ply considered, are never made the subject of divine 
legislation ; though the divine law directs how they are 
to be used, and to what ends they are to be made sub- 
servient. It is only in this last view, that they assume a 
moral aspect. 

The conclusion, to which I wish to conduct my rea- 
ders on this subject, results directly, it will be observed, 
from a matter of fact, with which we are familiarly ac- 
quainted. We know by experience and observation, 
that the natural affections, sympathies and instincts of 
man really exist and are active in those who are morally 
depraved. And although Scripture and observation 
unite in teaching, that there are some forms or degrees 



25 



of moral evil, which generally destroy natural affection ; 
it is obvious that other forms and degrees of it do not. 
From the actual appearances of human nature, no one 
could ever suppose, that the amiable qualities which 
have been mentioned as belonging to men, whether old 
or young, have any necessary connexion with moral 
character. And certainly no one can suppose this, who 
makes the divine law the standard of moral character. 
What is called natural affection neither constitutes that 
which the law requires, nor shows the absence of that 
which it forbids. 

I have dwelt so long upon this particular point, be- 
cause it is in reality of great consequence, and because 
it is one which has occasioned, and is still likely to occa- 
sion a variety of mistakes, both theoretic and practi- 
cal. 

Dr. Ware remarks, p. 27, that children are general- 
ly simple and unsuspicious, " until the disposition and 
tendency of nature has been changed by education, ex- 
ample, and circumstances." Now I very much doubt 
whether the possession of a character opposite to the 
simplicity and unsuspiciousness of children, implies any 
essential " change in the disposition or tendency of na- 
ture." Because it is easy enough to account for it, that 
a child or youth, who is now simple and unsuspicious, 
because he has not been versed in the subtle and impos- 
ing arts of life, and has never been in circumstances which 
have tempted him to learn those arts, and so has never 
had the latent properties of his own nature brought in- 
to action, or been exposed to suffering from the deceit 
and wickedness of others, should afterwards become 
artful and false in his practices, and suspicious in his 
temper, without any radical change. The natural fac- 
ulties and dispositions of the mind admit of an endless 



26 



variety of modifications. Difference of animal tempera- 
ment and of external circumstances may originate innu- 
merable differences in men's visible conduct, and in the 
aspect of their character, while their intellectual facul- 
ties and moral dispositions are substantially alike. 

Secondly. Dr. Ware attempts to prove his doctrine 
respecting human nature by the following argument ; p. 
26. " How universally is the infant an object of inter- 
est to those about it ! W ould it be so, if it manifested 
such tokens, as the Orthodox doctrine of depravity sup- 
poses, of a disposition and tendency wholly directed to 
evil, and appeared to possess nothing good, and no ten- 
dency to good ?" 

In replying to this reasoning, I would refer to the 
representations, which Dr. Ware has repeatedly made, 
of the state of infancy. He says, that men at first are 
not the subjects of either moral good or evil, and have 
no disposition to the one more than the other. And he 
puts the same thing in a different form, when he says, 
p. 41, " that men by their natural birth receive no mor- 
al character, and have none before they are born 
again." Now take children in the state in which Dr. 
Ware here represents them to be ; i. e. before they 
have any moral character or any inclination to good or 
evil. According to this representation, they really " ap- 
pear to possess nothing good, and no tendency to good ;" 
of course, if Dr. Ware reasons correctly, they cannot be 
" the objects of interest to those about them." 

But although this conclusion seems to follow from 
our Author's remarks, taken together ; I am by no 
means convinced of its correctness. Is there nothing in 
children, viewed as subjects of depravity, which can ren- 
der them objects of interest to those about them? Does 
it excite no interest in us, to look upon those who are 



27 



possessed of so many faculties, and so many engaging 
characteristics, which may render them amiable and 
usefel in human society ? But there is a subject of 
higher interest still, which Dr. Ware, at the time of 
writing p. 26, seems wholly to have overlooked. Little 
children, though morally corrupt, have immortal souls, 
and are capable of endless happiness, or misery. And 
beside this, they are placed under a dispensation of 
mercy, and may become children of God, and heirs of 
his kingdom, " to the praise of the glory of his grace." 
Are not these faculties, these circumstances, and these 
prospects sufficient to render children interesting ob- 
jects ? Nay, does not the very fact, that they are sub- 
jects of moral corruption, and exposed to a state of irre- 
coverable ruin, render them objects of a still deeper in- 
terest ? Were not the unbelieving Jews, and the cor- 
rupt, idolatrous gentiles interesting objects to an apos- 
tle ? Is it not the very corruption, guilt, and wretched- 
ness of unconverted sinners, that excites such compassion 
towards them in the hearts of Christians ? And how 
was it with our blessed Saviour ? Did not he feel a 
most sincere, lively interest in those who were lost, and 
because they were lost ? And have not men, dead in 
trespasses and sins, been objects of the highest inter- 
est to their merciful Creator ? 

Thirdly. Another argument of Dr. Ware in sup- 
port of his theory is thus stated. " The doctrine of de- 
pravity is repulsive. The mind naturally revolts at it. 
It seems at first, to all men universally, to be inconsistent 
with the divine perfection. But the first impression is 
made upon us by the nature which God has given us ; 
and I think we should be'slow to believe that a nature, 
thus given to all, is intended to mislead, and actually 
does mislead all, on so important a subject." p. 22. 



28 



Here let it be remembered, that the question in con- 
troversy between the two parties, is, whether the first 
moral feelings of man are right. The argument of Dr. 
Ware, just stated, assumes that they are right, and so is 
another instance of taking for granted the point in de- 
bate. Admit the doctrine of depravity to be true, and 
the fact of its being repulsive to the natural feelings of 
men is easily accounted for, from the depravity itself. It 
is surely no uncommon thing for the feelings of wicked 
men to revolt at a faithful representation of the vileness 
of their character, and the greatness of their ill-desert, 
especially if that representation comes clothed with au- 
thority. Those feelings, which render the doctrine of 
man's sinfulness repulsive, are, in our apprehension, a 
part of his sinfulness. If he has a spirit of pride and 
self-complacency; a doctrine, which tends to humble 
pride, and to oppose the spirit of self-complacency, will 
of course be repulsive. But this is not a solitary case. 
The feelings of man revolt at the strict and holy de- 
mands of the law. They equally revolt at the high re- 
quisitions of the gospel.' The feelings of a very amia- 
ble youth revolted at the command of Christ, to " sell 
all that he had and give to the poor." Was the fault in 
the command, or in his feelings ? Does not the New Tes- 
tament account for that disgust and enmity of man which 
the Christian religion has to encounter, by the fact that 
he is sinful ? And does not the self-righteous, self-ex- 
alting spirit, which lurks in man's heart, manifestly tend 
to give a repulsiveness to any doctrine, or any religion, 
which shows his character despoiled of its moral beauty, 
degraded and disgraced, and the object of God's disap- 
probation ? How can we for a moment think, that 
man's natural feelings are a proper test of what is true, 
and of what is consistent with the perfections of God, 



29 



when the Bible constantly directs us to a test, so ex- 
ceedingly different ? Let man be just what he is in his 
natural, unrenewed state, and it becomes an insepara- 
ble attribute of the religion of the cross, that it is of- 
fensive. 

The circumstance that " the scheme of total moral 
depravity, or of any original bias to evil rather than 
good, is something different from what we should ex- 
pect, and involves difficulty," is indeed, as Dr. Ware 
says, " a reason for yielding our assent with caution, and 
not without very satisfactory evidence." In this light 
we have viewed it ; and, according to this maxim, we 
have regulated our belief. The repulsiveness of the 
doctrine of depravity, and the natural reluctance to re- 
ceive it, which Dr. Ware justly states to be universal, 
and which the Orthodox have probably felt as strongly 
as others, would not surely have been overcome, as it 
has been, by evidence of ordinary clearness. 

Fourthly. Another argument, which Dr. Ware uses 
in support of his scheme, is derived from " a general 
view of the commands, precepts, exhortations, promises 
and threatenings of religion, and from the whole history 
of the divine dispensations to men." p. 29. 

We begin with the three first. What then do the 
divine commands, precepts, and exhortations show? 
They show what mankind ought to 6c, not what they are. 
Can Dr. Ware really think, what his argument seems to 
imply, that God's requiring men to be holy, proves that 
they already are holy ? His commands undoubtedly 
presuppose that those, to whom they are given, are 
moral agents ; of course, that they possess all the prop- 
erties, which are necessary to constitute them proper 
subjects of law. But is freedom from moral corruption 
essential to moral agency ? If so, then as soon as men 
5 



30 



become sinners, they cease to be moral agents. And if 
they cease to be moral agents, they can be under no 
moral obligation. How then can God with propriety 
require them to repent, or in any respect to obey his 
law ? And what shall we say to those commands and 
exhortations of the Bible, which require men to be con- 
verted, to repent, to wash themselves from sin? As it 
is evident from the nature of these commands and ex- 
hortations, that they cannot be enjoined upon any but 
sinners ; and as Dr. Ware's argument implies that 
sinners cannot properly receive them ; it would 
seem, they ought to be blotted out. But if freedom 
from sin is not essential to moral agency ; in other 
words, if every thing essential to moral agency is found 
in those who are depraved ; and if nothing but what 
is essential to moral agency is required, in order that 
divine commands may be given to men ; then God's 
giving such commands proves nothing one way or the 
other, as to the existence of moral corruption. This, I 
think, is a sufficient answer to the argument of Dr. Ware, 
now under consideration, and to much of the reasoning 
of Whitby and Taylor on the same subject. 

Should any one here introduce the distinction which 
Dr. Ware makes in another place, between men's be- 
ing sinners, and their making themselves sinners ; between 
the character born with them, and that which is acquir- 
ed; I should endeavour to make it appear, that the dis- 
tinction has no concern with this subject. Sin is always 
of the same nature; and at whatever time, and in what- 
ever instances it exists, it neither destroys nor weakens 
the obligation of the divine commands. And this is the 
same as saying, that divine commands may be given to 
man, and may be obligatory upon him, notwithstanding 
his native depravity. And if so, then their being actu- 



31 



ally given cannot afford any argument against native de- 
pravity. If sin exists in any moral agent, it must have 
had a beginning. But whether it began at one time or 
another, is not a circumstance which affects its nature. 
Suppose it began to exist at a period after the com- 
mencement of moral agency ; it must have consisted 
radically in a wrong disposition or affection of heart. If 
an outward act is sinful, it is sinful because it is the expres- 
sion or effect of that wrong disposition. Suppose now that 
moral evil began to exist at the very commencement of 
moral agency ; still it must have consisted precisely in 
the same thing, that is, in a sinful affection or disposition. 
In this respect there is no difference. Do you say that, 
in the last case, the supposed disposition or affection 
could not have been really sinful, because there was no 
preceding exercise of moral agency which could be its 
cause? I answer, the same is true, in case moral evil is 
supposed to begin at any subsequent period. It is per- 
fectly clear, that the first sinful affection or disposition 
cannot be consequent upon any preceding act of moral 
agency, as its proper cause, unless a right act can be the 
cause of a wrong one ; or unless there can be a sinful 
act before the fast sinful act, and that sinful act, which is 
before the first, can be the cause of the first. But it 
surely needs no proof, that all the exercises of moral 
agency, which precede the first existence of moral evil, 
must be right* Whether therefore the beginning of sin- 
ful affection is coeval with the beginning of moral agency, 
or not, it cannot be derived from any faulty exercise of 
moral agency, which preceded. But if by men's making 
themselves sinners, Dr. W are means that they first be- 
come sinners by an act or exercise of theirs which pre- 
cedes their being sinful, and which of course cannot 
be sinful itself; this is the same as holding, that the first 



32 



existence of sin in man is derived from a sinless exercise^ 
as its cause. But who ever entertained so absurd an 
opinion as this ? 

But if by men's making themselves sinners, or be- 
coming sinners, Dr. Ware only means that, when they 
begin to sin, they exercise their intellectual and moral 
powers, free from coercion ; or that the particular sins 
they commit are voluntary, and that their sinful affec- 
tions are, in the most proper and perfect sense, their own ; 
then I say, this is all true of those who begin to be sin- 
ners, when they first begin to be moral agents. The 
supposition then of sin's commencing so early, is no more 
inconsistent with the commands of God, than the suppo- 
sition of its commencing subsequently. 

Let me say also, that the distinction, above referred 
to, between what is native or original in moral agents, 
and what is acquired, is one with which an unbiassed 
conscience is not likely to give itself any concern. Sure 
I am, that the divine law has nothing to do with it. The 
law requires moral agents to love God and man, that 
is, to be holy. If they are destitute of the holy affec- 
tion required, whether at the commencement of their 
moral agency, or afterwards, the law regards them as 
transgressors. Conscience regards them in the same 
light. If I look into my heart, and find that I have 
had a disposition or affection contrary to what the 
law requires, my conscience condemns me for it. If 
I have, had that sinful disposition for a long time, 
I feel myself to be so much the more criminal. And 
if I began to exercise that disposition as soon as I 
began to be a moral agent, and have exercised it ever 
since, I must be regarded by myself, and by others, 
as criminal in a very high degree. Present before a 
court of justice, and before the world, a man, who has 



33 



always shown a lying, malicious, thievish disposition, from 
the time when he was first capable of showing any dis- 
position ; would he not be regarded with deep abhor- 
rence, and sentenced with unsparing severity ? It is evi- 
dent then, that common sense, not trammelled by false 
reasoning, unites with the word of God in condemning 
sinful affection, whatever may be the date of its origin. 
Whether it is the first affection of moral agents, or has 
its commencement afterwards, it is equally their own. 
In either case, they are free and unconstrained in exer- 
cising it, and possess every thing necessary to render 
them proper subjects of law, and capable of obedience. 

This is a subject on which most writers of the Ar- 
minian school have, in my apprehension, fallen into a 
variety of palpable mistakes. And their mistakes, so far 
as I am able to judge, have arisen from a wrong notion 
of moral agency ; and their wrong notion of moral agen- 
cy, from their not attending, with sufficient care, to the 
properties which the mind actually exhibits, and the 
laws according to which its operations are, and always 
must be regulated. 

Dr. Ware argues against the doctrine of native de- 
pravity, from "the promises and threatenings of religion." 
But what do these prove ? If God promises eternal life 
to those who obey the law, or to those who repent, and 
believe the gospel, and threatens destruction to those 
who do not ; does this prove that men are by nature 
free from moral depravity ? Are not such promises and 
threats just and proper in relation to those who are nat- 
urally depraved ? If not, it must be because natural de- 
pravity destroys moral agency. But we have seen 
above, that if depravity, beginning at any time, is con- 
sistent with moral agency ; it is so, if it begins when 
moral agency begins. And if depravity, beginning so 



34 



early, may be consistent with moral agency ; why may 
it not be consistent with " the promises and threatenings 
of religion ?" 

The last particular to be noticed under this head is, 
" the whole history of divine dispensations to men." 
This, our Author thinks, is an argument against the Or- 
thodox doctrine of depravity. I presume he means the 
history of God's goodness. The argument then would 
be, that God could not be supposed to show such kind- 
ness to men, if they were naturally depraved. But this ar- 
gument is at once confuted by the representations of Scrip- 
ture. " God maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on 
the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the un- 
just." Christ represents this as a prominent feature of 
the divine administration. God is a kind Father, a be- 
ing of infinite grace, and bestows favours which are 
wholly undeserved. Plainly then the divine dispensa- 
tions in the present state, how kind and beneficial soev- 
er they may be, cannot be urged as a proof, that men are 
" naturally innocent and pure." 

Fifthly. Dr. Ware alludes " to a great number of par- 
ticulars," mentioned in the Scriptures, " each of which 
separately," as he thinks, " seems to imply that mankind 
come into the world innocent and pure, the objects of 
the complacency of their Creator." p. 29, 30. He in- 
stances only in one, but that alone is, in his opinion, deci- 
sive of the question. He refers to the manner in which 
little children are spoken of by our Saviour, and by the 
Apostle. Matt. xix. 14. "Suffer little children to come 
unto me — for of such is the kingdom of heaven." 
"These," he says, "seem to have been infants, or at 
least very small children." And he adds ; " There is not 
the slightest intimation, that these children had become 
the subjects of any great moral change." Then comes 



35 



his conclusion. " But if they were depraved, destitute 
of holiness, &c. could our Saviour declare respecting 
them, "of such is the kingdom of God ?" 

It will doubtless occur to Dr. Ware, on a review of 
his Letters, that there is an appearance of a small in- 
consistency between this passage and some others. He 
tells us here, that infants^ or very small children, belong 
to the kingdom of God, without " becoming the subjects 
of any great moral change;" and just below it is impli- 
ed in his reasoning, that they are not " destitute of holi- 
ness." But in p. 20, he describes man in infancy as 
"destitute of all positive holiness." And p. 41, 42, 
he represents men by nature as " wanting that per- 
sonal holiness which is necessary to their becoming 
members of the kingdom of God," and as need- 
ing " a great moral change- — in order to their being fit 
members of that kingdom." Here, infants are destitute 
of personal holiness, and cannot belong to the kingdom 
of God without a great moral change ; but there, they 
belong to the kingdom of God as they come into the 
world, without that moral change. 

Let us now return to the reasoning of Dr. Ware from 
Matt. xix. 14. The question, which contains the point 
of his argument, is this : " If the children who were 
brought to our Saviour, were depraved, how could he 
declare respecting them, of such is the kingdom of 
God ?" I answer, the kingdom of God consists, and will 
forever consist of those, who have been sinners. All 
the members of that kingdom will unite in the song ; 
" Unto him who loved us and washed us from our sins 
in his own blood — be glory and dominion forever." So 
that their belonging, and being destined to belong to 
Christ's kingdom, proves nothing as to their native char- 
acter, except that it was such as to need spiritual wash- 



36 



ing, or a " great moral change." It is a complaint of the 
Pharisees, that Christ receives sinners ; and he declares 
it to be the great purpose of his coming into the world 
to seek and to save that which was lost ; to call sinners 
to repentance, and gather them into his kingdom. He is 
a Saviour from sin. We have no intimation of his being 
a Saviour of any except sinners. His whole office, as a 
Saviour, relates to sinners, — to sinners exclusively. How 
then does the fact, that, any persons, whether old or 
young, belong to his kingdom, prove that they are not 
by nature depraved, or that they are without sin ? 
Christ gave it as a reason, why little children should 
come, or be brought to him, that they belonged, or 
would belong to his kingdom. Now this reason was cer- 
tainly as strong, if they were depraved and sinful, as if 
they were innocent and pure. Their being sinful placed 
them upon the same general footing with all others, who 
are invited to come to Christ as a Saviour. If, because 
thev belonged to the kingdom of God, we conclude their 
nature was free from the pollution of sin, we must make 
the same conclusion respecting the nature of others who 
belong to that kingdom. And this perhaps we might do, 
had not the Bible informed us of whom the kingdom 
will consist. 

Thus far I have admitted the passage to signify, that 
the children themselves belonged to the kingdom of God. 
But ftosenmuller, and many others, understand it as teach- 
ing, that the members of Christ's kingdom must be like 
little children, and so put it in the same class with the 
other texts, quoted by Dr. Ware ; Mark x. 14. 1 Cor. 
xiv. 20. " Unless ye be converted and become as little 
children, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of God." — 
44 In malice be ye children." 

We well know it to have been the practice of the 



37 



Prophets and Apostles, and especially of Christ, to make 
use of those objects, with which they were familiar, and 
often those which were present, to illustrate the divine 
perfections, the character and duty of men, and the gen- 
eral truths of religion ; which is only saying, that in their 
religious instructions they used familiar metaphors, simi- 
les, and comparisons. And it is an acknowledged prin- 
ciple of figurative language, that the object, from which 
a metaphor or simile is drawn, may not, in its own na- 
ture, or principal attributes, truly and exactly resemble 
that which is meant to be illustrated by it. The resem- 
blance may respect any one of the properties or circum- 
stances of that object, without the least reference to 
others. In the texts above quoted, Christians are lik- 
ened to little children. But can we infer from this, 
that children possess any moral excellence or goodness, 
like that excellence or goodness of Christians, which 
is meant to be set forth by the comparison? Chris- 
tians are also likened to sheep, lambs, doves. But do 
sheep, lambs, and doves possess moral excellence ? Sup- 
pose I should say, that the texts, which represent 
Christians as being like sheep, lambs, and doves, " most 
clearly imply, until turned from their obvious meaning," 
that those animals " are objects of the Saviour's com- 
placency and affection," and are " what men become by 
regeneration." Would not this argument be as conclu- 
sive, as Dr. Ware's ? If he can infer the moral purity of 
little children, from the circumstance, that Christians are 
compared to them ; I can infer the moral purity of lambs 
and doves from the same circumstance. To make this 
subject still clearer, look at the texts which represent the 
disciples of Christ as salt, light, and the branches of a 
vine. Do these texts imply that salt, light, or the branch- 
es of a vine, have any moral qualities like those, which 
6 



38 

these metaphors represent as belonging to Christ's dis- 
ciples ? Look at another case. Christ directs his Apos- 
tles to be not only as harmless as doves, but wise as ser- 
pents. Does the direction imply that serpents have any 
moral or intellectual qualities, like what he would see in 
his disciples ? Even the wisdom of the serpent, — what 
is it but a mischievous subtiity, which we regard with 
abhorrence and dread, and which, in its nature and ef- 
fects, is most unlike the wisdom from above ? But there 
is a stronger case. Christ described to his disciples the 
conduct of an unjust steward, who, from regard to his 
own interest, altered his master's accounts, and wickedly 
released his debtors from part of their obligations. This 
conduct of the steward Christ held up, as a proper ob- 
ject of imitation ; that is, he represented the conduct 
which his disciples ought to pursue, as being like the con- 
duct of a steward, chargeable with unjust and fraudulent 
practices. If it were necessary to go any farther, I would 
recite the passage, in which God is likened to an unjust 
judge, who, though destitute of humanity, was influenc- 
ed by the wearisome importunity of a poor widow, to 
grant her the assistance she craved. 

Now what is the natural conclusion from these, and 
other instances of metaphors, similes, and comparisons, 
but this ; that, in illustrating the truths of religion, the 
inspired writers lay hold on any object in the physical, 
animal, civil, or intellectual world, or any thing else, which 
is suited to the purpose of illustration ; that the partic- 
ular object from which a metaphor is taken, may not, 
in its nature or principal attributes, resemble that 
which is to be illustrated by it ; and that it is sufficient, 
if there is any one apparent attribute, relation, or cir- 
cumstance, which may serve as a foundation for the met- 
aphor, though all the other attributes of the object are 



39 



such, that they must be set aside, as utterly incompati- 
ble with the design of the metaphor. The properties 
or circumstances of any natural object may be made use 
of to illustrate things of a moral nature. For example ; 
wicked men are represented in Scripture as being like 
barren trees, dogs, swine, and serpents. Now from the 
nature of the discourse, common sense always determines 
what is the particular property, relation, or circumstance, 
which is the ground of the comparison ; as in the instan- 
ces just mentioned; we easily perceive what it is in bar- 
ren trees, in dogs, swine, and serpents, which is suited to 
illustrate the character of wicked men. Who ever sup- 
posed that, because these figures imply a likeness of 
some sort between the wicked men and the things by 
which they are represented, therefore, those things 
have a moral nature like the moral nature of Christians ? 
There is indeed something in barren trees, dogs, swine, 
and serpents, which aptly sets forth the character of the 
wicked ; and this is all that is meant by the figures. So 
in the case above mentioned, in which Christians are 
likened to sheep and doves. The mildness and harm- 
lessness of those animals aptly illustrate those proper- 
ties in Christians, which are expressed by the same names; 
though the former are merely natural or animal prop- 
erties ; the latter, moral, or spiritual. The same re- 
marks apply to those texts which represent Christians 
under the similitude of salt, light, and the branches of a 
vine. There is something in the useful qualities of salt 
and light, to which the useful character or influence of 
Christians may fitly be compared ; and there is some- 
thing in the dependence of the branches upon the vine, 
which fitly represents the dependence of Christians upon 
their Saviour. Nor is the illustration in these cases any 
the less striking or just, because salt, light, and the branch- 



40 



es of a vine, have only a physical nature, while the char* 
acter of Christians, which is likened to them, is moral or 
spiritual. Once more. Christians are represented as 
pilgrims, soldiers, and conquerors. But did any man ev- 
er interpret these figures as implying, that pilgrims, sol- 
diers, and conquerors are free from moral evil, and re- 
semble Christians in moral purity ? These last instan- 
ces show that there may be something even in depraved 
human beings, on account of which Christians may be 
likened to them. 

Now if such is the principle, which must govern 
us in the interpretation of all figurative language ; how 
utterly void of force is the favourite argument of Dr. 
Ware from the texts above recited ? Because it is 
said that, in order to be Christians and enter into the 
kingdom of heaven, we must become as little children, 
he argues that children have a moral virtue or good- 
ness of the same nature with the holiness of Chris- 
tians. Suppose now that our Saviour had taken a 
lamb, instead of a child, and had set the harmless, 
lovely creature in the midst of his disciples, and told 
them, they must become like that lamb; would it 
have implied that the lamb had moral goodness, and 
was " what men become by regeneration ?" The plain 
truth is, that the amiable natural qualities, which dis- 
tinguish little children, and which, as we have seen, 
are perfectly consistent with the existence of depravi- 
ty, are made use of to illustrate the amiable moral 
qualities which ought to belong to Christians. The 
text 1 Cor. xiv. 20, is to receive the same construction. 
Christians are exhorted to show in their conduct a 
harmlessness and kindness like that, which is charac- 
teristic of children. The natural qualities of children 
are made to represent the moral virtues of Chris- 



41 



tians ; precisely on the same principle, that the kind 
and tender care, which the hen extends towards her 
young, is made to illustrate the tender mercy of Christ 
towards sinners. 

We have now attended to the chief arguments 
which Dr. Ware has offered, as the support of his 
theory of human nature. The reader, after a thorough 
examination, will judge whether they are conclusive, 
and to what they really amount. 



CHAPTER II. 

In the foregoing chapter, I have made it appear, 
as I think, that those amiable qualities, which are, 
really characteristic of early life, and which Dr. Ware 
has mentioned as indications of moral purity, are in 
fact of such a nature, that they may consist, and in 
subsequent life often do consist with depravity, and 
so cannot afford any argument at all against the com- 
mon Orthodox doctrine. 

But why does Dr. Ware, in his attempt to show 
what human nature is, confine his attention to a part 
of those things which are characteristics of early life ? 
How can he think it just, to dwell upon those things 
only, which are amiable and attractive, while he gives 
no weight to those of a contrary character ? Why es- 
pecially, does he make such an effort to explain all 
the appearances of folly and corruption in the youthful 
mind in such a manner, as to give no support to the 
common doctrine of the Christian church ? Does he 
find in this no evidence of being warped by a favourite 
theory ? He is " persuaded," as has been noticed be- 



42 



fore, " that no man was ever led by personal observa- 
tion and experience to the thought of an original corrup- 
tion of human nature." But how happens it that he 
has this persuasion, when the well known fact is, that 
sober, thinking men through the Christian world have 
generally been led by observation and experience, not 
only to think of an original depravity, but to believe it? 
I shall here give the testimony of a man, who had no 
tinge of melancholy or superstition, and who was as lit- 
tle inclined to judge severely or uncandidly on this sub- 
ject, as any man living. " I have been employed," he 
says, "in the education of children and youth more than 
thirty years, and have watched their conduct with no 
small attention and anxiety. Yet among the thousands 
of children, committed to my care, I cannot say with 
truth, that I have seen one, whose native character I 
had any reason to believe to be virtuous ; or whom I 
could conscientiously pronounce to be free from the evil 
attributes mentioned above ;" that is, disobedience, re- 
venge, selfishness, &c. # But I do not give this as the 
opinion of a single man. I hesitate not to say, that it 
has been the opinion of a great majority of enlightened 
Christians in all ages and countries. And might not Dr. 
Ware have found various passages of Scripture which 
announce the very truth I contend for ? Might he 
not have found a man of no less observation and 
judgment, than Solomon, declaring it as a general truth, 
that, " foolishness is bound in the heart of a child ?" 
Might he not have found that David's experience 
led him to the thought of an original, native de- 
pravity, when he made it a part of his humble confes- 
sion before God ; " Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and 
in sin did my mother conceive me ?" Might he not 

* Dr. Dwight'g Theology, Vol. 2, p. 28. 



43 



have found that Job's observation or experience led him 
to the thought of original depravity, when he said, 
" Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" and, 
" How can he be clean that is born of a woman?" And 
might he not have found God himself declaring, direct- 
ly, in his own name, that " the imagination of man's 
heart is evil from his youth ?" 

I have the unhappiness to differ entirely from Dr. 
Ware on this point, and am persuaded that no man, who 
is careful to make the law of God his rule of judgment, 
can avoid the conclusion above expressed. For just 
consider what are the real characteristics of childhood 
and youth, in relation to that law. I ask not now what 
are those amiable affections or instincts, which belong 
to domestic and social relations ; but what are the mor- 
al characteristics of children ; — not what we should sup- 
pose they must be, from the views we have entertained 
of God ; but what they are in fact. What are the 
real feelings and actions of children in regard to God's 
holy law ? Begin the examination of childhood at an 
early period. Begin at the period when moral agency 
begins ; and suppose moral agency begins earlier or lat- 
er, as you please ; and inquire for the disposition which 
children manifest, in respect to the divine commands. 
Do they show a heart to love God supremely, 
when they are two or three years old ? Is it said, 
they are not generally capable, at that age, of having 
any correct knowledge of God, or of their duty, and 
so are not capable of loving him ? Take then a 
later period. Follow them to the age of four, or five 
years, to six, or ten, till they have been instructed in re- 
ligion, and are capable of loving and worshipping God. 
Do they generally show a disposition to love and wor- 
ship God then ? When they first begin, by visible con- 



44 

duct, to exhibit the temper of their minds, as subjects 
of the divine law ; do they show signs of cheerful, holy 
obedience ? Does the observation of Christian parents 
and ministers teach them any thing like this ? Does not 
their observation rather confirm the truth of what the 
scriptures declare, as quoted above? Was there ever 
a man, who laboured in earnest to teach children the 
things of religion, and to induce them to keep the divine 
commands, who did not find their inclinations mighty ob- 
stacles to his success ? If children were uncorrupt and 
pure, they would, as soon as capable, show the proper 
signs of holiness. Children who are renewed early in 
life, manifest a desire after God, hatred and dread of 
sin, and delight in duty. But do not children in general 
show, at every period of childhood, that they have not 
the love of God in them ; that they dislike the duties of 
religion, and choose the ways of sin ? You may set be- 
fore them the most serious and tender considerations, 
and may succeed so far, as in some measure to gain their 
attention, and rouse their conscience. But you will find 
that their heart has a bias towards the pleasures of sin, 
which no consideration of duty or of happiness can over- 
come. With those who judge themselves by the law 
of God, is not this a matter of fact, a truth written as 
with a sun-beam ? The earliest period of childhood, to 
which their memory can extend, furnishes to their own 
minds abundant evidence of a disinclination to the du- 
ties and pleasures of religion, and a relish for the pleas- 
ures of sin. What is moral depravity, if this is not? I 
do not say that depravity, at first, exists in the high- 
est degree, and that children are at once ripe for the 
most atrocious deeds. I do not say that children are 
inclined to lie merely for the sake of lying, without any 
temptation. They may speak many truths to one false- 



45 



hood, as " the greatest liars" may. But we expect 
great liars will speak falsehood, when they have occa- 
sion to do it. Their telling lies now and then, when 
they have some bad ends to answer, may, as appears 
from the case which Dr. Ware mentions, render them 
highly criminal. So with children. They may 
generally be disposed, in the simplicity of their 
hearts, to speak the truth. But has not every one 
who has had the care of little children, found them 
inclined to lie when tempted to it ? Does it not 
require unremitting care and every possible effort, to 
guard them against the practice of lying, whenever they 
think it the way to exculpate themselves, or to secure 
any favourite gratification? And when a habit of lying 
is once formed in children, is it not found to be extreme- 
ly difficult to correct it ? The same might be said as 
to other tendencies of the youthful mind. When every 
thing goes smoothly with children, and all their wishes 
are gratified, they may exhibit a disposition quite pleas- 
ant and friendly. So may persons arrived at manhood, 
though really possessed of a contrary disposition. But 
how is it with little children, when their wishes are 
crossed, and when they are subjected to suffering ? How 
is it, when they are flattered, and when they are slight- 
ed? Do they not very early show signs of the same 
temper of mind, which we see exhibited in active life by 
the proud, the envious, the selfish, the wrathful, and the 
revengeful ? In short, if we find any thing in mankind 
at large, which furnishes proof of depravity ; we find it 
in little children; not indeed in the same form, or degree; 
for they are not capable of this. But we find what 
is of the same nature. And even as to form or degree; 
do not the pride, the selfishness, the ill will, the revenge, 

7 



46 



exhibited by little children, resemble the same evil pas- 
sions in a man, as much as their bodies or their minds 
resemble his ? They have the understanding, the 
bodily strength, the features, and all the attributes 
of a man, though in miniature. And who that watches 
the character of children, with the eye of a Christian 
or a philosopher, can have the least doubt, that they 
possess, in a correspondent degree, all the moral attri- 
butes, and especially the moral corruptions, which ap- 
pear among men ? As soon as they are capable, they show 
these corruptions by intelligible outward signs. And they 
show them in a manner perfectly agreeable to the state 
and circumstances of childhood. True, they do not show 
them as soon as they are born. Nor do they show a ra- 
tional mind, as soon as they are born. And yet who 
ever doubted that children naturally possess a rational 
mind ? Dr. Ware says that, " by their birth men 
become reasonable, accountable beings." But does 
a child actually show reason, as soon as he is born ? And 
would Dr. Ware consider a child really accountable, as 
soon as he is born ? But reason and accountableness 
universally belong to mankind ; and children begin early 
to show signs of being reasonable and accountable beings, 
and exhibit more and more evidence of it, till they come 
to the understanding of a man. Now I refer it to im- 
partial observers, to judge, whether children do not ex- 
hibit as clear signs of moral evil, as they do of reason ; 
and whether they do not begin to exhibit these signs as 
early as could be expected, allowing moral evil to be a 
native property of their minds ? Although they are by 
nature depraved ; still, in order that their depravity 
may be visibly acted out, they must not only be capable 
of showing it by outward signs, but must have occasion 
thus to show it. Now as soon as children have ability and 



47 



occasion to show their dispositions, they generally exhib- 
it as clear evidence of initial depravity, as of intelligence, 
The occasion may not be constant, nor very frequent ; 
any more than the occasion for actual falsehood among 
" the greatest liars." But this circumstance does not in 
either case affect the clearness of the evidence. 



CHAPTER III. 

Whether human depravity can in any proper sense 
be called native, innate, natural, or hereditary, is a ques- 
tion, which seems to call for more particular discussion. 
There are many pretences against the common doctrine, 
which ought to be exposed, and some difficulties attend- 
ing it which ought, if possible, to be cleared away. Dr. 
Ware allows that " all men are sinners," but says, they 
are so by habit, not by nature. All the wickedness of 
man is, in his view, perfectly consistent with his coming 
into being, innocent and pure. With a view to what he 
and others have advanced in opposition to the doctrine 
of native depravity, and to present the doctrine to oth- 
ers precisely in the light in which it has presented itself 
to my own mind, I shall allow myself in the free discus, 
sion which follows. 

My first inquiry respects the proper meaning and 
use of the words and phrases commonly employed in 
stating the doctrine ; such as native, innate, natural, born 
with a depraved nature, &c. To satisfy myself on this 
subject, I take a number of examples, in which the 
words and phrases are employed with undoubted pro- 
priety. 



48 

First example, Man has a natural disposition to so- 
ciety : or be has by nature a propensity to social life ; or 
he naturally possesses a social principle, or is naturally 
formed for society. Such phrases are frequent ; nor 
did I ever hear any objection against them. But what 
is the fact which these phrases denote ? Do children 
actually show a social principle, as soon as they are 
born ? Do they immediately give visible signs of social 
affection, or of that propensity which is the foundation 
of domestic and civil society? Is it not a long time, be- 
fore they become capable of expressing or exercising the 
social principle ? What then do we mean by its being 
natural to man, or his having it by nature, but that man 
is born with such a constitution, or in such a state, that if 
he is not turned aside from the real bent of his nature? 
he certainly will be a social being, or will be actually in- 
clined to live in society ; in other words, that his being 
disposed to choose society, rather than solitude, results 
directly from the original constitution or tendency of his 
mind ? If he choose a hermitage, he does violence to his 
nature ; he shows that there has been some jar in his 
constitution, some unnatural shock to his temper. 

Second example. Man is naturally pitiful He is born 
with a principle of sympathy, or compassion ; or pity is 
one of the natural, original principles of the human 
heart. These expressions, which are in common use, do 
not mean that pity begins to show itself, or even to be 
distinctly exercised, as soon as man is born ; but that it 
Uniformly results from his original constitution ; that it is 
the certain consequence of the state in which he is born, 
or the temper of mind which he possesses by his birth ; 
and that, in every case, it will in due time show itself, 
unless his nature is perverted. 

As a third example, I would mention what is com- 



49 



monly called natural affection ; by which is intended par 
ticularly the affection of parents for their offspring. 
Man is born with such a nature, or has such a tendency 
in his constitution, that, as soon as the relation exists, he 
feels the affection. However distant from his birth the 
time when it is first distinctly felt and acted out ; it is 
called natural, because with 'such, a nature or constitu- 
tion as his, unbroken and unperverted, he will certain- 
ly feel the affection, whenever he comes into the rela- 
tion. The affection implies no refinement upon his na- 
ture. It rises naturally or spontaneously, like the affec- 
tion which irrational animals show for their young. 

Fourth example. We speak of a man as having an 
original strength of mind, or liveliness of imagination, 
superiour to what others possess. This might not 
appear for many years. But it is at length evident, 
that the difference cannot be accounted for by difference 
of culture, and so must arise from difference of original 
constitution. On this account we call it native superiority. 
We say, a man was born a king, or was born a command- 
er ; because uniformly, from early life, he showed marks 
of an elevated character, or qualities which fitted him to 
command. We consider those qualities natural, because 
it is plain, that they are no more owing to his educa- 
tion, than the features of his countenance ; which may 
perhaps indicate, as clearly as the qualities of his mind, 
his high destination. Of another we say, that he was 
born an idiot ; that he had an original want of under- 
standing, or a natural defect in the structure of his mind ; 
because his idiotism cannot be. traced to any calamity 
which has befallen him since his birth, but is manifestly 
owing to the constitution of mind, with which he was 
born. In this case, we say his mental imbecility was 



I 



50 

natural to him ; though there might have been a con- 
siderable time after his birth, before it appeared. 

Thus too we say of Handel, that he had a native or 
inborn taste for music, or that he was born a musician ; 
because he showed that taste very early, and no influ- 
ence of education or example could account for the dif- 
ference, which existed between him and other men, in 
this respect. Milton, we say, had a native sublimity of 
mind and fruitfulness of invention, which qualified him to 
be a distinguished poet. 

Fifth example. We sometimes say of a bodily dis- 
ease, that it is native, or that it was born with a man ; be- 
cause it appears manifestly to result from the original con- 
stitution of his body, though the disease did not show itself 
for many years. It is often said, a man was born with a 
consumptive constitution, or with a state of body which 
tended to a consumption ; and it is deemed a matter of 
great importance in the medical art, to discover when 
this is the case. 

If another example were necessary, I might notice 
the manner in which we apply the words and phrases, 
now under consideration, to irrational animals ; as when 
we say, it is natural for serpents to bite ; it is the nature 
of birds, to fly; of lions, to be carniverous; of fishes, to 
swim. But the illustration has been pursued far enough 
to answer the purpose intended. 

I would not however proceed, without inquiring a 
little into the use of the word hereditary, in relation to 
these subjects. It is obviously suitable to speak of par- 
ticular properties of mind and of body as hereditary, when 
they can most satisfactorily be accounted for on the com- 
mon principle of a likeness between parents and children. 
There is a general resemblance which a child bears to 
his parents, as belonging to the same species ; and a par- 



51 



ticular resemblance which he bears to them, as individu- 
als. Observation shows that, in regard to the faculties 
and dispositions of the mind, as well as the structure 
of the body, parents universally transmit to their offspring 
a general resemblance, and frequently, a particular, indi- 
vidual resemblance. With respect to each of these, what 
is more common than to say, that children inherit it, or 
derive it from their parents ? Diseases are said to be 
hereditary in certain families, where they are observed 
to descend from generation to generation, and where, at 
the same time, they evidently result from something 
originally belonging to the constitution. There is, for 
example, an hereditary blindness and deafness ; an he- 
reditary firmness or weakness of bodily constitution ; an 
hereditary strength or imbecility of mind. A man in- 
herits a slowness or quickness of imagination, a quietness 
or irritability of temper, &c. Wherever there is an ob- 
vious resemblance between children and their parents 
with respect to any properties of body or mind, espe- 
cially if that resemblance has been the same for many 
generations, and is most easily accounted for on the com- 
mon principle, that children bear the likeness of their 
parents ; we hesitate not to say, those properties are 
hereditary. And some respectable writers have been 
led by the particular opinions they have held on the 
subject, to speak of piety in the same manner. Southey 
says, "Talents of no ordinary kind, as well as a devotion- 
al temper, were hereditary in the family of the Wesleys.'* 
I mention it merely to show in what sense the word is 
used. 

Let us now bring this train of remarks to bear di- 
rectly upon the subject of investigation. Here we are 
to inquire, whether the circumstances, which lead us to 
apply the words natural, native, innate, and hereditary. t« 



52 



such bodily and mental properties, as those above men- 
tioned, do in fact belong to the moral depravity or sin- 
fulness of man. We should pursue this inquiry with 
special care, because the result must be of great conse- 
quence in settling the present controversy. 

I say then, that moral depravity is a thing which has 
been found in the human species from generation to gen- 
eration. There never has been a single exception in 
any age. Dr. Ware mentions it as a truth which no one 
will deny, that all men are sinners. This is not a general, 
but an universal truth. Every child of Adam, has sin- 
ned. Moral depravity is as universal as reason, or mem- 
ory, or social affection, or pity, or any of the bodily ap- 
petites. We can as easily find a man without any of 
these, as without sin. So far then as the universality or 
constant occurrence of the fact is concerned, there is as 
much propriety in saying, that moral depravity is natur- 
al to man, as that the faculty of reason, or any bodily ap- 
petite is. 

Another circumstance, which justifies us in applying 
the epithets innate, natural &c. to human depravity, is, 
that it shows itself very early. We are indeed incapable 
of looking into the mind of an infant, and seeing the first 
emotions of moral evil. It is impossible that our mem- 
ory should go back to what took place in our own minds 9 
during our infancy. Nor can we have any definite 
knowledge of what takes place in the minds of others in 
infancy ; because they are unable to exhibit those intel- 
ligible signs, which are to us the only medium of access 
to the mind. But among the earliest things, which our 
memory can recal in ourselves, or which we are able to 
observe in others, are the indications and incipient exer- 
cises of sinful affection. Now if, as far back as our re- 
collection can go in regard to ourselves, or our observa- 



53 



tion in regard to others, we uniformly find marks of mor- 
al evil ; is it not reasonable to think it may exist be- 
fore ? and that we should be perfectly satisfied of its 
earlier existence, if we could, in any way, trace back to 
an earlier period, the operations of our own minds, or if 
children at an earlier period could, by any intelligible 
signs, indicate to us the moral state of their minds ? In 
order that any affection may show itself by outward signs, 
and especially that its actings may be distinctly recollect- 
ed, it must have acquired a certain degree of strength. 
But is it not according to the law of our nature, that the 
affection should exist in a lower degree, before that time ? 
We are, indeed, unable to determine how early deprav- 
ed affection may begin to operate. But considering how 
early it rises to such strength, as to make itself visible ; 
and considering too the gradual growth of every thing 
in the mind ; can we avoid the conclusion, that it prob- 
ably exists, though in a feebler state, much sooner than 
it becomes visible ? May it not be with our moral na- 
ture in this respect, as it is with the peculiar properties 
of an eagle, a serpent, or a lion, which have always been 
considered as existing radically in the original constitution 
of the animal, though they begin to show themselves a 
considerable time after? Be this, however, as it may; 
the actual appearance of moral evil in man is, in com- 
mon cases, very early ; so that as far as the period of 
its first occurrence is concerned, there is a plain reason 
for calling it natural, or innate. 

Another circumstance, distinguishing those things 
which are properly called natural or innate, or which we 
say belong to man from the first, is, that they cannot be 
traced to any change in the constitution of his nature, 
subsequent to his birth, and do not presuppose such a 
change. If idiotism is occasioned by a fracture of the 

8 



54 



skull, or by the influence of disease, it is not called nat- 
ural. But if no such calamity has befallen a man, who 
shows himself to be without understanding, and his want 
of mind results, as a direct consequence, from his origin- 
al constitution ; in other words, if he never had any mind; 
and if, with such an original structure, it would be im- 
possible that he ever should have any ; then his idiotism 
is called natural, or he is said to be born an idiot. 

Now is the moral depravity of man to be traced 
to any calamity which has befallen him, or to any 
change which has taken place in his moral consti- 
tution, subsequently to his birth ? Does it presuppose 
that there has been such a change ? If a change takes 
place adequate to account for moral depravity ; it 
must be an universal change, because it must account for 
the fact, that all are sinners. The position then would 
be, that, although men are universally born without any 
disposition or tendency in their nature, which can account 
for the depravity they afterwards exhibit; a change uni- 
formly takes place, which is the spring of all the moral 
evil actually found in man. And this change must take 
place very early, because by the supposition, it must pre- 
cede the first appearance of moral evil. We have then 
before us a most important event; an universal change 
in the moral constitution of man ; a change which al- 
ways takes place very early in childhood, and which sat- 
isfactorily accounts for all the sins which mankind com- 
mit. Here it becomes a matter of deep interest to 
inquire, what is the cause of a change, so momentous in 
its nature, and in its results ? Is that cause extraneous to 
the human mind, or within the mind ? If any oppo- 
nent should say, the cause is extraneous to the mind ; 
then I should wish him to solve the difficulty of suppos- 
ing, that our moral nature, without any faulty conduct of 



55 



ours, is subjected to the calamitous influence of such a 
cause. Call that which is the cause of the change, " ed- 
ucation, example, and circumstances," as Dr. Ware does, 
p. 27. It is a cause, which is extraneous to the mind, and 
over which, especially at so early a period, we can have 
little or no control. I should wish Dr.-Ware to show, upon 
his own principles, how we can be accountable for the 
consequences of a change, produced in such a manner. 
And before leaving the subject, I should be gratified to 
know, how he would make it appear consistent, that a 
God of infinite goodness should expose his feeble, help- 
less creatures, in the very first stage of their existence, 
to the operation of a cause so dreadful. 

But if the cause of the supposed change is within the 
mind, it must consist in something which belongs to the 
original constitution of the mind, or in something which 
is superinduced upon the mind, after its first existence* 
If it consists in something which belongs to the original 
constitution of the mind ; then we are thrown back upon 
the very difficulty which Dr. Ware and others think it 
so important to shun. But if the cause of the supposed 
change consists in something which is superinduced upon 
the mind, after its first existence ; it is certainly proper 
that we should inquire, what that thing is ; what has oc- 
casioned it, or by what means it has been superinduced 
upon the mind. And the answer, if there could be an 
answer to this inquiry, would only make way for another 
of the same kind, and that for another, and so on indefi- 
nitely. 

These are some of the difficulties which attend the 
supposition, that the depravity, which man actually ex- 
hibits, is owing to any calamity which befals him, or to 
any change which takes place in his moral constitution, 
subsequently to his birth ; while on the other hand, the 



56 



supposition, if admitted, has no advantage whatever 
over the common supposition, that our actual wickedness 
is to be traced back to what is original or native in our 
moral constitution. It gives no convenience or clearness 
to any philosophical reasoning, which we may think it 
proper to pursue in relation to this subject ; as it only 
presents other causes, of the existence of which we have 
no evidence, and which, if they were real, must after 
all be traced back to the original constitution of our 
nature. The supposition has no advantage in regard to 
our views of the divine character, it being every way as 
easy to reconcile it with the goodness of God, that he 
should give us originally a constitution, which uniformly 
results in actual transgression, as that he should expose 
us to the operation of causes, such as Dr. Ware names, 
p. 27, which uniformly produce a change in our nature 
afterwards, from purity to pollution. 

Against the supposition of such a change in our na- 
ture, there are strong objections. In the first place ; 
so far as our observation goes, all the causes which op- 
erate upon the human mind, are suited only to excite to 
action, in various ways, the powers and dispositions actu- 
ally belonging to our nature, but not to change that nature. 
Secondly; the supposition of such a change in our nature 
is wholly unphilosophical, because wholly unnecessary. It 
is as unphilosophical, as to suppose a change of nature in 
order to account for the serpent's venomous bite, the 
lion's fierceness, or that intelligence, gratitude, sympathy, 
and kindness of man Dr. Ware considers as natural. 
Thirdly. The uniformity of the fact that men be- 
come sinners, denotes that it results from the settled con- 
stitution of our nature, and not from any occasional or 
accidental cause. We reason thus respecting things 
w T hich uniformly take place in the physical world ; and 



57 



why not in the moral world ? If our becoming sinners were 
not owing to a steady law or principle of our nature, but 
to some accidental cause ; we should, in all reason, ex- 
pect to find some exceptions. The uniform motions of 
the planets denote a uniform cause, a settled constitution 
of nature ; while the occasional appearance of transient 
meteors denotes occasional, transient causes. If there 
were no settled constitution or law of nature respecting 
the motion of the planets, who would expect to find 
their motions constant and invariable ? 

Now just as far as there is evidence, that man's 
actual sinfulness is owing to the original constitution of 
his moral nature, and not to any change in his nature 
experienced after his birth ; just so far we have reason 
to consider his depravity natural. 

I have yet another reason for considering man's de- 
pravity natural. I look at other principles in man, which 
are generally considered natural, such as the animal ap- 
petites, the love of parents for their offspring, and also 
that gratitude, compassion, and kindness, which Dr. 
Ware notices, " as original attributes of human nature." 
I find these natural principles operate freely and sponta- 
neoushj* It requires no laborious discipline to produce 
them, no urgency of motives to excite them to action. 
When the proper occasion occurs, they arise unsolicited. 
This is a general mark of those active principles, which 
are allowed to be native properties of man. The same 
mark distinguishes man's moral depravity. Take chil- 
dren, as soon as they are capable of manifesting what 
they are ; and let the occasion for exercising a corrupt 
affection occur. How soon is it excited ? How spon- 
taneously does the feeling of pride, ill will, and revenge 
show itself in their looks and actions ? It gets posses- 
sion of them before they are aware. It arises of its own 



58 



accord, before they have considered whether it is good 
or bad. They first learn its turpitude from having felt 
its spontaneous operation in their own minds. And it is 
the case not only in childhood, but in every period of 
life, that sinful affections arise readily, as soon as the oc- 
casion occurs. So far then as this circumstance has in- 
fluence, it is a justification of the doctrine of native de- 
pravity. 

But moral evil in man has still another mark of be- 
ing natural or innate ; and that is, that it is hard to be 
eradicated, and resists powerful means of overcoming it. 
From this we are led to think, that it has taken deep 
root in man's nature, and is not an accidental or super- 
ficial thing. The christian, who makes the greatest ef- 
forts to eradicate his depraved affections, has, from his 
own experience, the clearest evidence that they adhere 
to the very constitution of his moral nature ; that they 
make a part of himself; and that getting rid of them is 
like cutting off a hand, or plucking out an eye. He has 
evidence too, that while the heart is unrenewed, or while 
man continues in his natural state, no dictate of con- 
science, no motive or influence which can be brought to 
bear upon his mind, can subdue his selfishness and pride, 
or induce him to love God and be humble. This fact is 
as well supported by experience, as any fact whatever 
in the history of the mind. And as there is no other 
way, but experience, to prove it, on supposition of its real 
existence ; my last appeal for the truth of the Orthodox 
doctrine of depravity would be to the experience of 
Christians. 

There is one circumstance of human depravity, 
which justice requires me distinctly to notice, as 
it seems utterly incapable of being reconciled to any 
scheme but the Orthodox. When we look upon a new 



59 



born child, we predict, that he will certainly be a sinner. 
It is not a conjecture, nor a probability, but a certainty. 
It is a thing which no precautions, no circumstances 
whatever can prevent. Let the child be, from the first, 
in the hands of parents, nurses, and tutors, as holy as 
angels, so that he shall never hear any thing but words 
of truth and love, and never see any thing but examples 
of excellence ; still we predict with certainty, that he 
will not escape the pollution of sin; that he will be a 
transgressor of the divine law. Now such a prediction 
as this must rest on some fixed principle, some certain, 
uniform cause ; just like our prediction respecting the 
future developement which the child will make of any 
bodily or mental power. We know beforehand, that if 
the child is free from special defects, he will speak, and 
walk, and love, and desire, and remember. This fore- 
knowledge in us rests upon the full evidence we have, 
that such is the settled law or constitution of human nature. 
It is precisely on the same ground, that we predict the 
future transgression of the new-born infant. The pre- 
diction does not imply any particular knowledge of this 
individual child, in distinction from other children ; for, 
in the case which I suppose, we only know that he is 
human. We found our prediction solely upon the fact, 
that the child has human nature. We know that it is 
the invariable law of his nature, that he will be a trans- 
gressor. If there is no such steady cause, no such inva- 
riable law, how can we certainly conclude that this par- 
ticular child, born of pious, faithful, exemplary parents, 
will be a sinner ? May not this child, if such as Dr. 
Ware supposes every infant to be, — "innocent, pure, 
free from all disposition or tendency to sin," and under 
the salutary influence of the best of parents ; — may not 
such a child be secured against moral evil ? Or if this 



60 



child should not escape those powerful, calamitous caus- 
es, which are supposed to turn our nature from innocence 
to guilt ; how do we know that some other child of Ad- 
am may not ? If there is no steady, no uniformly oper- 
ating cause, or law of nature, leading to moral evil ; or 
as Dr. Ware expresses it, " if man is by nature no more 
inclined or disposed to vice than to virtue may we not 
suppose that one of a thousand, or at least one of eight 
hundred millions, will retain his original purity, and go 
through this short life without becoming a sinner? But 
we are forbidden to suppose this by that sober observa- 
tion, which teaches us the truth of our Saviour's maxim, 
that " no man can gather grapes of thorns, or figs of 
thistles." The cause in the former case is indeed moral; 
in the latter, physical But in both cases the cause 
which operates is constant ; and it is the constancy or 
uniformity of the cause, which enables us, in either case, 
to form a certain judgment respecting the constancy of 
the effect. Now in any such case, where do we look 
for the cause of a constant, uniform effect, but in the na- 
ture or constitution of the thing ? If this reasoning is sub- 
stantially correct, what can be more proper than to call 
the sinfulness of man natural, original, innate? 

It might here be expected, that I should argue par- 
ticulary from those texts, which teach directly that 
our sinfulness results from the original constitution 
of our nature ; from various maxims and rules of Scrip- 
ture, implying a bias in human nature, which it is the 
object of Christian instruction and discipline to correct ; 
and particularly from the representations of the New 
Testament, that man has, by his natural birth, that carnal 
mind which is opposite to holiness, and on account of 
which he needs to be born again. But the arguments 
derived from these sources were distinctly brought to 



61 



view in my Letters to Unitarians; and I cheerfully 
leave it to the judgment of my readers, whether any 
thing has been offered to diminish their force. 

I have now stated the leading considerations, which 
prove the depravity of man to be native, natural, innate. 
First. Moral depravity is as universal among men, as 
reason, memory, or the bodily senses, which are allow- 
ed by all to be natural. Second. Depravity shows it- 
self very early ; as early as could be expected, on the 
supposition that it is native ; that is, at the earliest pe- 
riod of childhood to which our memory can reach in re- 
gard to ourselves, or in which children are able, by in- 
telligible signs, to manifest their feelings to others. 
Third. The depravity of man cannot be traced to any 
calamity which befals him, or to any change which takes 
place in his moral constitution, subsequently to his birth. 
Fourth. Moral depravity, like other native affec- 
tions or principles of the mind, is spontaneous in 
its operations, and hard to be eradicated. Fifth. 
We can predict concerning any human being, as soon 
as born, that if he live long enough to exhibit the 
character of a moral agent, he will certainly be a sinner; 
and this power of prediction must depend on a settled, 
uniform cause, a law of our nature. 

These, with the Scripture arguments alluded to, are, 
to say the least, as good reasons why we should believe 
moral depravity to be a native, original attribute of man^ 
as any which Dr. Ware can have for believing "kindness, 
gratitude, and love of truth" to be so. I admit that 
these and other things of like kind, if taken with proper 
explanations, are as Dr. Ware represents them, natural 
properties of man. But let him tell us why they are to 
be considered as natural ; and then we may see whether 
the reasons, which prove them to be natural, are stron- 
ger than those which prove human depravity to be so. 

9 



62 



CHAPTER IV, 

The principal objections urged against the doctrine., 
which I attempted to defend in the preceding chapter, 
and the principal difficulties in which it is entangled, will 
now be made the subject of particular consideration. 

Notwithstanding the universal prevalence of moral 
evil, and all the arguments which have been adduced to 
prove that it is natural to man, like those other appetites 
and affections which are, on both sides, regarded in this 
light ; there are, it is said, special reasons against con- 
sidering moral evil to be a natural property of man ; 
reasons strong enough to countervail all the arguments 
in favour of the Orthodox doctrine. These reasons are, in 
brief, that the doctrine of native depravity, is inconsistent 
'with the moral attributes of God, and inconsistent tvith 
moral agency in man. Objections like these are ar- 
rayed against the common dontrine of native depravi- 
ty by Dr. Taylor, and many other writers, and are sug- 
gested by Dr. Ware in several passages in his Letters. 

Here I must take the liberty to remark, as I remark- 
ed in my Letters to Unitarians, that the mode of reason- 
ing, introduced by those who urge objections in this 
manner, is altogether unphilosophical, and can never be 
relied upon either in physics, ethics, or theology. The 
particular fault to which I refer in their mode of reason- 
ing, is, that they consider a difficulty which they are not 
able to solve, as sufficient to disprove a doctrine, 
supported by clear and conclusive evidence. In the sci- 
ence of the mind, as well as in natural philosophy, the 
legitimate object of research is, as the most approved 
writers have abundantly shown, to discover what is fact; 



63 



not to determine what is possible or consistent. What 
would be thought of me, should I regulate my inquiries 
in natural philosophy by the principle involved in the 
mode of reasoning referred to? I start with a full belief 
of the common doctrine of philosophy, that all material 
substances have the power of attraction constantly oper- 
ating with regard to each other ; and I am resolved to 
admit nothing, which seems to me incapable of being re- 
conciled with this. If in the progress of my inquiries I 
should find any thing, which seems to me inconsistent 
with the grand principle of attraction, I am predeter- 
mined not receive it into my creed. By and by facts oc- 
cur, which indicate that, in certain cases, material substan- 
ces have the power of repulsion. But as I am unable to 
see how this power can consist with the other, I will not 
believe its existence. Or if I admit the existence of re- 
pulsion, I will no longer admit attraction. Am I now a 
disciple of Newton ? Or has my understanding gone 
back to the thraldom of the school-men ? Govern- 
ing myself by the same maxim, I attempt to learn 
the properties of the magnet. 1 am not satisfied with 
the simple inquiry, what properties do in fact belong 
to it? What do experience and observation show? 
With this I must join another inquiry; — -how can such 
properties be compatible with each other? And how 
can I admit two different things, when I am not able to 
see their consistency ? Such philosophizing as this 
would lead to results, for which few men would be wil- 
ling to be responsible. 

But the falsity of the mode of reasoning, above de- 
scribed, is no less obvious, in relation to the doctrine of 
depravity. The proper inquiry is, what is taught by 
the word of God, and by the facts which fall under our 
observation ? I ought to come to this inquiry with a 



64 



mind as free from prepossesion, as that with which a 
physician inquires, whether his patient exhibits the signs 
of a consumption. And if I find such proof that deprav- 
ity naturally belongs to man, as satisfies me that any 
other properties of man are natural; I have come to the 
end of my inquiry. So far as my belief of the 
fact is concerned, I have nothing to do with the 
question, how this fact is consistent with the per- 
fections of God, or with the moral agency of man, 
or with any thing else. I say not this, however, because 
I have the least reluctance to consider the question of 
consistency, in its proper place ; but to show that, in 
our reasoning, the consideration of this is to be made entire- 
ly distinct from the consideration of the evidence, which 
proves the fact. If I would be either a philosopher or 
a Christian, I must believe what is clearly proved to be 
fact, whether I am able to reconcile the fact with other 
things I believe, or not. Nor must I in any case suffer 
my views of the clearness and competency of the proof, 
or my mode of coming to the discovery of it, to be in- 
fluenced by any difficulty I may feel, as to the consisten- 
cy of the fact to be proved with other facts. But I 
wish it to be remembered that I say all this, not because 
I suppose that two facts or truths, which are to be be- 
lieved, may be really inconsistent with each other ; but 
because, admitting that they are consistent, we may not 
in every case be under advantages to discover how they 
are consistent. 

To come at a still clearer view of the error involv- 
ed in that principle of reasoning, against which my ob- 
jections have been aimed ; suppose some philosopher 
should rise up and say, that my believing the power of 
repulsion to exist in matter is inconsistent with my be- 
lieving the power of attraction ; or should charge me 
with denying attraction, because I believe repulsion- 



65 



And suppose this pretended inconsistency of repulsion 
with attraction should be perpetually mentioned, or 
hinted at, as an argument proving conclusively, that mat- 
ter can have no such property, as the power of repul- 
sion. In reply to such sophistry I should say, first, that 
there is, in my view, no inconsistency at all between these 
two powers, and that, if any man affirms there is an inconsist- 
ency, the burden of proof certainly lies upon him. Sec- 
ondly. A man's being unable to see the consistency of the 
two powers can be taken as no part of the proof of a 
real inconsistency. Thirdly. The question, whether 
there is such a thing as repulsion in matter, must de- 
pend entirely on its proper philosophical evidence, and 
must be discussed without any regard to the alleged in- 
consistency of repulsion with attraction. If repulsion is 
proved to exist by clear, conclusive evidence ; I should 
be a child, and not a philosopher, to refuse it a place in 
my belief, because it is difficult to reconcile it with 
something else. 

I entertain the same views of the proper mode of 
reasoning on the subject of man's natural depravity ; and 
these views I exhibited in my fourth Letter, to which I 
beg leave particularly to refer the reader. After sev- 
eral remarks^ intended to simplify the object of inquiry, 
I said ; " These remarks are intended to show that ac- 
cording to the just principles of reasoning in such a case, 
we have nothing to do w T ith the inquiry, whether the 
common doctrine of depravity can consist with the moral 
perfection of God, &c. If I say, this doctrine cannot be 
true, because I cannot reconcile it with the goodness of 
God ; it is the same as saying, I am an infallible judge 5 
and my opinion must stand, though opposed by the de- 
clarations of Scripture and the evidence of facts. To 
take such a position would be an effectual bar to convic- 



66 



tion, and render ali reasoning useless. If we would reg- 
ulate our investigations on this subject by correct princi- 
ples, we must reject totally every prepossession against 
the doctrine of depravity, arising from the consideration 
of the divine perfections, or from any thing else, and must 
restrict ourselves to this single inquiry, what is true in 
fact ? If the subject is one on which the Scripture un- 
dertakes to decide ; the question is, what saith the Scrip- 
ture? — If when we pursue our inquiry, we find that the 
Scripture, interpreted without the influence of any pre- 
possession, and according to just rules, teaches that man 
is by nature unholy ; this must unhesitatingly be admit- 
ted, as a certain truth. That God declares it, is proof 
enough. — If observation and experience teach the same 
truth ; we are to admit it as doubly confirmed. As to 
the goodness of God, we know it from other evidence." 

Dr. Ware thinks the course I pursued in regard to 
this subject liable to objection. " This is certainly a 
very extraordinary thought," he says, " that in defending 
his system against an objection to which it is thought 
liable, he should have nothing to do with the very ob- 
jection itself, nor with the difficulty it involves. Did the 
question relate to the simple fact, whether the doctrine 
of depravity, as maintained by the Orthodox, were a doc- 
trine of Scripture or not, its consistency or inconsistency 
with the moral perfections of God would indeed make 
no part of the ground on which the argument should 
proceed." p. 12. 

My reply to this, and to what stands connected with 
it, is a very easy one. The grand point at issue was 
and is, whether the Orthodox doctrine of depravity is 
true. I was aware that Mr. Channing and others had 
not made this the grand point at issue, and with a view 
to expose what I considered a mistake in them, and to 



67 



simplify the object of inquiry, I made the remarks in my 
fourth Letter. I represented that the great inquiry in 
relation to this subject ought to be ; " Do the Scriptures, 
understood according to just rules of interpretation, teach 
the doctrine of native depravity ?" Now if this were 
really to be made the chief topic of inquiry, Dr. Ware 
himself allows, that " the consistency or inconsisten- 
cy of the doctrine with the moral perfections of God 
would indeed make no part of the ground, on which the 
argument should proceed." The fact was, that it had 
often been mentioned, as a decisive reason against believ- 
ing the doctrine of depravity, that it is inconsistent with 
the moral perfection of God. If an appearance of such 
inconsistency had been mentioned merely as a difficulty 
attending an important Scripture doctrine ; the case 
would have been different. But its absolute inconsisten- 
cy with the divine perfections had been urged, as con- 
clusively disproving the truth of the doctrine. I under- 
took to show that such a mode of reasoning is altooeth- 
er unphilosophical, and that it would be seen to be so in 
other like cases. And I now say again, that what I 
have represented to be the grand inquiry is not to be 
shackled with any other matters. If indeed, after we 
have proved from legitimate sources of evidence, that 
man is by nature depraved, any one choose to bring into 
view the difficulty of reconciling the doctrine with the 
divine perfections; I will be so far from attempting to 
evade the difficulty, that I will apply myself with all 
possible diligence and care, to solve it. And this I shall 
actually do, in some measure, before leaving the subject. 
But after all, be it remembered, that, whether I succeed 
in solving the difficulty or not, the ground of my faith in 
the doctrine is the same. I believe it, because it is 
taught in the Scriptures ; just as the philosopher be- 



68 



lieves what thorough investigation shows to be be fact, 
whether he finds himself able to reconcile it with other 
facts, or not. 

But Dr. Ware insists, p. 12, 13, that it certainly 
does belong to him, who would relieve the Orthodox 
system from the imputation of being inconsistent with 
the divine perfections, to prove that it is consistent 
For the sake of elucidating more fully the principle of 
reasoning under consideration, I will allow, for the pres- 
ent, that it does belong to me to prove this consistency. 
And I will give in few words, the nature of the 
proof which I now have to offer. Let then the alleged 
inconsistency appear ever so great, even as great, and as 
hard to be removed, as Unitarians suppose ; 1 shall con- 
sider it as valid evidence of a real consistency, if I show 
by proper arguments, first, that God possesses moral per- 
fection; and secondly, that man is by nature depraved. I 
am speaking now of the kind of proof that is to be reli- 
ed upon, not attempting to exhibit the proof at full length. 
Suppose each of the two positions, just stated, to be sup- 
ported by suitable evidence. I adduce the simple fact, 
that both positions are shown to be true, as satisfactory 
proof of their real consistency with each other. In many 
cases, this may be the only possible method of proof ; be- 
cause we may not be able to bring the two things to- 
gether by a direct comparison, and in that way to show 
that they are consistent with each other. This princi- 
ple is much used in Geometry. In some cases where 
we cannot compare two things together so as to prove 
their agreement with each other directly, we com- 
pare them both with a third, and by making out 
their agreement with that, we prove their agreement 
with each other. Their agreement with the third 
is ihe medium of proof. So in the case under consider- 



69 



ation. Even if we could do nothing, by a direct compar- 
ison of the two positions, towards proving a mutual con- 
sistency ; the fact that each of them is shown by prop- 
er evidence to he true, must be taken as evidence that 
they are consistent. This is the only way in which a 
thousand things in physics, and in the philosophy of 
the mind, can ever be proved to be consistent with each 
other ; and it is the only way in which men, who are 
completely disentangled from the hypothetical philoso- 
phy, deem it necessary to attempt a proof. 

But Dr. Ware shows at the end of Letter II, that he 
is of a very different opinion, as to this principle of rea- 
soning. He says, that I have contented myself with endeav- 
ouring to prove the doctrines of Orthodoxy, as matters of 
fact, upon the principle, that if 1 could clearly prove them 
to be doctrines of Scriptures, I should not be bound to show 
how they can be consistent with the divine perfections. He 
signifies his disapprobation of all this, and declares that, 
as I have proceeded thus, it is unnecessary to say any 
thing more to show, that the imputation of our holding doc- 
trines inconsistent with the divine perfections is not removed. 
To this remarkable passage I request the reader to 
give some close attention. The principle on which I pro- 
ceeded in my reasoning, as Dr. Ware here observes, was 
this ; that if I could clearly prove our doctrines to be 
matters of fact, and doctrines of Scripture, I should not be 
bound to show, in any other way, how they can be consist- 
ent with the divine perfections. Now he says, as I have 
contented myself with an attempt made according to 
this principle, the imputation of our holding opinions in- 
consistent with the divine perfections remains ; that is to 
say ; my having clearly proved our doctrines to be doc- 
trines of Scripture, if 1 had done it. would not be enough 

10 



70 



to prove them consistent with the divine perfections ; — 
for this is the same as his saying, that my having clearly 
proved our doctrines to be doctrines of Scripture would 
not remove the imputation of our holding doctrines in- 
consistent with the divine perfections ; and this is the 
same as to say, that, for aught we know, the Scriptures 
may contain doctrines inconsistent with the divine per- 
fections. I should be sorry to think, that this is the 
ground-work of Dr. Ware's reasoning on this subject. 
But. it really is so, unless he is so unfortunate as not to 
express what he intends; or unless I am so unfortunate 
as to misinterpret his language. But truly I see not 
how I could avoid the conclusion above stated. For if 
the principle on which he says I proceeded, and on 
which I indeed meant to proceed, that if I could clearly 
prove our doctrines to be doctrines of Scripture, we 
should be free from the imputation of holding doctrines 
inconsistent with the divine perfections, — if this principle 
is to be rejected ; it must be because the Bible may- 
contain doctrines inconsistent with those perfections. 
Only let us agree in the position, that the Bible teaches 
nothing really inconsistent with the divine perfections ; 
then, of course, my proving the doctrines in question to 
be doctrines of Scripture would be considered as remov- 
ing every pretence, that I hold doctrines inconsistent 
with those perfections. I know indeed that Dr. Ware 
did not mean to admit that I had proved our doctrines to 
be taught in the Bible. But what he says manifestly 
implies, that if I had proved this, and proved it clearly, 
and had done no more, I should still be chargeable with 
holding doctrines inconsistent with the perfections of 
God; for this was the imputation, which he says would 
not be removed.- 



71 



As this subject is of very great consequence in the 
regulation of our religious inquiries in general, and as 
my wish is to make it perfectly intelligible to every 
reader; I beg leave to exhibit my views in a varied 
form. 

The positions which I have laboured to establish, as 
the regulating principles of our reasoning, and of our 
faith, particularly on this subject, are these. 1. The 
grand inquiry, and in truth the only inquiry is, what 
is taught by the word of God ? 2. Though the 
Scriptures contain doctrines which may, to some, have 
an appearance of being inconsistent with the divine per- 
fections ; they contain none which are inconsistent in re- 
ality. 3. As soon as any doctrine is clearly proved to 
be a doctrine of Scripture, it is, for that reason alone, en- 
titled to our faith ; and even if we should entirely fail of 
showing its consistency with the divine perfections, or 
with moral agency, to the satisfaction of an objector ; 
we could not, on that account, be justly charged with 
holding a doctrine inconsistent with the divine perfec- 
tions. But Dr. Ware's representation is, that as the Or- 
thodox are charged with denying the moral perfection 
of God, or with holding doctrines inconsistent with it; 
the very point at issue is, whether our doctrines are in- 
consistent with the divine perfections ; and that it was 
my business in this controversy, to prove them to be con- 
sistent. For the sake of clearing away this perplex- 
ity, as satisfactorily as possible, I will, for the present, 
admit these views of Dr. Ware to be correct, and will 
undertake the task of giving the proof demanded. But 
I claim the right of choosing my own method of proof. 
And for the purpose of trying the principle, I do now 
choose to make use of this method, and to rely upon this 
method alone ; that is, to prove that our doctrines are in 



72 

Jact consistent with the perfections of God, by proving them 
to be doctrines of his word. Will Dr. Ware allow this 
method of proof to be valid, and satisfactory ? If so, he 
must alter the close of his second Letter. But if not, I 
ask why ? Let him offer any reason whatever, to show 
that this method of proof would not be valid; and then 
see if the reason offered does not clearly imply, that the 
Scriptures may contain doctrines inconsistent with the 
divine perfections. 

Should Dr. Ware say, as he has said, that he by no 
means admits that I have proved the doctrines of Ortho- 
doxy to be doctrines of Scripture, and so that I have 
made out no such proof as this of their consistency with 
the divine perfections; I should make this obvious reply. 
The thing now under consideration is the principle of 
reasoning, not the success of it. The present question is 
not, whether I have actually proved our doctrines to be 
doctrines of Scripture ; but whether, if I should do this, 
though I should then stop, it would be a sufiicient proof, 
that our doctrines are consistent with the perfections 
of God; or whether, after clearly proving them to be 
doctrines of Scripture, the imputation might still lie 
against me of holding doctrines inconsistent with the di- 
vine perfections, because I did not in any other way, 
show, nor attempt 44 to show, how they can be consist- 
ent." 

But possibly, after all that has been said, Dr. Ware's 
real meaning may not be what I have understood from 
his language ; and he may on reflection, cheerfully ac- 
cede to the principle of reasoning which I have been la- 
bouring to establish. The principle is this ; and if the 
word of God is true, it will stand forever; namely; 
that clearly proving any doctrines to be doctrines of 
Scripture, is, by itself, a satisfactory proof of their con- 



1 



73 

sistency with the divine perfections ; that in this contro- 
versy, the simple inquiry should be, what do the Scrip- 
tures teach ? and that in pursuing this inquiry, and in esti- 
mating the value of evidence which bears upon it, we 
ought not to be influenced by any apprehension, that the 
doctrines in question are inconsistent with the character 
of God, nor by any appearance of such inconsistency ; — 
just as we should pursue the inquiry, whether there has 
in reality been a general deluge, without any regard to 
the question, whether we are able to show such a fact 
to be consistent with the character of God. From this 
principle it would follow, that if any man finds, in regard 
to the doctrines of Orthodoxy, that he has been influen- 
ced by an appearance or apprehension of their inconsis- 
tency with the divine perfections, and that in this way 
he has been prepossessed against those doctrines, and has 
refused to be convinced of their truth by evidence, which 
would be satisfactory in other cases ; it is high time for 
him to inquire, whether he has not done violence to the 
principles of reasoning, and whether he is not in danger 
of wandering irreclaimably from the path of divine truth. 
He forgets that such short-sighted creatures, as we are, 
may, in a thousand cases, be unable to see how things 
can be consistent, which really are so ; and that we may 
think we see an inconsistency, when, if we had a great- 
er extent or clearness of vision, we might see none. 
While he rejects a doctrine, which is supported by such 
evidence as is generally deemed sufficient, because he is 
unable to see how the doctrine can consist with some- 
thing else ; he places a reliance upon the strength 
of his understanding, to which it is not entitled, and 
opens the door for a wide-spreading skepticism ; and 
he does this in relation to doctrines, which are of the 



74 



highest importance, and the truth of which is shown by 
evidence of noon-day clearness. 

Under the influence of such mistaken views, as those 
just alluded to, a philosopher examines the proof of a 
general deluge, and finds it clear and strong. But he 
determines not to believe it, because he cannot see how 
it could have been consistent with the justice and good- 
ness of God, to destroy a world by a deluge. You tell 
him, it is clearly taught in the Bible, which he professes 
to receive as the word of God, and that it ought, on that 
account alone, to be believed, whatever difficulties may 
seem to attend it. But he avers, with increasing warmth 
of feeling, that it is totally inconsistent with the good- 
ness of God, w 7 ho is the Father of his creatures ; " that 
p we can make no supposition upon the ground of which 
we shall be able to see that it can be consistent that 
it ought therefore to be rejected; and that the few 
texts of Scripture which seem to favour it, must be ex- 
plained in some other way, so that they may give no 
support to a fact, which u certainly admits of no recon- 
ciliation with any notion we can have of the moral per- 
fection of the Author of our being." 

The same philosopher casts his eye over the destruc- 
tion of Sodom by fire from heaven, and of Jerusalem by the 
Roman army. His sensibilities are shocked by the idea 
of such scenes of distress and desolation. That God 
should visit so great a multitude of people, old andyoung, 
including so many thousands of harmless infants, with 
such overwhelming judgments, seems totally irreconcile- 
able with his paternal character. Our philosopher, who 
feels for his fellow-creatures, cannot think, that a Being 
of infinite compassion could ever have taken pleasure in 
witnessing so awful an event, brought about too by his 
own agency. And though the evidence from history is 



75 



such as would satisfy him in other cases, he thinks 
it cannot be satisfactory in this, as it would involve us in 
the belief of a fact, so inconsistent with the moral per- 
fection of God. So far as the Bible is concerned, instead 
of openly rejecting its authority, he goes about to put 
such a sense upon it, as he thinks it ought to have. He 
claims the right of proceeding in this way from one sub- 
ject to another, and of rejecting or modifying any texts 
of Scripture, so that they may not oppose the notion 
which he has suffered to preoccupy his mind, in regard 
to the character of God. He seems to see that the com- 
mon doctrines of depravity, atonement, election, regen- 
eration, and the endless punishment of the wicked are 
incapable of being reconciled with the divine perfections. 
According to his maxim, therefore, these doctrines must 
all be rejected y and the Bible must be so explain- 
ed, as to give them no support. 

Now the foundation of such a philosopher's reason- 
ing is just this : He has more confidence in his own pre- 
conceptions, than in the word of God. While he ought 
to guide his reason by the dictates of revelation ; he la- 
bours to conform the dictates of revelation to the hasty 
judgments of reason. See how clearly and strongly the 
Scriptures assert the natural corruption of man. If with 
half the clearness and strength they asserted his native 
purity, how would Unitarians glory in the firm founda- 
tion of their faith ? But no sooner does the word of God 
begin to assert man's native depravity, than it has to en- 
counter a strong preconception, that the doctrine cannot 
consist with God's moral perfection, and cannot be true. 
Our opponents think that the Scriptures do not teach 
the doctrine. But would they think soj were they not 
biassed by a preconception against the doctrine ? And 
must it not be evident even to themselves, that such a 



76 



preconception is likely to prevent all fair and impartial 
investigation of the evidence which supports the doc- 
trine ? How can there be a fair investigation of the 
meaning of Scripture by those, who have prejudged 
what its meaning must, or must not be ? Is it not 
obvious, that they judge differently in regard to 
other doctrines, against which their prejudices are not 
arrayed ? Is not evidence of inferior clearness perfect- 
ly satisfactory on a thousand other subjects ? But here, 
according to the maxims which govern our opponents, it 
seems utterly impossible they should ever be convinced. 
Let the Scriptures say what they will ; let them assert 
the doctrine of native depravity, and the other doctrines 
allied to it, in language ever so plain, and in circumstan- 
ces which show, according to all just rules of interpreta- 
tion, what the sense must be ; and let it appear from 
the conduct of the writers, and from what they exhibit- 
ed of their own feelings, that they did actually regard 
these doctrines, as divine truths ; it still answers no pur- 
pose with our opponents. For they meet all this with 
the argument, that these doctrines can never be recon- 
ciled with the moral perfections of God. Viewing the 
doctrines in this light, and entertaining this strong pre- 
possession against them, they can receive no result of 
experience, and no declaration of Scripture, as conclu- 
sive evidence of their truth. I say then, that so long as 
they suffer that notion of inconsistency to occupy their 
minds, and to control their faith ; it is perfectly idle to 
cite the Scriptures as evidence. If Paul himself were 
here, and should declare the doctrines, as we understand 
them, to be according to truth ; they would even then 
reject them. Just so far as their maxim is adopted, 
the authority of the Bible is given up, and the dis- 
cussion proceeds on the ground of mere natural rea- 



77 



son. And even after it has been clearly proved that 
any particular doctrines are taught in the Bible ; we 
must still inquire at the oracle of reason, whether those 
doctrines are worthy to be received. 

I am aware that presenting the reasoning of our op- 
ponents in this light may be thought to savour but little 
of candour. But truly, 1 think they will not hesitate to 
acknowledge, that so far as the exercise of candour is 
concerned, I can justify myself by appealing to the stan- 
dard which they themselves have established. For if 
it is consistent with candour for them to charge us with 
denying the moral perfection of God, or with holding 
sentiments implying such a denial ; w 7 hy should I be 
thought deficient in candour for endeavouring, accord- 
ing to my serious conviction, to show, that they 
entertain sentiments, or adopt a mode of reasoning, 
which involves the denial of the truth and authority 
of the Scriptures ? 

The same remarks apply to the other part of the 
objection against the evidence of native depravity ; name- 
ly ; that it cannot be admitted to be conclusive, because 
the doctrine is inconsistent with moral agency. But 
without repeating these remarks, I will just say, that it 
is altogether as proper for me to deny man's moral agen- 
cy on account of its apparent inconsistency with the doc- 
trine of depravity, as for others to deny man's depravi- 
ty, on account of its apparent inconsistency with moral 
agency. 

Let it not however be supposed, from any of the 
foregoing remarks, that I wish to discountenance direct 
and free inquiry respecting the consistency of our doc- 
trine of depravity with the moral perfection of God ; or 
that I think there is no other way of meeting the ob- 
jection under consideration, than the one I have thus far 
11 



78 



pursued. I must, however, view this as sufficient. 
And whether I succeed or not in my attempt to show, 
by another mode of reasoning, that the doctrine of de- 
pravity is reconcileable with the moral perfection of 
God and the moral agency of man, I shall consider the 
doctrine as worthy of unhesitating belief, if it has no 
support but this, which is indeed the best support of all, 
- — that it is taught in the holy Scriptures. 

Nor let it be supposed from the foregoing remarks, 
that I apprehend any peculiar difficulty in showing the 
consistency of native depravity with the divine perfections. 
There is certainly no contradiction in the terms ; that 
is, the proposition which affirms the native depravity of 
man, does not, in the terms of it, contain a denial of the 
perfection of God. The inconsistency, if there is any 9 
must be made to appear by an investigation of the sub- 
ject. If Dr. Ware soberly thinks that there is an incon- 
sistency ; he ought not to content himself with such a 
bare assertion of it, as is suited to make an impression on 
those, who will not give themselves the trouble of think- 
ing, or to excite prejudice in those who are governed by 
sounds, and first appearances. It behoves him to sup- 
port his charge of inconsistency by substantial evidence. 
But it cannot surely be considered, as having any thing 
of the nature of evidence, for him to say, that we can make 
no supposition upon which we shall be able to perceive the 
consistency between natural depravity and the divine good- 
ness, or that the doctrine of native depravity certainly ad- 
mits of no reconciliation with any notion we can have of 
the moral perfection of God. These are strong affirma- 
tions, and doubtless sincere ones, expressing the real con- 
viction of the writer. But he cannot expect us to 
receive them, as arguments. Should I think it best 
to make affirmations in the same way, expressive of my 



79 



views on this subject ; I should say, in direct opposition 
to what has just been quoted from our Author, that there 
is a very plain supposition, upon which we are able to 
perceive the perfect consistency of native depravity and 
divine goodness ; and this supposition is, that the exist- 
ence of man, with such a nature or character as we as- 
cribe to him, may, in the administration of a perfect mor- 
al government, be made ultimately conducive to the great 
end of benevolence, that is, the happiness of the universe. 
Or I should say thus ; that man's native depravity is not 
in the least inconsistent with divine justice, if it be 
so that man, notwithstanding his native depravity, nev- 
er suffers more than what he truly deserves for his 
own personal sins ; — not inconsistent with divine good- 
ness, if man's depravity is made an effectual means of 
promoting the object, at which goodness aims ; — and 
not inconsistent with wisdom, if the system, of which 
man's depravity is a part, is so contrived, that it is suit- 
ed to promote the best end in the best manner. 

But although, in this brief statement, I have made a 
supposition, according to which the native depravity of 
man must appear perfectly reconcileable with God's 
moral perfections ; I shall not stop here ; but shall pro- 
ceed, once for all, freely to investigate this subject, and 
to inquire, whether there is any force in the objection, 
so often and so triumphantly repeated, that the doctrine 
of native depravity is totally inconsistent with the moral 
perfection of God, and can, on no supposition whatever, 
be reconciled with it. 

What then do my opponents mean by saying, that 
any thing is inconsistent with the moral perfection of 
God ? that is, with his benevolence, or goodness ? Most 
obviously they must mean, that if that doctrine is true, 
or if that event takes place, God cannot be good ; in 



80 



other words, that he canrtot have benevolent feelings, or 
he cannot pursue the end of a benevolent administration. 
It is clear that the end of true benevolence, whether in 
feeling or in action, is to do good, or to promote real 
happiness. And if the being who possesses perfect be- 
nevolence, has also an infinite understanding, and is ca- 
pable of comprehending a vast system of intelligent be- 
ings, which extends to eternity ; the object of his benev- 
olence must be the happiness of such a system — the 
highest degree of happiness of which that system is ca- 
pable, taken in its whole extent and duration. Now the 
native depravity of man is plainly consistent with the di- 
vine benevolence, if it is, on the whole, consistent with 
the greatest good of the intelligent system. Do you ask 
how it can possibly be made consistent ? My answer is, 
it may, in one way or another, be the means of making 
a brighter and more diversified display of the divine 
perfections, and thus of giving the intelligent creation, 
as a whole, a higher knowledge and enjoyment of God. 
It may be the means of illustrating more clearly the ex- 
cellence of the law and government of God, and of pro- 
ducing ultimately, through his moral kingdom, a purer and 
more ardent attachment to his character, and his admin- 
istration ; so that his intelligent creatures, by means of 
the instruction and discipline in this way afforded, may 
be brought at length to a state of higher perfection and 
enjoyment, than they could attain in any other way. 
Through the vigilant wisdom and justice of civil rulers, 
such a happy result of rebellion sometimes appears in 
human governments. And why may it not be so in the 
divine government, which is directed by wisdom and jus- 
tice infinitely more vigilant, and controlled by power in- 
finitely more efficacious, than any human government? 
If in the ways here suggested, or in other ways, the de- 



81 



pravity of man may be made to subserve the end of the 
divine administration; its existence is plainly consistent 
with the divine goodness ; or, which is the same thing, 
it may exist, and yet God show himself to be infinitely 
good. The subject of native depravity is, in this respect, 
explained on the same principle with that of moral evil 
generally. If you ask, how the existence of moral evil 
can be consistent with the moral perfections of God ; 
you ask a question of as difficult solution as the one we 
have been considering ; and the proper answer to it 
must, in my view, be the same. 

But has any thing ever taken place under the divine 
administration, which in any degree illustrates this sub- 
ject? Are there any facts which tend to. show, that the 
solution I have given of the difficulty, is conformable to 
truth, and ought to be satisfactory ? 

In reply to this, I refer the reader to all the instances 
recorded in the Scriptures, and all which have occurred 
in the common course of divine providence, in which the 
sins of men have been made the occasion of glory to 
God, and of good to his kingdom. These instances 
press upon our notice from every quarter. But I shall 
content myself with suggesting one or two of those which 
are most remarkable. No one will think it strange, that I 
should here mention the case of the Egyptian king; which 
I do, not Because it is a case essentially different from 
others, but because the Scriptures make it a subject of 
particular remark, and give an explanation of it, which 
fully confirms the general principle involved in my 
reasoning. In a passage too weighty to be over- 
looked, and in language too plain to be misunder- 
stood, God himself expressly informs us of the very pur- 
puse for which he raised that wicked man to the throne 
of Egypt. Exod. ix. 16. Was not the purpose which 



82 



in that case God had in view, and which he actually ac- 
complished, a benevolent purpose ? And were not all 
the means he employed, consistent with his moral per- 
fections ? And can any thing be clearer, than that the 
principal means employed was the diversified display 
the Egyptian monarch made of the most impious pride, 
and the most unrelenting hardness of heart? It is utter- 
ly in vain to attempt an enumeration of the instances, 
more or less remarkable, in which the sinful passions and 
actions of man have been made to praise God. The 
work of redemption exhibits this wonderful subservien- 
cy of moral evil to a benevolent end, with the greatest 
possible clearness. All those acts of God in the salva- 
tion of men, which are " to the praise of the glory of his 
grace," and all the songs of thanksgiving among the 
redeemed in heaven, are occasioned by human transgres- 
sion. And a careful examination of this subject will 
show not only the fact, that moral evil is so overruled 
by the divine hand, as to be made actually subservient 
to the end of benevolence, but something of the manner 
in which it is done. I will only add here, that in regard 
to this subserviency of evil to good, there can be no dis- 
tinction between moral evil generally, and that moral 
evil which is native. For if moral evil, occurring at any 
period of man's life, may be made to contribute to the 
end of a benevolent administration ; why may not that 
which occurs at the earliest period ? 

Such, in brief, are my views, as to the actual consist- 
ency of man's native depravity with the divine perfections. 
I turn now to the objector, who thinks native depravity 
to be inconsistent with the divine perfections. Let 
him tell me definitely, why it is inconsistent. Because 
man, from the first of his existence as a moral agent, is sin- 
ful, does God cease to be good ? May not God so overrule 
the corruption of our nature, that, in the final result of 



83 



his administration, it shall be the occasion of a brighter 
display of his holiness, and an augmentation of hap- 
piness in his universal empire ? Cannot Omnipotence 
bring good out of evil in this case, as well as in 
others ? How does it appear, that the moral perfection 
of God must necessarily preclude the existence of sin in 
man, at the commencement of his moral agency? Will 
the objector say, that native sinfulness, if it should exist, 
must of necessity be attributed to the immediate agency 
of God, and that this would make him the cause of moral 
evil in a sense, obviously inconsistent with his infinite ho- 
liness ? I would request the objector, before adopting 
such a conclusion, to allow himself time for a little free 
inquiry. — Does not moral evil actually exist ? Are not 
all men sinners ? If so, then it must be allowed by both 
parties, that moral evil has a beginning in men. It is 
true, indeed, that Unitarians differ from us as to the 
time of its beginning. But when we assert that man is 
a sinner, or begins to sin, as soon as he is a moral agent, 
we no more attribute sin to the immediate agency of 
God, than those do, who assert that sin begins at any 
subsequent period. Show me how T sin may begin to ex- 
ist at any period of man's life, without implying an agen- 
cy of God inconsistent with his holiness ; and 1 will show 
you how it may begin to exist at the earliest period, 
without implying any such agency ? If you say that sin, 
when it exists in mature age, is the free, unconstrained 
action of a rational and accountable being, and that all 
its guilt is chargeable upon him, and not upon God ; I 
say the same respecting that sin, which we suppose be- 
longs to man at his first existence. It is the act of a ra- 
tional, accountable being; an act as free and unconstrained 
as any which takes place during his whole life ; and none 
the less free and unconstrained, because for a time it 



84 



may begin and end in the affections, — the circumstances 
of the case not permitting it to show itself outwardly in 
a visible form. This is true of a thousand sins, of which 
men are guilty in every period of their life ; sins which 
exist merely in the affections of the mind, and are visi- 
ble only to the eye of conscience, and of God. Now I 
think it manifest, that between the affections found in a 
state of manhood, and those in early childhood, there is 
no difference as to their nature^ though there is a vast 
difference as to their strength. Nor can there be any 
difference, as to the degree in which a child, and a per- 
son of mature age, is dependent on God in the exercise of 
his affections. From infancy to old age, man is in the 
highest degree dependent. He always lives, and moves, 
and has his being in God. The first movements of his 
moral nature, which must of necessity be affections mere- 
ly, have precisely the same relation to the divine agen- 
cy, as any moral affections afterwards. If God can cre- 
ate a being, who shall, at any time, be the subject of 
feelings and actions of a moral nature, or who shall, at 
any time, be a free, accountable agent ; he can, if he 
please, create one who shall be a free, moral, accounta- 
ble agent from the beginning. Suppose the first moral 
feelings and actions of such a being to be sinful ; are 
they not still his own feelings and actions, for which he 
is justly accountable ? With regard to the agency of 
God, it is evident that no difficulty attends that moral 
evil which begins thus early, and is therefore called na- 
tive, more than attends that which originates at any sub- 
sequent period. Or to express it in another form ; if 
God can, consistently with his holiness, create and pre- 
serve an intelligent being, who shall be a sinner at any 
period of his life ; he can create and preserve one who 
shall be a sinner from the beginning. With respect to 



85 



the perfections and the agency of God, there appears no 
difference between the supposition that moral evil be- 
gins at the commencement of man's existence, and the 
supposition that it begins at a subsequent period, unless 
there is some intrinsic absurdity or difficulty in supposing 
it to begin so early. If there is any such absurdity or 
difficulty, it must relate to the subject of moral agency. 
It is then important to inquire, whether the doctrine of 
native depravity is inconsistent with a right view of mor- 
al agency. This inquiry will be pursued in the next 
chapter. 



CHAPTER V. 

Is the doctrine of native depravity inconsistent with 
moral agency ? 

It seems to be frequently taken for granted by Dr. 
Ware, as well as by Dr. Taylor, and others, that man 
becomes a moral agent in consequence of an antecedent 
course of voluntary action ; and particularly, that he be- 
comes a sinner by a course of misconduct, which precedes 
his being a sinner. Dr. Ware says, pp. 33, 36, 37, that 
men become sinners by yielding to temptations — by obey- 
ing the impulse of the passions and the calls of appetite, 
in opposition to the direction of reason and the notices 
of conscience, — by subjecting themselves to the dominion 
of the inferior part of their nature, — by the abuse of 
God's gifts, &c. But does he mean to say, that all this 
conduct takes place, before men become sinners ? Then 
he means to say, that they commit as great sins before 
they are sinners, as after. For what worse can real sin- 
ners do, than " yielding to temptation — obeying the im- 

12 



86 



pulse of the passions in opposition to reason and con- 
science, subjecting themselves to the inferior part of their 
nature, and abusing God's gifts ?" Or does Dr. Ware 
mean only to say, that these are the ways in which they 
manifest and increase their sinfulness? If so, his mean- 
ing is doubtless correct. It is certainly sin, for men to 
do the things above mentioned ; and in the very act of 
doing them, they are sinners, 

Bat the question returns, whether native depravity 
is inconsistent with moral agency. There is no way to 
answer this satisfactorily, but by getting clear ideas 
of moral agency, as well as of native depravity, and 
then determining, by a careful comparison, whether 
they are repugnant to each other. What then is 
moral agency ? Or to make the question more con- 
venient, what is a moral agent? Answer. A moral 
agent is one who acts under a moral law, and is justly 
accountable for his conduct. Now we find it to be the 
opinion of Dr. Ware, pp. 21, 41, that " by their natural 
birth men become reasonable, accountable beings." This 
is as much as to say, they become moral agents. And if 
they are moral agents, they are capable of moral action ; 
that is, capable of holiness and sin ; as Dr. Ware often 
represents them to be. But if they are capable of sin, 
there is no absurdity in supposing that they may actual- 
ly be the subjects of sin ; and that they may be the sub- 
jects of sin, as soon as they are moral agents. In one 
place, which I have already noticed, Dr. Ware says bold- 
ly, they are so. In explaining the phrase, " All have 
sinned," he says it means, "all who are capable of sinning, 
all as soon as they are capable of it, all as soon as they are 
moral agents" For the assistance which these passages 
afford, I am under particular obligations to Dr. Ware. 
If these statements of his are correct, as I am persuaded 



87 



they are ; there can be no inconsistency between native 
depravity and moral agency. Oar Author seems here to 
rise to the highest point of Orthodoxy ; for he says, first, 
that " all who are capable of sinning, — all who are mor- 
al agents, are sinners ; and that they are sinners as soon 
as they are capable of sinning, or as soon as they are 
moral agents." And secondly, he says, that " men are 
reasonable, accountable beings," that is, moral agents, 
and of course capable of sin, — " by their natural birth." 
All, by their natural birth, are moral agents, and as soon 
as they are moral agents, they are sinners ; — moral agents 
by nature, and sinners as soon as moral agents. To this 
representation of Dr. Ware I fully accede ; nor do I 
believe that any man can perceive in it the least ab- 
surdity or inconsistency. 

The great question with many is, how children can 
be capable of sin at so early a stage of their existence, 
as is supposed. But if God has made them moral agents ; 
if from the first he has constituted them " reasonable, ac- 
countable beings;" or if they are such " by their natural 
birth," as Dr. Ware expresses it ; are they not of course 
capable of sin from the first ? They must be as really 
capable of sin at the commencement of their moral ex- 
istence, as at any subsequent period. If the objector de- 
nies this, then let him tell me how it can be, that men 
become more truly capable of sin, after they have been 
moral agents for some time, than when they begin to be 
moral agents. I speak not here, as to the degree of ca- 
pability, but the reality of it. If at the commencement 
of moral existence, men are not as really capable of sin, 
as afterwards ; it must be because they are not really 
moral agents. And if they are not really moral agents, 
it must be because they have not the properties which, 
are essential to mora! agency. But Dr. Ware asserts 



88 



that they have these properties by nature ; so that I 
have no controversy with him on this subject. 

But if men, at the beginning of their existence, are 
not really moral agents ; the present discussion has 
nothing to do with them at that period ; for the very 
question, whether they are the subjects of moral evil, 
manifestly implies that they are capable of moral evil. 
I make it no part of my object in this discussion, to de- 
termine precisely the time, when moral agency begins. 
There are difficulties in the way of such a determination, 
which I feel myself wholly unable to surmount My 
position is, that as soon as men are moral agents, they 
are sinners. Dr. Ware's limitation of the universal ex- 
pression, " all have sinned," p. 44, is undoubtedly just. 
It seems to me as unreasonable and absurd to say, that 
human beings are really sinners before they are moral 
agents, as to say that birds or fishes are sinners. Dr. 
Ware's position is mine, that men are sinners as soon as 
they are moral agents. 

But I wish to take a still nearer and more particular 
view of this point. Let me say then, that if men at first, 
have a low degree of moral agency, or a low and feeble 
degree of those faculties which constitute them moral 
agents, as we find the case actually is ; they must be 
sinners in a correspondent degree. This view of the 
subject appears to me perfectly reasonable. Men have 
by nature the constitution — they have all the faculties, 
essential to moral agency. But at first they have them 
in a small degree. Of course they are in a small de- 
gree accountable creatures — in a small degree capable 
of sin ; and if they are really sinners, they must be so 
only in the same degree. According to this view, there 
must be the same dl inference between men of mature age 
and little children in regard to their sinfulness, as there 



89 



is in regard to their intellectual and moral powers. In 
early childhood, there is only the feeble dawn of reason 
and conscience ; only the commencement, and that al- 
most imperceptible, of intellectual and moral faculties, 
and of moral agency — much like the commencement of 
corporeal powers and corporeal action in infancy. As 
childhood advances, the light of reason and conscience 
waxes brighter ; the intellectual and moral powers grad- 
ually increase, till they come to a good degree of strength. 
Now reason and observation lead us to think it is so, in 
regard to moral evil. In early childhood, there is a 
small and almost imperceptible beginning of sinful affec- 
tion, a beginning exactly corresponding to the feeble 
dawn of reason and conscience, and to the incipient state 
of moral agency. After this, sinful affection and action 
gradually increase with the increasing strength of the 
intellectual and moral faculties, till they rise to their ul- 
timate state. Is there any thing incredible in all this? 
Is it not fully confirmed by the actual appearances of 
human nature from infancy to mature age, as well as by 
the representations of Scripture ? 

But our attention is called to another view of the 
subject. In regard to moral agency, as well as many 
other subjects, Dr. Ware seems to agree with Dr. John 
Taylor, who invests his opinions and arguments with such 
charms of genius and taste, as are found in few writers 
of any age. Dr. Ware p. 20, represents man as with- 
out either sin or holiness, until he has, by the exercise of 
his faculties, actually formed a character either good or 
bad." He must mean an exercise of the faculties which 
precedes the existence of either sin or holiness. In anoth- 
er place, he seems fond of representing, that men make 
themselves sinners ; which, connected as it is, must mean, 
that they arc not sinners before they make themselves 



90 



so, and that the effort, or the exercise of their faculties, 
whatever it may be, by which they make themselves sin- 
ners, takes place before they are in any degree the sub- 
jects of sin. For it would hardly be to his purpose to 
say, that men make themselves sinners by an exercise of 
their faculties, after they have become sinners ; though 
he might very justly affirm, that they make themselves 
more and more sinful in that way. 

This then, if I mistake not, is Dr. Ware's theory, as 
it seems to be of many celebrated writers ; namely ; 
that men make themselves sinners, or bring themselves 
into a state of sinfulness, or form a sinful disposition in 
themselves, by an exercise of their powers, or a course 
of voluntary action, which is antecedent to the first ex- 
istence of sin in them. It is most certainly Dr. Ware's 
meaning, that the exercise or course of action, by which 
men make themselves sinners, precedes the first exist- 
ence of sin in them ; because it is his object to account 
for the fact, that men first become sinners ; and we 
should not expect that he would ascribe the commence- 
ment or origin of moral evil in mankind to an exercise of 
their faculties, which takes place after that same moral 
evil has begun to exist. His theory then is, that before 
men have any taint of sin, they go through an exercise 
of their faculties, or a course of action, which results in 
sin, or by which they make themselves sinners. 

The difficulties, with which this theory is encumber- 
ed, I have before hinted at. But I shall now set them 
before the reader more particularly and fully. 

L When Dr. Ware, in stating this theory, speaks 
of " the exercise of the faculties," he must mean those 
faculties of moral agents, which he thinks men pos- 
sess by their natural birth. I ask then, wheth- 
er they can exercise those faculties, without being in 



91 



fact moral agents ; or in other words, without exercising 
their moral agency ? My next question is. how they 
can be moral agents, and perform the actions, or have 
the feelings of moral agents, and yet have neither holi- 
ness nor sin ? If they are moral agents, they are account- 
able to God, Accountable for what? Why, according 
to one part of Dr. Ware's scheme, accountable for an ex- 
ercise of the faculties, which is neither holy nor sinful ; 
not holy, for if it were holy, it surely could not be the 
way in which men " make themselves sinners — and 
not sinful, because, according to this scheme, sin begins 
to exist as its consequence, not as its attribute, or attend- 
ant circumstance. If then this theory is true, moral 
agents, who are of course accountable to God, are, in this 
case, accountable for an exercise of their powers, which 
is neither holy nor sinful. What does such accountable- 
ness amount to ? Further. If they are moral agents, 
their actions have a relation to a moral law, and so must 
be conformed or not conformed, obedience or disobedi- 
ence. But here is an exercise of faculties or a course of 
action in moral agents, which partakes neither of obedi- 
ence nor disobedience. What then is its relation to law ? 
And of what account is it in a moral view ? 

But I have another question ; namely ; how can such 
an exercise of the faculties, or such a course of action, 
as is supposed by Dr. Ware, produce the effect attrib- 
uted to it? How can actions, which precede the existence 
of moral evil, and so have in them nothing of the nature 
of moral evil, tend to produce moral evil, as their result ? 
Was there ever any thing like this in the history of the 
human mind ? that is, that a rational, voluntary exercise 
should produce an effect, of an entirely different nature 
from itself? The exercise of reason may produce an im- 
provement of reason, or may excite a rational affection. 



92 



The exercise of any perverse, corrupt passion may in- 
crease the strength of that passion, and tend to bring 
the mind under its influence. But show me any fact in 
human nature, which can lead us to think, that actions, 
in no degree sinful, will produce sin. In the case before 
us, why should they produce sin, rather than holiness ? 
Have they, or has the mind in which they exist, any ten- 
dency to sin, rather than to holiness ? But this would 
be contrary to Dr. Ware's scheme, as exhibited, p. 20, 21, 
and elsewhere. Does sin, then, rather than holiness, re- 
sult from those actions, by chance, that is, without any 
thing in them, which can be a cause of this result, rather 
than of another ? If so, then the task still lies on Dr. 
Ware's hands, of accounting by some adequate cause, 
for the first existence of moral evil in the human mind. 

The difficulties I have now suggested, though quick- 
ly disposed of by men of superficial understanding, will 
not easily be passed over by those, who are accustomed 
to close and patient investigation. Dr. Ware attributes 
the first existence of sin in the individuals of our race, to 
a certain exercise of their rational faculties, or a certain 
course of voluntary action, as its cause. I can well 
enough perceive that, according to the known laws of 
the human mind, the exercise of the faculties will 
strengthen the faculties, and that any course of voluntary 
action will strengthen and confirm all those dispositions 
which it involves. But here is a scheme quite different ; 
not that the faculties of the mind, not that the moral dis- 
positions acquire strength by exercise, nor that intellectu- 
al and moral habits are in this way generated, or con- 
firmed ; but that an exercise of the faculties, or a course 
of action, which has not the smallest degree of any thing 
sinful in it, is yet the cause which produces sin, or the 
very way in which men first make themselves sinners. I 



93 

ask for facts, plain, obvious facts, which men have been 
conscious of in themselves or witnessed in others, to es- 
tablish this theory. I can indeed readily admit, that 
children and men may exercise their faculties for some 
time, before they make a particular disposition or trait 
of character, which belongs to them, manifest to others. 
This may be owing to the weakness of the disposition, 
or to the absence of those causes, which would excite it 
in any sensible degree and give it a visible form, or to 
the influence of causes which lead to a studied conceal* 
ment. But in all such cases, the disposition exists — ac- 
tually exists, though in a low and invisible degree. Mo- 
tives excite it. Exercise strengthens it. Occasions give 
it form, and bring it out to view. But according to the 
settled constitution of human nature, no motives, no ex- 
ercise of the mind, no occasions can ever produce a new 
moral disposition or affection, that is to say, one which 
does not in some way already belong to the mind. They 
can no more do this, than they can produce a new intel- 
lectual faculty, or a new bodily appetite. — It is readily 
granted, that motives and occasions may produce a new 
modification of a moral disposition, or a new combination 
of different dispositions, and in that way may originate 
a new form of affection, so that a new name will become 
necessary ; as a man, who has a spirit of selfishness 
lurking within him, may, at one time, be placed in cir- 
cumstances, which will give his selfishness the form of 
pride or vanity ; at another time, the form of covetous- 
ness ; at another time, the form of envy or revenge. 
But the general nature of pride, vanity, avarice, envy 
and revenge is involved in that selfishness, which before 
lurked in the mind, and which may be considered as the 
original affection. In all these cases, there is nothing 
new in its nature. The disposition, which is excited in 

13 



94 



a course of voluntary action, is one which before existed 
either in the same form, or in a different one. But Dr. 
Ware's scheme is very diverse from this. He undertakes 
to account for the origin of a sinful disposition, by an ex- 
ercise of the faculties, in which that disposition is in no 
sense involved. Let Dr. Ware prove, that there is any 
connexion between such a cause and such an effect. 

Before leaving this part of Dr. Ware's scheme, take 
one short view of it. He undertakes to account for the 
first existence of sin in individuals of the human race. 
But how does he account for it ? He says, they make 
themselves sinners, and that they do it by yielding to 
temptation, by obeying the impulse of passion in opposition 
to reason and conscience, and by subjecting themselves to the 
dominion of the inferior part of their nature. But how 
can all these things take place, without implying that 
sin already exists ? These certainly are sins, if there is 
any such thing as sin in the world. But these particu- 
lar modes of sinning are represented as accounting for the 
fact that men are sinners. Thus the same thing is made 
to be cause and effect. But how will Dr. Ware account 
for these particular modes of sinning ; namely, men's 
yielding to temptations which it is in their power to re- 
sist, obeying the impulse of passion, &c ? If sin in any 
other form is to be accounted for by a proper cause ; 
why not in these forms ? Or are we to stop short here, 
as Dr. Ware seems, p. 37, to think necessary ? Speak- 
ing with reference to the origin of sin, he says ; " when 
we have traced back the wickedness of men, as it actu- 
ally exists, to the voluntary neglect, perversion, and 
abuse of the nature God has given them, we can go no 
farther," But after all, this is only tracing back the 
wickedness of men, to itself — wickedness considered gen- 
erally or in the gross, to wickedness in particular forms. 



95 



This corrupt nature of men is what they have made for 
themselves ; and they have made it by the neglect, per- 
version, and abuse of the nature God has given them. 
But their nature must have been already corrupt, when 
such neglect, perversion, and abuse took place. These 
were sins, And one would rather suppose it rational to 
make a corrupt nature account for these particular sins, 
than to make these account for that ; because, manifest- 
ly, if either precedes the other, and may act as a cause 
of the other, it is the sinful disposition or corrupt nature* 
not any particular modes of sinning. Common sense 
leads us to ascribe sinful actions, or particular modes of 
sinning, to a sinful disposition or heart, as the source, and 
to speak of them as deriving from that source all their 
criminality. 

In the treatment of this subject, Dr. Ware seems to 
have a very commendable motive, that is, a conviction 
of the weakness and fallibility of man. He says, p. 37 ? 
" Questions may be asked upon this statement, which 
cannot be answered, because we have not faculties which 
enable us in any cases, to trace things up to the first 
cause and spring of action." Had Dr. Taylor, and other 
writers like him, observed this maxim, they never would 
have attempted to trace back the existence of moral 
evil in man to its first cause ; or if, while attempting 
this, they had been under the guidance of reason or phi- 
losophy, they never would have fixed upon the opera- 
tion of a free-will, or self-determining power. Because 
it is perfectly obvious, that the particular motions or de- 
terminations of the will are prompted and governed by 
the disposition or affections of the heart. This is one 
of the laws of our nature. And if in any case it should 
cease to be so, our volitions would cease to be either 
good or bad. If a man should have any volition, of 



96 



make any choice, which was not prompted by a dis- 
position or affection of the heart ; that volition or choice 
would no more be of a moral nature, than an accidental 
motion of the hand. This sentiment is recognized in all 
the judgments we pass upon the volitions and external 
actions of men. The moment you decide what was the 
disposition of heart, which gave rise to any particular 
volitions, or determinate acts of the will, you decide 
the character of those volitions. But if, in any case, 
you are unable to decide the former, you are of course 
unable to decide the latter. Or if, in any case, you 
could entirely separate particular volitions from the dis- 
position of the heart ; you could no longer regard them, 
as of a moral nature. This is the constitution of the 
human mind; the irreversible appointment of God. The 
prevailing disposition or affection of the heart prompts 
particular acts or determinations of the will, and satisfac- 
torily accounts for them. For example, the particu- 
lar choice or determination of Judas to accept the thirty 
pieces of silver, and deliver Christ to the rulers, arose 
from his avarice, or from his resentment, or from both. 
As long as men are free, they will follow their incli- 
nation, or choose and act according to their disposition, 
But was there ever any such thing in human nature, as 
that particular volitions or determinate acts of the will 
preceded and produced the disposition or affection of the 
heart? And if not, — then, how can any power or act 
of free-will be considered philosophically, as the cause 
of w r hat is sinful in the human character? 

There is another commendable motive which seems 
to have influenced Dr. Ware. He says, p. 37, " No dif- 
ficulty so great and insurmountable meets us, as, on the 
opposite theory, is the moral difficulty in which it involves 
the character of the Author of our being." My reply 



97 



is, first, that no proof has ever yet been given, that the 
doctrine of native depravity involves the character of 
God in any difficulty ; and secondly ; that if God's char- 
acter is to be vindicated in relation to this subject, it 
must be by something better than sophistical reasoning. 

But after all, Dr. Ware seems to have no kind of 
hesitation, as to the truth of his system, and the conclu- 
siveness of his reasoning. He has told us, as though it 
were perfectly obvious and certain, (and the same may 
be repeated by others,) " that man is by nature capable 
of making a right or wrong choice, and no more in- 
clined to one than the other ; that he makes himself a 
sinner by yielding to temptation and obeying the im- 
pulse of passion ; that all his wickedness may be ac- 
counted for without any native bias to sin ; that it may 
all be but the effect of neglect to restrain appetites 
in themselves good, to give proper direction to pow- 
ers designed to be useful, and in general, of a failure 
to exercise properly, in temptations and trials, the pow- 
ers of direction and resistance, which were in themselves 
sufficient." Now I have already granted that these are 
ways in which men commit sin ; ways in which they ex- 
hibit and increase their depravity. But I might say too, 
that mankind sin by worshipping idols, by taking the 
name of God in vain, by profaning the Sabbath, by cov- 
etousne&s and revenge. And why would it not be just 
as proper for me to account for the fact, that men are 
sinners, by these forms of sin, and to say, that their de- 
pravity is but the effect of idolatry, profaneness, covet- 
ousness and revenge, as to do what Dr. Ware has done ? 
The plain fact is, that the neglect and perversion and 
abuse of our faculties, yielding to temptation, and the 
other things which Dr. Ware has mentioned, and all the 
more particular instances of sin, as idolatry, profaneness, 



98 



covetousness, slander, revenge, &c, constitute human wick~ 
edness.- They make up the amount of man's sin ; as the 
parts of any thing, taken together, make up the whole. 
But these various parts of human wickedness, or ways 
of sinning, are not the cause of the depravity of the heart, 
but spring from it ; as our Saviour teaches, Matt. xv. 19. 
" Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adul- 
teries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." 
These things show the depravity of the heart, but do not 
produce it, nor in any wise account for it. Name any form 
of human wickedness, any thought, volition, choice, ac- 
tion, which is sinful ; any instance of yielding to tempta- 
tion ; any perversion or abuse of our faculties ; and you 
name that which proceeds from depravity of heart. 
If you say it is not so, then you say, that man can com- 
mit sin with a sinless heart, or else without any heart at 
all. Now take the earliest act of sin which men com- 
mit, the first sinful thought, volition, or choice, the first 
yielding to temptation, the first neglect or abuse of God's 
gifts, which takes place in children ; and even that im- 
plies a sinful disposition, or depravity of heart, and pro- 
ceeds from it. The sinfulness of the heart must be re- 
sorted to, as the fountain of every act and every form of 
sin, from the commencement of moral agency. And 
when Dr. Ware says, all men are sinners " as soon as 
they are moral agents," he does as much as to say, 
they have a sinful or depraved heart as soon as they 
are moral agents ; as there is no other way in which they 
can be sinners. If then he would account for the origin 
of moral evil in man, he must account for the wrong dis- 
position or sinfulness of heart, which is just as evidently 
presupposed in every particular act and every mode of sin- 
ning, as goodness of disposition is presupposed in every act of 
obedience, or as the principle of gravitation is presupposed 



99 



in every instance in which a stone falls to the earth, or any 
one body tends towards another. The first sinfulness or de- 
pravity of the heart is no more produced by a sinful volition 
or action, than the principle of gravitation is produced by 
the falling of a stone, or the descent of a river. My position 
is, that men have this sinfulness or depravity of heart by 
nature, and that it is not the effect of any preceding vo- 
lition or action in them, nor the effect of any change 
they undergo after their birth. And in reality, this 
seems to be taught by Dr. Ware himself in some re- 
markable passages of his Letters. We gather from pp. 
20, 21, 41, 45, that men are by nature accountable be- 
ings, or moral agents, but that they are destitute of holi- 
ness, and not inclined to holiness. And is it not sin, for 
those who are accountable beings, to be destitute of ho- 
liness, and destitute of all inclination to holiness ? Is not 
this the very case, upon which our Saviour put the 
mark of his high displeasure, when he said, " I know that 
ye have not the love of God in you ?" But every doubt 
as to Dr. Ware's views would seem to be taken away 
by what we find pp. 44,47, where he represents all men 
as reasonable beings or moral agents by nature, and sin- 
ners as soon as moral agents ; and where he represents 
Christians as delivered from the state of wrath in which 
they had lived from their birth. This is all I would con- 
tend for. Dr. Ware would hardly acknowledge this to 
be really a part of his system. But it is a little remark- 
able that, in a free investigation of the sense of Scripture, 
he should let fall expressions so contrary to his own the- 
ory, and so consonant to ours.* 

* Dr. Ware appears to have been somewhat inadvertent in his language, or 
unfortunate in his argument on some parts of this subject. In his remarks on 
Ephes. ii. 3. "And were by nature children of wrath," he says, "it does not 
point to any thing inbred or native— not to the state of men as they come into 
the world but yet a few lines after, he gays it denotes that very state, t: into 
which they came by their birth." p. 45. 



100 



We have now come in our reasoning, to an ultimate fact. 
Man, in the state into which he is born, has a sinful heart, 
or is inclined to sin. If any one thinks this supposition 
inconsistent with moral agency ; I ask, how it is any 
more inconsistent with moral agency for man to be a 
sinner, or to be inclined to sin at first, than afterwards ? 
If you deny that man can begin to be a sinner at the 
commencement of his moral agency, or that his 
first moral affections or actions can be sinful ; then 
tell me when he can begin to be a sinner. Can 
he the second hour, or month, or year after his 
moral agency commences? But if he has been 
exercising his moral agency an hour or month or year, 
without sin, he has been exercising a holy agency ; and 
he must have done something towards acquiring a habit 
of holiness. Now is it more easy and more consistent 
to suppose, that he will begin to sin after such a habit 
of holiness is formed, than before? No supposition can 
be made of sin's commencing in man at any period sub- 
sequent to his first existing as a moral agent, which will, 
in the smallest degree, relieve the difficulty attending the 
supposition of its commencing at first. A being consti- 
tuted, as man is, an accountable, moral agent, must be 
blame-worthy for every affection and action which is not 
conformed to the rule of duty, whenever that affection 
or action takes place. If you deny this, you deny that 
the rule of duty is just. If you allow this, you allow 
that sin's commencing at the commencement of man's 
moral existence does not prevent its ill-desert. 

I have wished to dwell upon this point long enough 
to make it perfectly plain, and to prevent, if possible, the 
endless repetition of the saying, that man cannot be cul- 
pable for any thing which he has by nature — for any thing 
which is not the fruit or consequence of his own choice. 



101 



Nothing can be more groundless than this notion. For 
whenever, and in whatever way, man has what the di- 
vine law forbids, or is destitute of what it requires, he is 
culpable ; unless the law itself is in fault. 

Mankind will indeed have difficulties respecting that 
agency, which God is supposed to exercise in this case, 
and the consistency of it with his infinite holiness and 
goodness. An outcry is raised against the Orthodox for 
charging it to the fault of sinners, that they are what 
God made them. And though it has been shown a thou- 
sand times, that our doctrine is liable to no valid objec- 
tion in this respect ; the objection is still reiterated ; just 
as though the writings of the Edwardses and others on 
this subject had never been published, or had been fair- 
ly confuted. 

My general remark on this topic is, that, in regard 
to the divine agency, and the divine goodness, the theory 
which I advocate is liable to no such objection as that 
above suggested, more than the theory of my opponent. 
The difficulties attending his theory, are perfectly obvi- 
ous to every intelligent man. Human beings, he would 
say, are brought into being in a state where they are ex- 
posed ^o danger. But if there must be danger, still why 
are they not fortified against it ? Why are not poor, 
frail creatures, who have as yet no moral principle to 
guide them, so aided by divine goodness at the outset, 
that they shall take a right direction ? They are at 
first, it seems, in a state of perfect equilibrium, inclined 
neither one way nor the other. Their Maker sees this. 
He has put them in this state. Why does he not, at 
this critical period, when they are so weak, and so de- 
pendent on him, just interpose, and turn the scale in fa- 
vour of holiness ? Why does he leave all, when they 
first act as moral beings, to act wrong — to catch the fa- 

14 



102 



tai contagion of sin ? Why does he expose them to that 
contagion ? And how does it happen that, without any 
predisposition to evil, they all run into it? The scale 
equally balanced, without the least tendency one way or 
the other, always turns the wrong way. And God stands 
by, and sees it, and lets it be, when a very little help 
from him would prevent And is there no difficulty in 
this ? 

But considering the importance attached to the par- 
ticular subject now before us, I shall extend my remarks 
a little farther ; making it my object to show, that the 
scheme of Unitarians is attended with as many, and as 
great difficulties, as that of the Orthodox. 

It will doubtless be consistent with Dr» Ware's views, 
to admit any divine" agency in dependent beings, which 
is necessary to their existing and acting, and which is 
suited to their rational and moral nature. Philosophical 
Unitarians, who respect the authority of Hartley, or 
Priestley, will maintain, as strenuously as any of the Or- 
thodox, that all the volitions and actions of men, wheth- 
er good or bad, result from causes, which operate accord- 
ing to the settled laws of our nature ; and that those 
causes are entirely under God's control, and are made 
efficacious by his will. Indeed I see not how any man 
can deny this, without falling into athesim. To prevent 
misapprehension in the minds of any of my readers, I 
will here add, that the agency which we ascribe to God 
in the formation and preservation of moral agents, and 
in the direction of those causes which determine their 
moral actions, is not to be illustrated by the agency of 
God in the natural world. God's forming a moral agent 
is not like his forming a stone or a tree. His giving 
activity to man, and efficacy to the moral causes 
which operate upon him, is not like his giving efficacy to 



103 



the causes which relate to the growth of a tree, or to 
the motion of the planets. The influence by which God, 
in any case, leads men to act, is an influence suited to 
their rational, active nature. It is not onlyconsistent with 
their moral agency, but is its grand security. The caus- 
es which, according to the divine appointment, act upon 
moral agents, do indeed produce effects. But what are 
those effects, but rational, moral actions, actions of such 
a nature, that those, who perform them, are justly and 
in the highest degree accountable ? 

After these explanatory observations, I request my 
opponents candidly to inquire, whether the Orthodox 
theory is involved in any difficulty with respect to the 
divine agency, from which theirs is free. Is more divine 
agency necessary to account for moral action in the 
first stage of our existence, than afterwards ? Or in ac- 
counting for men's beginning to sin as soon as they be- 
gin to be moral agents, is it necessary that the influence 
which God exerts, or the causes which he appoints, should 
be applied to them in a different manner from what 
they are in regard to sins afterwards committed? Are 
not men at all times equally dependent on God? Are 
not their feelings and actions regulated by the same caus- 
es at the beginning of their moral existence, as at any 
other period? And are they not as really accountable, 
when they first exist as moral agents, as when they have 
been moral agents for years ? I speak not here, as to 
the degree in which they exert their rational powers, or 
the degree in which they are praise-worthy, or blame- 
worthy ; but as to the fact of their really exerting them, 
and the fact of their being accountable. Now how can 
it be supposed, that the theory of native depravity in- 
volves any greater difficulty in regard to the divine agen- 
cy, than any other theory which admits that man is a 



104 



sinner ; inasmuch as the only difference in this respect 
is, that, according to one, man begins to be a sinner ear- 
lier, than according to the other ? Those who assert 
that men begin to be sinners at a later period, are as 
much obliged to account for that fact without in- 
volving a divine agencj that is inadmissible, as we 
are to account for the fact that men are sinners 
from the first. The fact which they are to account 
for, is, that men who have been moral agents for some 
time, and have, by the exercise of holiness, done some- 
thing towards forming a habit of holiness, should then be- 
come sinners. The task of accounting for this is, to say 
the least, as hard as what falls to us. For how is it 
that the holv affections, which have for some time 
been acquiring strength by exercise, should, in eve- 
ry human being, so easily give place to sinful affec- 
tions ? and that a habit, which has attained more or less 
confirmation, should be so easily overcome ? How is it 
that men can, according to the fixed laws which regulate 
the mind, be uniformly induced to sin, by any causes 
whatever ? Are not all the causes, which operate 
upon them, under the direction of the Almighty ? Sup- 
pose they are drawn aside from duty by temptations 
arising from external objects. Who is it but God that 
formed and arranged those objects ? And who is it but 
God, that has given man that constitution of body and 
mind, which exposes him to receive an impression from 
those objects, and to be drawn aside by their influence? 
Who is it that places him in such a situation, that those 
objects acquire so mighty a sway over his feelings and 
his actions ? How easy would it be for that God, who 
contrives and rules all things, so to direct the circum- 
stances of man, or, in all circumstances, so to 
influence his mind, that he should never fall into 



105 



sin? Or suppose he is drawn into sin by his appe- 
tites and passions. Who gave him those appetites 
and passions? And who gave them power thus to in- 
fluence his conduct ? Or who £ave him a moral consti- 
tution so weak, as to be uniformly overcome by such an 
influence ? Or to go back a little farther. When God 
formed the plan of this world, did he not clearly see how 
the mind of man, placed under the influence of such 
causes, would operate ? Did he not see how it would 
evolve its powers and its affections; how it would be 
impressed by other objects ; and what would ultimately 
be its moral aspect ? Did he not foresee all this ? Did 
he not form things as they are, with a perfect foreknowl- 
edge of the result ? Was it possible for him to adopt 
such a scheme, made up of causes and effects in the 
moral as well as in the natural world, with any other 
view, than that the consequences which have actually 
taken place, should take place ? Say, if you please, 
that man's conduct and character are owing to his 
own free will. Did not God give him his free will? 
And when he gave it, did he not know exactly what it 
was, and how it would operate ? And is it not accord- 
ing to his plan, that man's free will is influenced as it is 
by the various causes which affect it ? Should it be said, 
the will is prompted to act by no motive or cause ex- 
traneous to itself; my reply would be, first, that this would 
relieve no difficulty in regard to the character and agency 
of God. For if the will were not actuated by external mo- 
tives or causes, then we should be under the necessity of 
concluding that God so constituted the will, that it should 
be moved to act by causes ivithin itself, those causes, and 
the influence they should have on the mind, being as 
much dependent on a divine arrangement, as any thing 
else. But I should reply, secondly, that as man is in 



106 



fact constituted, such a supposition is not admissible. 
Because acts of the will, not prompted by the disposi" 
tion of the heart, nor by any other motive, could have 
no moral character. Of this any man may be satisfied, 
who will allow himself to think. It is perfectly plain, 
that any determinations of the will, in order to be vir- 
tuous or vicious, must be influenced by motives, and by 
motives of a moral nature. Motives are the proximate 
causes of all voluntary actions ; and must be so, or we 
cease to be moral agents. But are not these motives 
wholly under the divine control ? 

Now let Dr. Ware, in view of the whole subject, 
clearly show, how the concern which God must have 
with moral actions, in any instance of transgression, which 
takes place in any period of life, can be admitted, with- 
out dishonour to his character; and I will show how 
it can be admitted in the case of that early trans- 
gression, which our doctrine asserts. I insist that a mor- 
al depravity, existing from the first, involves no greater 
difficulty respecting the divine agency, than the scheme 
advocated by our opponents. 

The truth of Dr. Ware's declaration, that " we have 
not faculties which enable us in any cases to trace things 
up to the first cause and spring of action," I do not ad- 
mit, without some limitation. It is indeed true in all 
cases, where God has not, in one way or another, given 
us sufficient information. But as to the subject now un- 
der consideration, God has not left us in such profound 
ignorance, as seems to be signified by the above cited 
remark. And is there not an appearance, in this place, 
of Dr. Ware's shrinking back from the task of tracing 
the universal wickedness of man up to its cause or spring, 
lest he should run himself upon the same difficulty, which 
he charges upon the Orthodox doctrine ? But in reali- 



107 



ty, how can he excuse himself from attempting, by some 
adequate cause, to account for that universal wickedness 
which, as a matter of fact, he frequently acknowledges ? 
It behoves him at least, to admit candidly, and without 
fear of consequences, the natural, obvious meaning of 
those texts of Scripture, which expressly assign such a 
cause ; and not to impose upon himself, or his readers, 
by a representation, which does nothing more or less, 
than to make sin the cause of itself. He surely could 
not mean to say, that it has no cause ; for this would be 
the same as saying, that it takes place by chance — that 
it is a mere accident, or mishap. And who ever thought 
himself accountable for the freaks of chance ? 

Possibly Dr. Ware might allow, that our rational, 
moral nature has settled laws, and always acts under the 
influence of moral causes, and yet say, it is not for us to 
know, what those laws or causes are. But most certain- 
ly, this must be regarded as a suitable subject of inquiry. 
" The proper study of mankind is man." Nor does mod- 
esty or humility forbid us to extend, as far as possible, 
our knowledge of the properties of the mind, and of the 
causes which influence its actions. Nor does honesty 
permit us to stifle or conceal our convictions. Knowl- 
edge in regard to this general subject is of the highest 
practical importance. For there is no way, in which we 
can exercise any salutary discipline over our own minds, 
or attain any thing like self-government, unless we have 
learnt, in a good degree, the attributes and laws of our 
intellectual and moral nature. But how is this knowl- 
edge to be obtained ? Plainly, by experience and obser- 
vation. From ourselves and others we Jearn in what 
manner, and under what causes the mind acts. Now it 
might be easy enough for Dr. Ware to account for the 
moral disorders which prevail in the world, if the single 



108 



fact were admitted, that men are actually depraved, or 
have become sinners. For it is what every body knows, 
that men will act according to their prevailing disposition, 
and that their disposition is strengthened and confirmed 
by repeated acts. But the difficulty, which it behoves 
my opponent to solve, is, that reasonable, moral beings, 
coming into existence with a nature perfectly pure — 
with a nature not in the least inclined to evil, should uni- 
versally become sinners, as soon as they are capable of 
action. No act of the will can account for this fact. 
Certainly no right act of the will can account for it 
And there can be no wrong act of the will, before there 
is a wrong disposition or affection of heart. But if men 
have a wrong disposition, they are already depraved, 
and their being so is not by any means to be accounted 
for, by that sinful act of the will, which takes place after 
they become so. 

The corrupting influence of bad example is mention- 
ed by Dr. Ware and others, to account for the early and 
general depravity of mankind. But is this satisfactory? 
Upon the supposition that men are free from all wrong bias, 
and perfectly pure, they can have no disposition to fol- 
low a bad example, or in the least degree to be pleased 
with it. And if they have no disposition to follow it, or 
be pleased with it, it surely cannot injure them. There 
is no conceivable way, in which any bad example, any 
temptation or solicitation to sin from without, can be in- 
jurious to us, but by meeting with a disposition in as 
which concurs with it, and draws us into compliance. 
The power of temptation, whenever it prevails, lies in 
such a disposition in us. But such a disposition is 
sinful. Where it exists, even in the smallest degree, 
sin is already begun. Jesus was always, from the 
first, perfectly free from any sinful disposition ; and 



109 



therefore no temptation had any effect upon him, but to 
exercise and confirm his virtue. Temptation never pro* 
duces its effect upon moral agents, either in a compulso- 
ry manner, or by chance. They have a propensity, oft- 
en unperceived by themselves, to the sins, which they 
are tempted to commit. The prevalence of temptation to 
draw them into sin is always considered a proof, that there 
is something wrong in their disposition. Were it possi- 
ble that temptation should in any case have influence 
to lead men into sin, when there is no sinful incli- 
nation mixing with it, and giving it influence ; their 
compliance might be a misfortune, but could not be 
crime. It appears therefore, that the influence of temp- 
tation, though it may account for the first display of mor- 
al evil, or for the first outward, palpable act of sin, can* 
not account for the first existence of that which is the 
root and essence of all sin, namely, a corrupt disposition 
of heart. 

The attempt of Dr. Taylor to account for the cor- 
ruption of the world by the influence of bad example, is 
particularly answered by Edwards. The following is a 
summary of the answ T er. — It is accounting for the corrup- 
tion of the world by itself. For the universal prevalence 
of bad examples is the very corruption to be accounted 
for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil 
than to good ; how comes it to pass, that there are, in 
all ages, so many more bad examples, than good ones? 
Or if there are not more bad ones than good, how is it 
that the bad are so much more followed ? And when 
opposition has been made by good examples, how comes 
it to pass that it has had so little effect to stem thegen* 
eral current of wickedness ? There have in different 
ages been examples of eminent piety. and goodness, as 
that of Noah, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of the Pro* 
15 



110 



phets, apostles, and martyrs, but especially the exam- 
ple of Christ, which was in all respects perfect, and 
was exhibited in a manner and in circumstances to excite 
the highest possible interest. These examples are con- 
stantly held up to view in the Scriptures, and by the 
ministers of religion, and would surely produce a gen- 
eral effect in Christian lands, were there not a propensi- 
ty in man to follow bad examples rather than good ones. 

Again. The influence of bad example, without cor- 
ruption of nature, will not account for children's univer- 
sally committing sin, as soon as they are capable of it, 
especially the children of eminently pious parents. 

Several Unitarians have triumphantly repeated of 
late, what Dr. Taylor said long ago, that the occurrence 
of sin in Adam, who is admitted on both sides to have 
been at first sinless, invalidates the grand argument of 
the Orthodox in proof of native depravity. 

I frankly acknowledge that this fact does invali- 
date the argument of the Orthodox, so far as they 
have attempted to prove the native depravity of men 
from the naked fact, that they all commit sin. Although 
all who have come to adult years, are sinners ; this 5 by 
itself, is no conclusive proof, that they were sinners,yrom 
their birth. For if an individual, and that individual the 
parent of our race, may change from native innocence to 
sin ; we could not, by our own reason, certainly 
determine, that it would be impossible for the 
whole race to change in like manner. We must look 
then for facts. And for the evidence of facts, we must 
rely wholly on our own experience and observation, and 
on the word of God. If we could call to remembrance 
several years at the commencement of our life, in which 
we were wholly without sin ; or if we learnt, by care- 
ful observation, that children generally live a number of 



Ill 



years in a perfectly sinless state ; or if the Scriptures 
taught us that such is the state of human beings at the 
beginning of their life ; we should be obliged to admit 
the original purity of their nature, as we do that of Adam, 
though they all become sinners afterwards. In regard 
to Adam, there is satisfactory proof of the fact, that he 
was, at first, in a state of holiness, and for a time continu- 
ed in that state. But where is the evidence that such is 
the first moral state of his posterity? We have seen 
abundant evidence, that the contrary is true. In the 
case of Adam, we have evidence, that his transgressing 
the divine law implied a change of his moral nature, from 
holiness to sin, But respecting his posterity, both ex- 
perience and the word of God lead us to conclude, that 
the only moral change they are capable of, is from sin 
to holiness. The two cases then are materially different. 
And we can by no means reason respecting the one, as 
we do respecting the other. The sin of Adam can af- 
ford no evidence, that his nature was corrupt from the 
first. But the sin of his posterity, circumstanced as it 
is, affords the most conclusive evidence, that they are, 
from the first, subjects of a corrupt nature. Just as the 
case may be in bodily diseases. A man may have a 
consumption, when there is no proof that it is a native 
or constitutional disorder. But a consumption in other 
cases may be attended with circumstances, which prove 
beyond a doubt, that the disorder was founded in the 
original constitution. Both in regard to the bodily and 
the spiritual disorder, our single inquiry is, whether the 
circumstances of the case prove it to be natural. What 
I have said, Chapter in, is the substance of the argument, 
by which I prove the moral depravity of mankind to be 
native. But there is no evidence at all that Adam's deprav- 
ity Was native. I say then, we cannot reason from one to 



112 

the other, because the circumstances of the two are materi- 
ally different. I do not rely on the fact, taken by itself, 
that mankind are all sinners ; because if there were any 
reason to suppose that mankind exist for a time in a sin- 
less state, as Adam did, their being sinners afterwards 
would not show what their state was originally. But it 
is as true of Adam, as of any other man, that ev- 
ery sinful volition and act of his presupposed a sinful 
disposition, and must have arisen from it. And the first 
existence of that sinful disposition in his case is a 
fact as hard to be accounted for, as the existence of 
native depravity in his posterity. The commencement 
of sin in both cases, as also in the case of the angels who 
kept not their first state, is to be regarded as an ultimate 
fact in God's empire ; a fact perfectly consistent with 
the holiness of his character, and with the principles of 
moral agency. I should be content to consider it in this 
light, though I should be compelled to leave it totally 
unexplained, and should find it encompassed with a host 
of difficulties, still more formidable than any I have seen. 
But if Unitarians choose to call up again the reasoning 
of Dr. Taylor in order to show the weakness of one of 
the arguments employed by the Orthodox ; 1 must say, 
their success in this attempt will appear less complete 
than they have imagined. It is a principle founded on 
the laws of nature, that the fruit shows not only what 
the tree now is, but what it w 7 as from its origin, from its 
first vegetation, unless there is evidence that it has in 
some way undergone a change since. I do not mean to 
make an argument of a simile, nor to carry the analogy 
implied in it beyond due limits. But in truth, it is as 
plainly according to the general constitution of heaven, 
to consider the life of man to be a development of his 
intellectual and moral nature, under the influence of 



113 



those various causes which act upon it from the first, as 
to consider the growth and fruit of a tree to be the de- 
velopment of its original nature, acted upon by corres- 
pondent causes. This principle holds good in all cases, 
unless there is proof of such a change as has been sug- 
gested above. 



CHAPTER VI. 

I shall now consider the manner in which Dr. 
Ware confutes several arguments, which the Orthodox 
derive from Scripture in support of the doctrine of de- 
pravity. 

In my Letter, I cited Gen. vi, 5, not as a direct, but 
an indirect proof of the Orthodox doctrine of depravity. 
My object in quoting this particular passage was to il- 
lustrate the general nature of the argument from the 
Old Testament. I shall not take time to expose again 
the objection, which Dr. Ware urges against it, as it is 
the same with that, which I particularly noticed in Let- 
ter V. Dr. Ware has made no attempt to invalidate 
the argument, on which I chiefly relied for the confirm- 
ation of my theory. I had stated, that the Apostle 
quotes promiscuously from the Old Testament, passages 
descriptive of the wickedness of mankind formerly, as 
equally applicable to the human race at all times, 
and that, if the passages referred to are not ap- 
plicable to mankind universally, the Apostle has giv- 
en us sophistry instead of argument. My reasoning on 
the subject is given at length in my fifth Letter, to 
which I beg leave to refer the reader. It was the 



114 

reasoning on which I rested for the truth of my position; 
and it deserved the attention of Dr. Ware, as much as 
any thing I had written. But without any particular at- 
tention to my reasoning, he repeats the very objection 
which I had endeavoured to answer. See Letters to Trini- 
tarians p. 32. The passage in Gen. vi. 5, he says, " re- 
lates not to mankind universally, but to the degenerate 
race of men of that age, so remarkably and universally 
corrupt, beyond all that had gone before or have follow- 
ed since, as to call for the most signal tokens of the ven- 
geance of heaven." 

I begin my remarks on this quotation by saying, that 
there is not the least reason to think, that the men of 
that age were corrupt beyond all who have appeared 
since. There is certainly no evidence of this from the 
description given of their character; for the Bible con- 
tains many a description of human wickedness, as dread- 
ful as that. There is no evidence from the fact, that 
the world was destroyed by a deluge ; for God might 
intend to accomplish some important ends, by making 
such a display of his holy vengeance once, though he 
might not, on account of equal or even greater cor- 
ruption, think proper to repeat it. It is clear too, 
that many portions of the human race have suffer- 
ed more distressing calamities, and of course more dread- 
ful tokens of the divine vengeance, than being destroy- 
ed by a deluge. Besides, there is no probability from 
the circumstances of the case, that men, at that early 
period of the world, and with privileges comparatively 
small, could be guilty in so high a degree, as men of- 
ten have been since. And in addition to all this, our Sa- 
viour expressly cautions us against inferring the degree of 
men's wickedness from the evils they suffer in the pre- 
sent life. See Luke xiii. 1 — 5. So that, from the sig- 



115 



nal tokens of divine vengeance, which the contemporaries 
of Noah experienced, we could not safely conclude that 
they were corrupt above all others. 

This however is a point of minor consequence. To 
invalidate my reasoning, Dr. Ware first remarks, that the 
text, quoted from Gen. vi. 5, "relates not to mankind uni- 
versally, but to the degenerate race of men of that age." 
He means by this remark to prove, that we cannot, in any 
proper sense, apply such passages to mankind generally. 
I had attempted to show that we can learn what human 
nature is, or what man is, from the highest descriptions 
of human wickedness found in the Old Testament ; that 
those descriptions are substantially true in relation to all 
men ; not that all men are criminal in the same degree, 
but that all have the same nature, the same original pro- 
pensities, the same ingredients of character. In all this he 
thinks I expressed myself rashly or carelessly. "Are we," 
he says, much in the manner of Dr. Turnbull, — " are 
we to consider those places, which, singled out and dis- 
tinguished from all others, are expressly declared to 
have been destroyed for their enormous and incorrigi- 
ble wickedness, as fair representatives of the usual state 
and character of the human race ? People, who were 
ordered to be wholly extirpated for the very purpose 
of stopping the contagion of their vices &c, ? Are Pha- 
raoh, Jeroboam, and Judas fair examples and represen- 
tatives of human nature?" I answer, yes. For had 
they any nature but the human ? If they were not 
examples of human nature, of what nature were 
they examples ? — of some nature above the human, 
or below it ? The actions of an individual man always 
result from his own nature, influenced as it is by exter- 
nal causes. But his own nature is human nature. And 
have not others the same ? And admitting the moral 



116 



nature of men to be the same, may we not satisfactorily 
account for the variety of characters among them, from 
the different circumstances in which they are placed, 
and the different combination of causes under which they 
act? Or are we to resort to the strange supposition, 
that all the different degrees of wickedness, which men 
exhibit, are really to be traced back to a corresponding 
difference in their original character ? That is, are we 
to suppose, that Pharaoh, Jeroboam and Judas had orig- 
inally a moral nature as much worse than Moses, David, 
and Paul, as their ultimate characters were worse ? 
Nothing could be more unphilosophical ; nothing more 
contrary to the word of God, and the common sense of 
Christians. 

Now just try the correctness of the principle which 
Dr. Ware's reasoning involves ; namely, that the account 
which the Bible gives of the wickedness of men at one 
period, or in one country, does not make a fair display of 
human nature, and does not show, what is substantially 
the character of men at any other period, or in any oth* 
er country. If this principle is correct, of what use to 
us are the writings of historians, either sacred or pro- 
fane ? It has generally been held up by the best wri- 
ters, as a peculiar advantage of history, that it gives us 
useful lessons respecting human nature, or makes us ac- 
quainted with the character of our species. But if Dr. 
Ware is right, this cannot be admitted. For according 
to his opinion, history only gives us a description of the 
passions, and dispositions, and conduct of particular men 
or societies of men, who had no common nature, and to 
whom no one can reasonably suppose that we bear 
any moral likeness. We may read of the envy and mak 
ice of Cain ; but it is of no use to us, as it cannot be 
supposed that men nowadays have any tendency in their 



117 

aalure to envy and hate others who are better than they. 
And when the Apostle John referred to the conduct of 
Cain, for the purpose of counselling and warning those 
to whom he wrote; he must have done it inadvertently, 
unless there happened to be something in their charac- 
ter, which was different from what was common, and 
which would render such a procedure suitable. History 
may tell us of the great corruption and violence of the 
antediluvian world. But at this day, we can have little 
concern with what was so distant, except to gratify cu- 
riosity. For it would be very unreasonable to suppose 
that there is any thing in men generally, especially in 
those who are born in a Christian land, which would 
lead them into the same excesses, even if they should be 
placed in the same circumstances. We may read the 
history of the children of Israel in Egypt, at the Red 
Sea, at Sinai, in the wilderness, and in the promised 
land, and our astonishment may be excited at their 
fickleness, unbelief, ingratitude, and obduracy. But what 
is all this to us, who live in these better days, who are 
born Christians, and who cannot, with the least degree 
of justice, be charged with any disposition or tendency in 
our nature like theirs ? Admit that they were fickle, 
unbelieving, ungrateful, and obdurate. Does that show 
what we are, or what we should be likely to be in simi- 
lar circumstances? Are we to learn the character of 
human nature generally, from their nature ? " Would 
you go to a lazar-house or hospital to know what is the 
usual state of human health ?" And what shall we 
think of the x4postle to the Romans, who says, " Whatso- 
ever things were written aforetime, were written for our 
learning and who actually uses the passages of the 
Old Testament which were descriptive of the wicked- 

.16 



118 



ness of the Israelites at particular times, as applicable 
to men generally. 

History tells us of the ambition, despotism, and cru- 
elty of wicked kings and commanders. But are men, 
holding similar stations now, to be suspected of any pro- 
pensity to similar vices ? Indeed, as the moral consti- 
tution of different parts of the human species, or the ba- 
sis of their character is not the same ; no individual can 
be presumed to have any thing like what appears in 
any other. If I see some of my neighbours proud, self- 
ish, envious, revengeful, in willing servitude to their pas- 
sions ; I am not warranted to conclude that any others 
have similar traits of character. Those few men may 
be the only ones in a whole nation, who have their na- 
ture so infected. Of the thousands and millions of their 
contemporaries, supposing them placed under the influ- 
ence of the same external circumstances, there may not 
be a single individual, possessing radically the same dis- 
positions. And even if it should be found, that they all 
have substantially the same traits of character ; that 
they all in fact show themselves in a higher or lower de- 
gree proud, selfish, envious, revengeful, slaves to their 
passions ; still I am not to suppose that they have pre- 
viously any likeness of moral nature, which occasions 
this likeness of visible character. It may be quite an ac- 
cidental thing, or it may be owing to some unfortunate 
motion of free-will, happening to be the same in all, that 
they have come universally to be subject to the same 
corrupt passions. It is very certain that the sinful pas- 
sions or conduct of individuals, or of a nation, or of the 
whole world from generation to generation, does not 
show at all what the nature of man is. The conduct of 
the antediluvians does not show this, nor the conduct of 
heathen nations, nor of the Israelites, nor of Christen^ 



/ 



119 



dotn generally. Indeed there is no common nature 
among men. Human nature in one may have no sub- 
stantial likeness to human nature in another; and what 
is said truly of some cannot be in any sense safely ap- 
plied to others. The description which was given of 
men in the Psalms and in the Prophets, cannot be a true 
description of other generations or societies of men. And 
when the Apostle, Rom. hi, applied what had been 
said of men in seasons of uncommon corruption, to the 
generality of those who lived in his day, did he not do 
it rashly? Or if he actually knew that the whole mul- 
titude, on whom he heaped the reproaches contained in 
that chapter, were so uncommonly depraved as to de- 
serve them; it would still be the height of injustice to 
suppose they are deserved by men in general at the 
present day. And according to the same scheme, there 
is not one of all the declarations of the Bible respecting 
human corruption and guilt, which can be safely applied 
to the men of this generation. For those declarations, 
whatever appearance of universality some of them may 
have, were all made with a view to men who lived in 
times very distant from the present, and exhibited a 
grossness of character now seldom found. The Apos- 
tle Paul declared the carnal mind to be enmity against 
God, and represented the Ephesian converts as having 
been enemies to God. But it was a carnal mind which 
existed and yielded its hateful fruits at that particular 
time. Who will be so uncandid as to look upon the 
bulk of mankind now, especially in Christian lands, as 
having that carnal mind which is enmity against God? 
We find also that Christ said, " that which is born of the 
flesh is flesh," and on the ground of human corruption, 
thus expressed, asserted the necessity of regeneration. 
But he must have said it with reference to that carnal 



120 



race of men, by whom he was surrounded. Of those 
who are born among us now, it cannot be said that they 
are flesh in any such sense, as implies the necessity of 
being born again; any more than David's singular ac- 
knowledgment that he was " shapen in iniquity and 
conceived in sin," — made in very peculiar circumstances, 
and under great depression of spirits, can be understood 
as signifying any thing in regard to the native character 
of men generally. The Bible contains commands, ex- 
hortations, and warnings to saints and sinners, which were 
occasioned by the depravity of their hearts, and referred 
directly to their sinful passions and habits. But such 
commands, exhortations, and warnings may be altogether 
inapplicable to us, on account of our exemption from that 
depravity which would render them suitable to our case. 
The Apostle says ; " they that are Christ's have crucified 
the flesh with the affections and lusts." " If any man be in 
Christ, he is a new creature." He says all this of those 
Christians who lived in his day. To them it properly relat- 
ed. But it cannot be supposed essential to the character of 
the present generation of Christians, that they should be 
the subjects of any such change. Indeed we must go still 
farther. To give consistency throughout to the system, 
on the ground of which these remarks have proceeded, 
we must maintain that we are under no obligation to obey 
the commands of the decalogue. For to whom did God 
speak, when he said, " Thou shalt have no other gods be- 
fore me ; thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image ; 
thou shalt not take the name of God in vain ; remember the 
Sabbath day," &c ? Did he not speak to those particular 
persons who then surrounded the holy mount ? Is it 
said, or intimated, that men of future ages should come 
under the obligation of these strict and holy commands? 
Has God ever spoken particularly to us, and required us 



121 



to observe the precepts of the decalogue ? What au- 
thority then have the ministers of religion to urge the 
high obligation of these precepts upon us, just as though 
God had actually spoken to us in these last days, and 
given us commands, as he did the Israelites encamped 
at the foot of Sinai ? Surely when they do this, they 
overlook the vast difference between us, who live in an 
age of such intellectual and moral refinement, and the 
posterity of Jacob, at that time in so uncultivated a state, 
and just let loose from " the house of bondage." We 
cannot look to any of the commands which God gave 
them, to learn what he requires of us. Even supposing 
that, by the authority of Prophets and Apostles, they 
were enjoined on other generations of men who came af- 
ter; where is the Prophet or Apostle, who has expressly 
declared that men, living in the nineteenth century, and in 
this particular part of the world, would all be under ob- 
ligation to obey those very commands, which were en- 
joined upon men thousands of years ago ? — The same al- 
so as to the New Testament. Jesus said, repent. But 
he said it to his contemporaries, not to us. He said too, 
"He that believeth shall be saved ; and he that believ- 
eth not shall be damned." But that awful alternative 
was pressed upon that generation of Jews, not upon us. 
And in fact, all parts of the Bible were addressed to men 
of other times, and in other circumstances ; and there is 
no doctrine contained in it respecting the present state 
or future prospects of men, how true soever it might 
have been when first declared, which can be assumed as 
true and applicable now ; and no command, however just 
and important in relation to those, to whom it was first ad- 
dressed, which can bind us ; and no warning of danger, how- 
ever alarming once, which can properly alarm us ; and 
no promise of good, however cheering and animating 



122 



once, which can cheer and animate us. The whole Bi- 
ble, as really as that part which describes human cor- 
ruption, was spoken and written in other times, and to 
another race of men ; and nothing short of a new reve- 
lation can convince us, that the book can be of any 
practical use to us, except to inform us what the in- 
habitants of the world once were, and how God once 
treated them. 

I hope to be excused for exhibiting at such length what 
seems plainly implied in the system, which has here come 
under notice, and what are its legitimate consequences. 
The principle, on which that system sets aside the de- 
scriptions of human depravity contained in the Bible, as 
not in any way applicable to us, would, if closely adher- 
ed to, lead on to all the extremities above suggested. It 
would set aside one part of the Bible, as well as another. 
It would invalidate, in regard to us, the doctrinal and 
preceptive part, as well as that part which is descrip- 
tive of man's depravity. The same principle, which 
would free us from the mortification of applying to our- 
selves the high charges of corruption and guilt, contained 
in the Bible, would also deprive us of its high promises 
of divine mercy. If any man who sets aside the account 
of human wickedness found in the Scriptures, as inappli- 
cable to us, still thinks the moral precepts applicable ; 
I ask, on what principle such an application is founded? 
Is there any express declaration in the Scriptures them- 
selves, that the moral precepts, which were given thou- 
sands of years ago, are to be thus understood ? Is it any 
where in the Bible said, that the commands of God, there 
announced, should be obligatory upon men in every coun- 
try and in every age ? Not a word of this. In what 
way then are we satisfied, that every human being is un- 
der the same perfect obligation to obey the moral pre- 



123 



cepts of the Bible, as if God actually addressed them to 
him in particular? How is it that we immediately con- 
xlude that all men, now living, are proper subjects of the 
same law which God gave to men in former times, and 
feel it to be right for us to enjoin it upon them to love 
God supremely, to love their neighbours as themselves, 
and to keep all the precepts of the Bible ? When the 
ministers of Christ go to pagan nations, how is it that 
they feel themselves authorized to do just what the apos- 
tles did,— to call upon all men to forsake the vanities of 
heathenism, to repent, and to worship the true God? 
What could render all this proper, but the obvious prin- 
ciple that, as to the essential properties of moral agents, 
men in all ages and climates are alike ? Whenever we 
meet a human being, we instantly take it for granted, 
that he is a moral agent like ourselves, and like those 
who first received the law, and that the law is as suita- 
ble to him, as it was to them. When we see an infant, 
we take it for granted, as we have a right to do, that he 
is born to be a moral agent, and that it will be proper 
to inculcate the divine precepts upon him, as soon as he 
can understand them ; just as proper as though the divine 
Lawgiver expressly directed us to inculcate them upon 
that particular child. To all this I think the opposers of 
Orthodoxy would readily agree. But it is upon the same 
general principle that I proceed in my reasoning, with 
respect to the subject under discussion. There is as real 
evidence that men in all ages and climates are alike in 
regard to the essential traits of moral character, as in re- 
gard to the properties which constitute them proper sub- 
jects of law. This is in truth the practical judgment of 
men universally. Who does not know enough of human 
nature to satisfy him, that it always has the same essen- 
tial attributes? Who doubts that a man, whom he now 



124 



for the first time meets, will exhibit the same character- 
istics, as other men — the same substantially, though per- 
haps not in form ? The man whom we never saw be- 
fore, we doubt not has pride, and that, in circumstances 
which are likely to occur, he will show pride, — not in 
this or that particular way, but in some way, according 
to circumstances. We doubt not he has a culpable self- 
love, which will lead him, in a manner not to be justified, 
to prefer his own interest to that of others; a self-love 
therefore, which will require strong motives, and watch- 
ful discipline, and powerful influence from above to sub- 
due it. We doubt not he has a tendency to resent an 
injury, and to recompense evil for evil ; and to envy those 
above him, especially if their superiority operates sensi- 
bly to his disadvantage. And so of the rest. If in any 
case we should regulate our conduct towards particular 
men upon any other principle, than that they are sub- 
ject to the same corrupt affections with others, and 
that, acting under the influence of similar causes, they 
are likely to exhibit similar traits of character ; we should 
be charged, and very justly, with being deficient in the 
knowledge of our own species. And if any man thinks 
himself exempt from the moral depravity which men 
have generally exhibited, and forms his judgment and his 
maxims of conduct in regard to himself, on the principle, 
that he has little or none of the wickedness which has 
disgraced and ruined others ; he gives conclusive proof 
of self-ignorance. 

It is on this plain principle of the sameness of human 
nature in all ages and countries, that I would apply the 
mortifying description of human wickedness, found in the 
Bible, to men of the present generation ; just as the 
Apostle applied the description, which had been given 
of other generations of men, to those who lived in his 



125 



day. It is on this principle that I have said, we may 
draw practical instruction in regard to ourselves from the 
history of Pharaoh, of Saul, of Jeroboam, and of the Jews 
who crucified the Son of God. That history shows me not 
only what was in those particular men, but what is in hu- 
man nature, what is in my nature. It shows me what 
is man. In ourselves we may find those very sinful dis- 
positions which, after having been strengthened and ma- 
tured by various causes, constituted those men just what 
they were ; and which, operating in similar circumstan- 
ces, would render us like them. We are as truly like 
them in a moral view, as a man in an intellectual view, 
is like those who have risen somewhat above him in the 
acquisition of knowledge, but whom he would have 
equalled, had he been in their circumstances. 

Dr. Ware tells us, what indeed deserves special at- 
tention, that the very passages of Scripture, which rep- 
resent men as universally corrupt, " teach us with what 
qualifications they are to be understood." He refers 
particularly to Psalm xiv, and says, " that while it asserts 
in the strong language of emotion and eastern hyperbole, 
that all are gone aside, — that there is none that doeth 
good, no, not one ; it goes on to speak of a generation 
of the righteous." I might mention it as a fact of the 
same kind, that an exception was made in favour of Noah. 
Lot, and others, who lived in the midst of abounding 
wickedness. And the Orthodox make just such an ex- 
ception now. W r hen they understand the language of 
the Bible, which was descriptive of the great wickedness 
of men formerly, as expressive of the universal depravi- 
ty of those who live at the present day; they have no 
doubt there are many exceptions ; — many good men, who 
obey God, and are entitled to the happiness of heaven* 
The question is, how these two representations of Scrip- 

17 



126 



ture can consist together, and in what manner we are 
to modify the sense of the one by the other. Here we 
come to the grand principle of interpretation ; namely; 
that the Bible, taken as a whole, must explain itself. How 
then does the Bible account for the fact, that some men 
are holy, while the generality are sinful ? Does it ever 
represent them to be holy by nature ? No, never. It 
may sometimes speak of their being holy, as a matter of 
fact simply, without assigning the cause of it. But in 
other places, it does, with the greatest explicitness, ac- 
count for this fact. It represents the children of God 
as being holy, in consequence of regeneration. They 
who are in Christ, are new creatures. Old things are pass- 
ed away ; all things are become new. The Bible teaches 
all who are holy, to ascribe their holiness to the new- 
creating Spirit of God ; while it represents their natural 
character to be like that of others, and describes it in 
the same language. So that the exception made in their 
favour does not respect their own native character, but 
the new character which they possess in consequence of 
being born of the Spirit. The principle I am contend- 
ing for, may be easily illustrated by natural things, 
it may be said of a certain species of shrub or 
tree, for example, the thorn-bush, that it bears no useful 
fruit ; although in consequence of a scion being ingraft- 
ed into it from another tree, it may bear fruit that is de- 
licious and salutary. Still the proper nature of the 
shrub, and the just description of it, remain the same ; 
and we never think of representing it as a property of 
the thorn-bush, that it bears delicious fruit. Thus in the 
passages above referred to, the universal terms which 
describe human wickedness, instead of being limited as 
Dr. Ware proposes, are truly applicable to all men with- 
out exception, in regard to their own proper, original char- 



127 



acter. Those who are now Christians, are naturally sub- 
jects of the same depravity with others; and their being 
different now is owing to " the washing of regeneration 
and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." 

Here we are furnished with an easy answer to some 
of Dr. Ware's questions, p. 38. " Let it be asked," he 
says, " why the cruelty and obstinacy of Pharaoh, rather 
than the humanity, and piety, and meekness of Moses ; 
why the idolatry, and unprincipled ambition and selfish- 
ness of Jeroboam, rather than the piety, and tenderness 
of conscience, and public spirit of Josiah; why the sin- 
gle wretch who was so base as to betray his master, 
rather than the eleven who were true and faithful to 
him, should be selected as specimens of the race to which 
they belong?" The answer is, that all these vices and 
iniquities are the natural, spontaneous growth of human 
nature. They are what the Apostle calls " the fruits of 
the flesh ;" — of that flesh which, according to John iii. 6, 
belongs to us by our natural birth ; while the virtues 
enumerated are the fruits of the Spirit, or the effects of 
that divine influence, by which men are delivered from 
their natural character, and made new creatures. Those 
men are justly selected, as specimens of the race to which 
they belong, who are just what their own proper nature 
makes them, or whose traits of character result from 
their own moral constitution or nature, unchanged by the 
Spirit of God. But it would be obviously unjust to se- 
lect, as specimens of our race, or of the moral character 
which properly belongs to us, those who are what they 
are, not by nature, but by grace, or by the new-creating 
Spirit of God. And if the Bible is made its own inter- 
preter, this must be allowed to be fact with regard to 
every human being who is the subject of holiness. But 
the case which Dr. Ware afterwards brings into view, is 



128 



altogether different. He asks, " would you select the 
period of seven years' famine, as an example of the usu- 
al fertility of Egypt ? The desolating pestilence in the 
days of David, as a fair specimen of the salubrity of the 
climate of Israel ?" I answer, no. Because the famine 
does not show the proper character of the soil of Egypt, 
nor the pestilence, of the climate of Israel. They were 
real exceptions to what was natural; and Dr. Ware can- 
not justly adduce them, as he does, unless he can show, 
that great depravity is as foreign to the moral nature of 
man, as the famine was to the soil in one case, and the 
pestilence to the climate in the other. 



CHAPTER VII. 

Dr. Ware's reply to the argument from John iii. 3. Rom. v. 12. Ephes. ii. 3. 

Dr. Ware is convinced that the universal necessity 
of regeneration, asserted in John iii. 3, may consist with 
original innocency. Still, in his apprehension, the pas- 
sage implies " the absence or want of that which was 
necessary to becoming a subject of the kingdom of God 
p. 41 ; or as he expresses it, p. 42, " that men do not 
possess by birth that character of personal holiness, 
which is necessary to their being Christians." Let the 
reader consider a moment the consistency between this, 
and what is found in other places. Here, he says of all 
who are born into the world in every age, that they are 
by birth destitute of that holiness which is necessary to 
their being Christians. But soon after, p. 47, he affirms, 
that " those now born into the world in Christian lands, 
are as the Ephesians were after their conversion to^ 



129 



Christianity, saved — quickened — fellow-citizens of the 
saints." What he has written on this point, taken to- 
gether, stands thus. According to one place, men by their 
birth receive no moral character. According to another, 
they are destitute of that which is necessary to their be- 
coming subjects of God's kingdom. And according 
to IT third, "Jews and Gentiles were by nature, 
what they were before they became Christians." But 
here, p. 47, men are Christians by birth. In that very 
state in which they are born, instead of being as before 
described, without a moral character of any kind, they 
have a character that is good. Instead of wanting that 
which is necessary to their becoming subjects of the 
kingdom of God, as before, they are by their 
birth, of the household of God. fellow-heirs with the 
saints. Instead of being by their birth destitute of holi- 
ness, they are subjects of holiness, quickened, sanctified, 
as the Ephesians were after they became Christians. 
Little children or infants, generally, instead of being 
mere human beings, without any disposition or propen- 
sity whatever, " are what men are to become by regen- 
eration." p. 31. 

I hope the reader will not attribute these contradic- 
tions to the fault of Dr. Ware's understanding, so much 
as to the fault of the system, which he has the misfortune 
to defend. A man like him would not expose himself in 
this manner, if his cause did not mislead him. With 
this apology for him, let me proceed to a few more ob- 
servations on these remarkable passages, compared to- 
gether. 

In p. 41, men are represented as "reasonable, account- 
able beings by their natural birth." If accountable be- 
ings, they are moral agents, they are under the divine 
law, and must be judged according to that law. And 



130 



this is the same as saying, they will be condemned, if 
they are not conformed to the law, and approved, if con- 
formed to it. But while treating the same subject in 
other places, our Author gives us " reasonable, account- 
able beings," or moral agents, who have nothing in their 
disposition or character w 7 hich is either right or wrong, 
and nothing for which they can be judged. Accounta- 
ble beings, without any thing, either good or bad, for 
which they are accountable ! Moral agents, without mo- 
ral affections! 

According to Dr. Ware's statements, it would seem 
that the circumstances of our birth have an astonishing 
and mysterious efficacy as to the formation of moral 
character. Those who are born in Christian lands are, 
by birth, what the converted Ephesians were,- — Chris- 
tians, children of God, heirs of heaven. But the moment 
you pass the line which bounds Christendom, and enter 
a pagan land, you find it quite different. There, in con- 
sequence of an arrangement of divine providence,in which 
human beings could have no agency, and over which 
they could have no power, they are born without any 
moral disposition ; and of course are destitute of that 
holiness, which is necessary to their being admitted into 
Christ's kingdom ; so that it is plainly necessary that 
they should be born again, — should undergo " a great 
moral change," and form "a new character." But here 
in Christendom, it is not so. Either the atmosphere of 
a Christian land, or the character and privileges of their 
parents, or some other causes have so salutary an influ- 
ence upon their birth, that they possess at once, as soon 
as they are born, the character of converts. They are 
sanctified, quickened, and members of God's household, 
by their natural birth. So that, in regard to them, re- 
generation is not necessary. They are as good by their 



131 



first birth, as the Ephesians were, after they were 
"born again." — Now we should be much indebted to 
Dr. Ware, if he would tell us by what arguments, from 
Scripture or reason, he supports such an opinion as this. 
He indeed makes it a subject of strong affirmation. Re- 
ferring to the description of the converted Ephesians, he 
says; "All this language was applied to the Ephesians 
universally after their conversion, and all of it is as appli- 
cable now universally to those who are Christians by birth." 
We receive his affirmation, as showing clearly what his 
opinion is. This is all we would ask of him in a similar 
case ; and this no doubt is all he would ask of us. 

Dr. Ware considers the whole passage, Rom. v, as so 
intricate and obscure, that it can afford no solid support 
to any doctrine, farther than it is explained by other 
passages; and he seems to think I must view it in this 
light. I did indeed say that the passage is " in some re- 
spects very obscure." And so it may be, though in other 
respects it is very clear. It is surely nothing uncommon, 
either in inspired or uninspired writings, that a passage 
should contain a particular doctrine with perfect plain- 
ness and certainty, while its import, in regard to some 
other points, can hardly be ascertained. Such in many 
instances is the nature of the subject, that while, in some 
parts it is plain and obvious, in other parts it is necessa- 
rily obscure. The passage, Rom. v. 12 — 21, does, in 
my view, teach an important Christian doctrine more 
plainly and fully, and in language less capable of being 
misconstrued, than any other passage of Scripture. 
The writer declares his main doctrine again and again. 
He declares it in a great variety of forms, and with great 
strength of expression. He treats his principal subject, 
as though he was determined, in that one passage, to 
make it so plain, that no man could ever be at any loss 



132 



respecting it. And would not the opposers of Ortho- 
doxy consider any passage in this light, if it should hap- 
pen to teach, in the same clear, diversified, and forcible 
manner, some doctrine in their creed? Dr. Ware 
pleads the different meanings of the phrase Ecp cJ, trans- 
lated, for that, as a reason why we should not attach 
much consequence to the passage. I will only say, that the 
signification of the phrase, which is given in the common 
version, and which is the only one that leaves to the 
Apostle the credit of speaking good sense, fully supports 
our scheme. Whatever variety of signification the 
phrase may have in other circumstances, its signification 
here is obvious, and the argument derived from the pas- 
sage, conclusive. 

I have no objection, as I have before suggested, to 
the manner in which Dr. Ware proposes to limit the 
sense of the assertion, that all have sinned. He says, it 
is the assertion of a fact, which none will deny ; and 
that, all circumstances being taken into view, it must 
mean, "all who are capable of sinning, all as soon as they 
are moral agents." I presume Dr. Ware would be reluct- 
ant to undertake the task of determining, at what precise 
period human beings become moral agents. If he should 
undertake this, we might reasonably expect him to de- 
termine it, as he seems already to have done in his Let- 
ters, where he gives it as his opinion, that men are mo- 
ral agents by their birth. Speaking, p. 21, of what 
men are by nature, he represents them as having pas- 
sions implanted in them, natural affections, reason and 
conscience ; which, taken together, make them account- 
able beings, capable of right and wrong. This is per- 
fectly equivalent to saying, they are moral agents. He 
asserts nearly the same thing, p. 41. If these passages 
are put together, and understood according to the fair 
import of the words, they teach quite as much, as any 



133 



iriend of Orthodoxy believes, namely, that all men an 
sinners as soon as they are bom. I beg the reader to re- 
view and compare the passages to which I have refer- 
red, and see whether I have not given the just result of 
Dr. Ware's own representations. And if he does indeed 
entertain these views, we should suppose he might be 
relieved from the difficulty he feels, in conceiving that 
Adam's posterity should be subjected to death and oth- 
er sufferings, as penal evils, without admitting that they 
are charged with the sin of another. See his Letters^ 
p. 43. He says, " if this clause (all have sinned) be 
understood in a sense which shall prove any thing to the 
purpose, it will prove the genuine old Calvinistic doc- 
trine, the imputation of Adam's sin." But in the course 
of his discussion, he makes it prove something to the 
purpose, without any regard to that doctrine. We have 
seen his representation to be, that all are sinners as soon 
as they are capable of sin, or as soon as they are moral 
agents, and that they are reasonable, accountable beings, 
or moral agents, by their birth. The conclusion from 
these premises must be, that they are sinners, or sinful 
moral agents, by their birth. And if they are sinners, 
or have a sinful disposition or character by their birth, 
then obviously, in view of that sinfulness, death and other 
evils which they suffer, may be penal evils, without any 
thing like a literal imputation of Adam's sin. I stated 
in my Letters, as the sentiment of the Apostle, that in 
consequence of Adam's transgression, his posterity were 
constituted sinners, and subjected to death and other suf- 
ferings, as penal evils. Dr. Ware says, if this means any 
thing to the purpose, and yet short of the common no- 
tion of imputation, he is unable to perceive what it is. 
But it is strange, that his own representation did not 
help him to perceive. — All are sinners. This is a fact ; 
18 



134 



and according to the divine constitution here set forth 
by the Apostle, this fact is the first or nearest conse- 
quence of Adam's transgression. The fact intended is, 
that all are sinners really, not in pretence ; in their oivn 
persons, not in the person of another ; and that the 
evils they endure relate directly to their own sinfulness, 
as the meritorious cause, and remotely to the sin of 
Adam, as the occasion ; that is, the occasion of the ex- 
istence of that personal sinfulness, on account of which 
penal evils are suffered. I do not admit that they are 
sinners by the sin of Adam, in such a sense that they 
suffer directly on his account, they themselves being free 
from moral pollution ; or in any sense but this, that they 
are constituted and actually exist, sinners, that is, sinful, 
ill-deserving creatures, not by the transfer of another's 
guilt to them, (a thing utterly incongruous and incon- 
ceivable,) but in their own persons ; in short, that they 
are essentially what they show themselves to be in their 
subsequent life. Speaking of the representation of Stap- 
fer, that God gives Adam a posterity like himself, Dr. 
Ware very justly says, " if this means any thing, it must 
mean sinners like himself;" that is, sinners in their own 
persons, sinful in their character, ill-deserving in them- 
selves, and so justly liable to suffering. Such they are, 
or they are not like Adam. 

On this part of the general subject of Dr. Ware's Let- 
ters, I have only a few more remarks. Page 49 and 
elsewhere, he makes much of man's having a natural or 
communicated power to resist his sinful propensities, and 
to be otherwise than what he is. Now in regard to 
man's power, properly so called, our notions are proba- 
bly as high as Dr. Ware's. We conceive man's power, 
understood in its literal, proper sense, to be always com- 



135 



mensurate with his obligation. There can be no duty 
without it, and none beyond it. 

I hope Dr. Ware will reconsider what he has 
written respecting a propensity to sin; namely; "that 
the propensity itself is no sin, and implies no guilt." 
p. 49. Every man must decide, and does decide, that 
a propensity, inclination, or disposition to sin, is the very 
essence of sin, and the only thing which makes any out- 
ward action or any volition sinful. Before we impute real 
blame to a man for any action, we either know, or take 
it for granted, that he has a wrong disposition or propen- 
sity. And in regard to ourselves ; if, in any case where 
our actions appear exceptionable in the view of man, 
we are conscious of no bad disposition or propensity ; 
we charge ourselves with no real guilt. But how fair so- 
ever our actions may appear to man, if we are conscious 
of having a sinful propensity or disposition, we condemn 
ourselves, — we condemn ourselves for the disposition 
itself, as being the essence of sin. 

In connexion with this subject, Dr. Ware makes one 
representation of the scheme of Calvinism, on which I 
beg leave briefly to remark. He says, p. 50; "If I 
rightly understand the scheme of Calvinism, divine pun- 
ishments are not, according to that scheme, disciplinary, 
but vindictive. God punishes his offending creatures not 
to reform them, but to vindicate his authority. The 
sufferings of the wicked have no tendency to reform," &c. 
But this cannot be admitted as a just account of Calvin- 
ism, unless the remarks are understood to relate exclu- 
sively to future punishment. So far as my information 
extends, all Calvinists, whether higher or lower, consid- 
er the sufferings of the present life, not only as tending 
to vindicate the character and law of God, but as disci- 
plinary, that is, as having; a real tendency, under the dis- 



136 



pensation of mercy, to reform the wicked ; a tenden- 
cy, which is in many cases effectual, and which would 
be so in all cases, were it not counteracted by other 
causes. In respect to this subject, the Scripture leads 
us to make a clear distinction between the state of 
probation, and of retribution. In the former, the evils 
which God inflicts on men are corrective or disciplina- 
ry, though at the same time suited to show God's jus- 
tice, and to vindicate his authority. In the latter state, 
as we understand the word of God, the reformation of 
the wicked does not come within the design of punish- 
ment. The end to be secured relates wholly to the di- 
vine character and kingdom. But we cannot accede to 
Dr. Ware's notion, that disciplinary punishment may be 
inflicted by a righteous and benevolent God, without real 
ill-desert in those who suffer. Is not disciplinary pun- 
ishment intended for correction and reformation? But 
what place can there be for correction or reformation in 
regard to those, who are not faulty, or blame-worthy ? 
What need of reformation ? And what occasion for cor- 
rection ? Suppose punishment is laid upon them. How 
can it produce any good effect ? Certainly not accord- 
ing to any physical laws. The effect to be produced is 
in the mind, and must be produced, if produced at all, 
according to the laws of our intelligent and moral nature. 
Punishment, to be salutary, must relate to some fault, 
some moral evil, and must express to us the divine dis- 
pleasure on account of it. Where this is the case, there 
is correction ; and if we are not refractory, there will be 
reformation. 

I can spend but a few moments upon the views of 
our Author, p. 52. He thinks that the scheme of Uni- 
tarians on the subject of depravity is suited to produce 



137 



much greater humility and self-abhorrence, than that of 
the Orthodox. Those, who are familiarly acquainted 
with what the advocates of Unitarianism and of Ortho- 
doxy have written on the subject of human corruption, 
and with the views they respectively entertain as to the 
proper estimate of our own character, must, I think, be 
surprised at this opinion of Dr. Ware. The truth is, 
Unitarians have constantly complained, that the Ortho- 
dox make too low an estimate of human virtue ; that 
they indulge too debasing views of human nature, and 
paint the wickedness of their species in too strong colours. 
At the same time, Unitarians of an independent, liberal 
judgment, like Dr. Priestley, have freely acknowledged 
the tendency of our doctrine of depravity, erroneous as 
they think it, to promote deep humility. And I have 
been greatly mistaken, if the repugnancy of the doctrine 
to the pride of the heart has not occasioned the chief 
objection against it. Dr. Ware indeed says ; " we cer- 
tainly have no cause to feel ourselves humbled under a 
sense of any thing we are by nature" But he says it 
very incautiously. For whatever he may think of those 
born in Christian lands ; he hesitates not to allow that 
the Ephesians " were by nature children of wrath that 
is, sinful, and deserving of wrath. Was not this a cause 
for humility in them? The foundation of Dr. Ware's 
misapprehension must, I think, be, that he considers native 
sinfulness to be, in its essential properties,different from the 
sinfulness exhibited in our life ; whereas these two must 
be regarded as only the commencement, and the continu- 
ance of the same thing. " Humility and self-condemna- 
tion," Dr. Ware says, "should spring only from the con- 
sciousness of a course of life not answering to the pow- 
ers, and faculties, and privileges of our nature." Now 
which should be the occasion of greater humility and 



138 



self-condemnation to a man, the consciousness that such 
a course as this has extended through one or two years, 
or that it has extended through his whole life ? Sin must 
be considered as essentially the same thing, whether it 
begin sooner or later. And other things being equal, a 
man's guilt is proportionate to the duration of his sinful- 
ness. Dr. Ware and other writers distinguish native 
wickedness from active, voluntary wickedness. But they 
do it without reason. For that which is native may be 
as active and voluntary, as that which gets into the mind 
afterwards. We certainly do not make such a distinction 
in regard to other things. For example ; those appe- 
tites which are given us with our original constitution 
and are therefore called natural, are as strong and active 
as others. It is true, these appetites have no direct rela- 
tion to the moral law, and in regard to that law, are neither 
right nor wrong. But we do not deny their relation to 
the law because they belong to us from the first. It 
is simply from a consideration of the real nature of any 
affection or action of man, and not from a consideration 
of the time or the occasion of its beginning to exist, that 
we denominate it good or bad, praise-worthy or blame- 
worthy. If man began to exercise love to God at his first 
existence, surely our opponents would not, on that ac- 
count, consider it, as any the less excellent and worthy of 
approbation. Let any one read what Dr. Ware has 
written respecting that gratitude, that love of truth, that 
kindness, and those other dispositions and tendencies to 
good, which he represents as native properties of man, 
and see whether there is the least appearance of his 
considering them any the less amiable or praise-worthy, 
on that account. Why then should bad dispositions, or 
tendencies to evil, which are natural, be, for the same rea- 
son, considered as any the less odious and blame-worthy ? 



139 

Dr. Ware has no difficulty in representing men who are 
born in Christian lands, as having by their birth just what 
the Ephesians had after their conversion ; that is, religion, 
holiness. But where does he intimate that their holi- 
ness was less estimable, because it was a native property? 

Our author seems fond of saying and of repeating, 
that our doctrine ascribes human wickedness to the 
agency of God ; that it traces sin to that constitution 
which was given us by our Creator, &c. But though all 
this is admitted, even in the offensive terms he uses ; the 
difficulty is not a whit greater, than what attends his 
system. He says, that human beings, created innocent 
and pure, afterwards fall into sin by their own choice, 
and in the exercise of their own free agency. Now if 
there is any truth in Philosophy or Revelation, it can 
be proved that their falling into sin, at any period of 
their life, is a thing as really to be ascribed to the op- 
eration of their Maker, or to the constitution he has 
given them, as native sinfulness. For suppose, accord- 
ing to Dr. Ware's scheme, that a man, influenced by 
strong temptation, at any time falls into sin. Who gave 
him a constitution of mind, fitted to be wrought upon by 
temptation ? And who ordered things so, that he should 
be exposed to temptation, and to those particular temp- 
tations which prevail to draw him into sin ? Did not 
God know the result beforehand? Was it not a result 
which naturally flowed from causes, which God directed 
and controlled, operating upon a moral nature which he 
created, and according to laws which he established ? 
The question I would ask him to solve, is, how, in such 
a case, there can be any blame ? I am far from saying, 
that no difficulty attends the scheme of native depravi- 
ty, in this respect. But the difficulty is, in my view ? no 
greater, than what attends any other scheme. 



140 



But I must check my inclination to pursue this met- 
aphysical mode of reasoning ; though it must be allowed 
that I have an apology, in the metaphysical nature of 
the arguments to be confuted. I will just add, that 
the habit of attributing moral evil to God in such a 
way as to destroy or diminish its criminality, is, in my 
view, one of the worst habits, of which the human 
mind is capable. It produces alarming stupidity of con- 
science and hardness of heart, and leads to the most de- 
structive fatalism. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

As to the practical importance of the subject of na- 
tive depravity, which has now been discussed at such 
length, any man may be satisfied, who will maturely con- 
sider what connexion it must have with our views, gen- 
erally, of Christian truth and piety. It is not enough to 
say, that the denial of the original, native corruption of 
man does in fact go in company with such and such no- 
tions of Christianity. It may be shown, and it must be 
remembered, that the connexion, which exists in fact, is 
not accidental, but arises directly from the nature of the 
subject. If we believe that our moral disease results 
from our moral constitution, — that it is inwrought in our 
very nature : we shall surely have different views of the 
remedy that is necessary, from what we should have, if 
we considered our disease as merely accidental, or as 
less deep and radical. Just as it is in regard to a bodily 
disease. If it is a slight, superficial disorder, which first 
appeared but yesterday, or which has appeared but a 



141 

few times, the original constitution being sound and vig- 
orous ; we have little concern. Some gentle remedy 
will be sufficient to remove it; or perhaps it will shortly 
disappear of itself. But if the disease is rooted in our 
constitution ; if it began to show itself very early, and 
evidently results from our original structure ; especially, 
if there is evidence of its being hereditary; it becomes 
an alarming case. Some powerful remedy is necessary ; 
something that will effect a great and salutary change in 
our very constitution. If this cannot be had, we despair 
of a thorough cure. In like manner, those who serious- 
ly believe themselves and others to be the subjects of a 
native and entire depravity, must be convinced, that a 
mighty operation of divine power is necessary to make 
them holy. They must view it as indispensable, that 
they should be born again. Passing by human efforts, 
and all slight, common remedies, as totally inadequate, 
they must found every hope of moral purification on 
that energy of God, which gives men a new heart and 
a new spirit, — which creates them in Christ Jesus unto 
good works. Though they have been born in a Chris- 
tian land ; though they have enjoyed the best instruc- 
tion, and witnessed examples of the greatest purity ; 
though distinguished by the most correct habits, by the 
most useful actions, and by the highest improvement of 
their rational powers and natural sensibilities ; and though 
applauded for their virtues by those who look only on the 
outward appearance ; yet, while unrenewed, they find 
in themselves that corruption of heart, which is the foun- 
tain of all iniquity ; — they find the utter want of that 
holiness, without which no man can see the Lord. The 
disease of their nature, that is, the earthly, selfish, un- 
holy disposition, which has from the first borne sway in 
their hearts, and influenced all their actions, spoils the 

a 9 



142 



beauty of their fair exterior, lays them low in the dust, 
and brings them to rely solely on the purifying grace of 
God. They have a strong, humbling conviction that, 
amiable and excellent as their character may appear to 
others, they must be saved, if saved at all, by the wash- 
ing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost. 
Through their whole course, their religious feelings 
and duties are materially affected by their belief of 
the radical, native depravity of their hearts. While 
sensible of this deep-rooted evil of their nature, they 
suffer no proud self-complacency to possess their 
minds, New reasons constantly occur for self-dis- 
trust and self-abhorrence. In a greater or less degree, 
the fountain of evil still remains within them. They 
never account themselves to have attained complete vic- 
tory over sin. They have perpetually an inward war- 
fare, and in every part of their warfare, they confide in 
that divine grace, which gives purity and strength to the 
soul. In their latest moments, they deplore that obsti- 
nate, hateful malady of their nature, which has so long 
kept up its resistance to the best means of cure ; and, 
with their dying breath, they cry for the Spirit of God 
to complete their sanctification, and fit them for the 
presence of him whom their soul loveth. 

Consider now 7 , how different are the views of those 
who deny the native corruption of man, and believe him 
to be originally pure; and how different the whole aspect 
of their religion. On this subject, I would gladly ex- 
cuse myself from saying what the case seems to require ; 
because my controversy is with a man, whose talents 
and office I would treat with invariable respect, whose 
coolness of judgment and sobriety of character I wish to 
copy, and whose candour, civility, and kindness towards 
me I am most cordially disposed to reciprocate. I trust 



143 



it will be well understood, that my animadversions re- 
late not to him, personally, but to the system which he 
has undertaken to unfold and vindicate. What then is 
the scheme of practical religion, with which the denial 
of innate depravity is associated ? If I believe, as a 
general truth, " that young children are what men are 
to become by regeneration;" that is, if I believe them 
to be friends of God, subjects of real holiness ; if I be- 
lieve that all, who are now born into the world in Chris- 
tian lands, are already " saved by the grace of God, and 
fellow citizens with the saints I must treat them ac- 
cordingly. I must treat them as persons, who have no 
need of conversion, or of the grace of God to effect it ; 
inasmuch as they are born Christians, and already pos- 
sess the character of converts. And if at any time I 
seem to see some mark of depravity common to children, 
I must apologize for it, and soothe their feelings by tell- 
ing them, it can " fairly be traced to causes which im- 
ply ne degree of depravity, and no fault of character or 
disposition ;" so that they have no occasion for uneasi- 
ness, or for reformation. And if I address sinners at 
large, either in public or in private ; instead of depicting 
their guilt, as the inspired writers do, and labouring to 
make them feel, that they are dead in trespasses and 
sins, and justly under the wrath of God ; I must not hes- 
itate to say to them, as our Author does, p. 24, " that as 
much as there is of wickedness and vice, there is far 
more of virtue and goodness ; — that wickedness, far from 
being the prevailing part of the human character, makes 
but an inconsiderable part of it." And if I ever have 
occasion to speak to men of the worst character, to liars, 
thieves, adulterers, blasphemers, men of revenge and 
blood, infidels, atheists, — I must soothe their feelings too, 
not by persuading them to apply to that blood which 



144 



cleanseth from all sin— not by pointing them to mercy 
higher than the heavens ; — but by so far forgetting the 
word of God, as to tell them, 44 that even in the worst of 
men, good feelings and principles are predominant," and 
that, as " the greatest liar" may comfort himself with 
the idea, that " by the constitution of his nature he 
speaks many truths to every lie he utters ;" so other 
monsters of wickedness should not deprive themselves 
of the satisfaction of believing, " that in the course of 
their lives, they perform many more good than bad 
actions."* And if I am to carry such a flattering message 
to " the worst of men ;" with what sincere congratula- 
tions must I address myself to the generality ? As to 
men who are destitute of holiness, enemies to God, dead 
in sin, men whose imaginations and desires are only evil, 
and who are ready to perish, — none can be found among 
us. Through the healing influence of being born in 
Christian lands, another race of men has sprung up, saints 
by nature, needing no renovation ; of the household of 
faith and of the kingdom of God by their first birth ; to 
whom it would be altogether superfluous to be born 
again of the Spirit of God.t 

If men transgress the rules of morality, I must indeed, 
according to Dr. Ware's views, tell them, they are sin- 
ners, and urge them to repent. But here is the differ- 
ence. If I am duly impressed with the common doc- 
trine of depravity, I shall endeavour to convince them, 
whether old or young, not only of the impropriety and 
guilt of the particular acts of sin they have committed, 
but of the corrupt principle, the depravity of heart, from 
which they have proceeded, and from which, if it re- 
main, sinful acts will continue to proceed ; and to show 
them, that it is not more evidently their concern to re- 

* Bee Letters to Trin. and Calv. p. 25, f Do. p. 47. 



145 



pent of the particular sins committed, than it is to be 
renewed in the Spirit of their minds. I shall take occa- 
sion from what they have actually done, to turn their 
thoughts within, to make them acquainted with the 
plague of their own hearts, and lead them to feel that 
the word of God does indeed address them, when it says, 
"ye must be born again." And as to any repentance or 
reformation short of this, I shall most seriously assure 
them, it will avail nothing. 

These are cutting, humbling truths, marring the beau- 
ty of all external virtue, where the heart retains its na- 
tive alienation from God. They make the great force 
of that conviction, which the Holy Spirit produces, to 
relate to that very inbred, entire depravity of the heart, 
which is the subject of this controversy. Thus the 
doctrine, as I have exhibited it, is a practical truth, con- 
firmed by Christian experience. They who, being thor- 
oughly illuminated by the Spirit of God, judge themselves 
by the divine law, and receive salvation by grace, are as 
really convinced of this doctrine by their own experi- 
ence, as by the plainest declarations of Scripture. And 
they who have this deep, heart-felt conviction, can no 
more be induced to deny the doctrine, than to deny any 
truth whatever which they know by their own con- 
sciousness. 

But if I should deny the doctrine of innate deprav- 
ity, and entertain those opinions of human nature which 
are set forth in the Letters to Trinitarians and Calvin- 
ists ; my treatment of those, who transgress the rules 
of morality, would be materially different. I should in- 
deed exhort them to repent and reform. But I should 
never occasion any uneasiness to their conscience, by di- 
recting their attention to the badness of the tree which 
bears bad fruit, or to the impurity of the fountain from 



146 



which impure streams flow. Only let them be careful 
to guard against those particular sins to which they have 
been inclined, and maintain a regular, decent behaviour ; 
and I should bid them be quiet, and give no place to 
any gloomy apprehension respecting the necessity of an 
inward change. Thus the thing would pass off, without 
any great solicitude on my part, or on theirs. 

I mean to treat this subject exactly according to 
truth. If I exaggerate or discolour any thing, and by 
such means do the least degree of injustice to those who 
differ from me; it is totally contrary to my intention; 
and the temper of mind which would lead to this, I most 
heartily reprobate. But if I mistake not, the general 
conduct of those ministers, who hold the opinions of the 
book, to which I have undertaken a reply, corresponds 
substantially with the representation I have made. 
Such I am well persuaded would be my conduct, should 
I adopt those opinions. If sinners, deeply convinced of 
their depravity, and of the total inefficacy of any refor- 
mation, or any doings of theirs, while their heart remains 
unrenewed — convinced too, that they are enemies to 
God, without excuse, ready to perish, — and suffering the 
agony of soul, which such conviction naturally produces; 
if sinners in this condition should come to me, and in the 
language of anxiety and distress should say, as multi- 
tudes, through the mercy of God, are constantly saying 
to their ministers, what shall we do to be saved ? — I should 
indeed pity fellow creatures in such distress ; but at the 
same time, if I entertained the sentiments of Unitarians, I 
should endeavour to satisfy them, that their distress was 
without reason, and was occasioned by false views of re- 
ligion, or by some fright of imagination, or some de- 
rangement of the nervous system. I should labour to 
relieve their sense of guilt, their anxiety and fear, by in- 



147 



culcating more comforting views of the nature which 
God has given them, of the service he requires of them, 
and of the treatment they have a right to expect at his 
hand. In a word, I should look upon such persons to be 
in a state more deeply to be deplored, than if they were 
living in fashionable vice, totally regardless of God and 
eternity. — If there are any ministers, who embrace the 
prevailing system of Unitarianism, but still do not feel 
and converse thus in reference to such cases ; I rejoice 
that they have something within them to counteract an 
influence, which I am persuaded would produce upon 
me all the effect above described. 

The denial of man's innate corruption must have a 
direct influence on our views of the nature and necessi- 
ty of the divine influence. It may indeed seem desira- 
ble to Unitarians, that God should afford to men all the 
assistance they need in regulating their passions, and in 
pursuing a course of virtuous conduct. But their scheme 
implies that, comparatively, but little divine aid is ne- 
cessary. It ascribes to the Holy Spirit no such achiev- 
ments, as we ascribe to him, when the heart is renewed, 
and the sinner savingly converted. When rebels against 
God — when those who have felt an entire hostility to 
the spiritual religion of the Gospel, become penitent and 
humble, friends to God, and obedient to his law ; the work 
performed by the Spirit of God has, in our view, a great- 
ness and glory, which entitle it to the admiration of 
heaven and earth. But in what language do Unitari- 
ans describe it ? 

In regard to the whole of religion, our belief of hu- 
man depravity has an influence on the mind, of the high- 
est moment. It is one of the elements of a holy life. 
It produces in Christians a strong conviction, that, in re- 
spect to their good affections, their duties, and their 



148 



enjoyments, they are in a state of total dependance 
on the Spirit of God. They apprehend their moral 
disease to be so deep-wrought in their nature, that 
it will yield, in no degree, to any power, but that 
which is divine. If they have any degree of holiness, 
they ascribe it, not to any goodness of disposition nat- 
urally belonging to them, but to the grace of God. 
To God alone they give the honour of all their suc- 
cess in resisting temptation, in subduing the evils of their 
hearts, in cultivating pious affections and habits, and in 
doing good to their fellow creatures. They are fully 
convinced that, without his effectual operation, they can 
have nothing truly excellent in their character or life ; 
nothing consoling in affliction, or peaceful in death. In 
the best moral state which they ever attain on earth, 
they perceive so much want of conformity to God's per- 
fect law, — so much unlikeness to their Saviour, that the 
language of the Apostle becomes the sober expression 
of their feelings ; " O wretched men that we are ! Who 
shall deliver us from the body of this death ?" Thus 
they are led, as Jeremy Taylor directs, " so to live as if 
they were always under a physician's hand." In short 
it is manifest, that those Christians, who admit, in all its 
extent, and with suitable impressions on their own minds, 
the Orthodox doctrine of depravity, must find in it a va- 
riety of motives, powerfully constraining them to con- 
stant and fervent prayer, to self-denial, to a godly jeal- 
ousy over their own hearts, to a watchful avoidance 
of every thing which can minister to their moral cor- 
ruption, and to efforts of the greatest intensity, to 
" put off the old man with his deeds, and to put on 
the new man, which after God is created in righteous- 
ness and true holiness." 1 must decline here, as I did 
in my Letters, any formal comparison between the gen- 



149 



eral character exhibited by the Orthodox, and that ex- 
hibited by Unitarians. Indeed I am perfectly ready to 
confess, that among those who profess to believe the 
common doctrine of depravity, and even among those 
who preach it, instances of wickedness sometimes occur 
of the most hateful aspect, and stamping the perpetra- 
tors with indelible infamy. These instances I regard? 
as painful proofs of that very corruption, that deep, in- 
veterate corruption of human nature, which has been 
under discussion. At the same time I contend, that the 
cordial belief of the doctrine tends to produce, and actu- 
ally has produced all the salutary influence above de- 
scribed ; and that those views of the human character, 
which my opponents attempt to vindicate, lead on to all 
the hurtful consequences which [ have suggested. 



CHAPTER IX. 

Mr. Channing and others have accused the Orthodox 
generally of maintaining certain opinions on the subject of 
Election. We have repelled the accusation, by saying, that 
we do not maintain those opinions. Dr. Ware's apology for 
Mr. Channing is this ; — if the Orthodox " do not maintain 
the opinions, against which the sermon of Mr.Channing is 
directed, there seems to have been no good reason why 
they should feel themselves at all concerned in the 
charge. Calvinists only who do maintain them, can fairly 
consider their opinions as attacked, and themselves called 
upon to defend them." This apology would have been 
satisfactory, if Mr. Channing had directed his sermon 
against opinions merely, and not against men. But as 
20 



150 



the charges contained in the sermon are made against the 
Orthodox, we have this to do with them at least, that 
is, to declare them untrue. And as Mr. Channing has 
been distinctly informed that we disclaim the senti- 
ments which he has charged and has been understood to 
charge upon us ; it would be no unnatural expectation, 
that he would have something to do, besides repeating 
such groundless charges. Indeed it has become a question 
of difficult solution with many, how it can be reconciled 
with fairness or integrity for him to continue, without 
abatement or correction, to publish charges, by which 
the great body of Christians in the world are really as 
much injured, as he himself would be, if the same charges 
were published against him. 

It must not be forgotten that the doctrine of Election, 
which Orthodox Christians believe, and Orthodox Min- 
isters preach, is not the doctrine, which our opposers 
ascribe to us. The picture which Unitarians and Armi- 
nians draw of the doctrine is, in its essential features, very 
unlike the doctrine which we maintain. John Wesley 
says, and one of his late biographers thinks he has stated 
the case with equal force and truth ; "The sum of all is 
this.; one in twenty (suppose) of mankind, are elected; 
nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The elect shall be 
saved, do what they will ; the reprobate shall be damned, 
do what they can." Now the fact is, that human ingenui- 
ty could not make a representation of the doctrine, more 
uncandid, distorted, or false. And if, after all the ex- 
planations which have been given of our doctrine, any 
man still chooses to represent it in this manner, I will 
leave it to him to assign his reasons for doing so. 

In my Letters, I represented the doctrine of Election, 
in a general view, as implying the eternal purpose of God 



151 



respecting his own acts in the work of redemption ; that is, 
the eternal purpose of God to do what he actually does 
in saving sinners. Dr. Ware thinks no Unitarian would 
dissent from this form of the doctrine. It would seem 
then, from this concession of his, that the eternal purpose 
of God, as we understand it, is thought by Unitarians to 
differ, in some important respects, from what really takes 
place, and that it is on this account simply, that they object 
to our doctrine. If this should prove to be the case, the 
limits of the controversy would be very much narrowed ; 
as all the objections against the doctrine of an eternal 
purpose, from its alleged inconsistency with man's free- 
dom and accountableness, with the invitations of the gos- 
pel, &c. would be superseded, and the simple inquiry 
would be, whether our doctrine gives a representation of 
the Divine purpose, correspondent to the facts which 
occur in divine providence. 

The existence of an eternal purpose in a mind possessed 
of eternal intelligence, is self-evident. And nothing is more 
certain from Scripture, than that God eternally enter- 
tained a design respecting human salvation. As to this 
there can be no dispute. And it is equally clear, that 
the purpose of God must correspond with what actually 
takes place ; so that, by observing what comes to pass in 
divine providence, we learn not merely that there was a 
purpose in the divine mind, but what that purpose was. 
The events which take place show us at once, what God 
actually does, and what were his purposes. This, then, 
I lay down, and repeat, as a universal truth, and a truth of 
special importance in this controversy, that God's purpos- 
es respecting the salvation of men, and all other subjects, 
correspond perfectly with his administration, or rather, 
that his administration corresponds with his purposes. 



152 



There can be no unforeseen occurrence, no event not 
predetermined. I would say then, in pursuance of the 
views expressed in my Letters, and to make the subject 
still more plain, that so far as the acts of the divine 
administration are right, the divine purposes are right. 
In the discussion of this subject therefore, I find it most 
convenient and satisfactory, to fix my attention on the 
divine administration, which is a visible, definite thing, 
actually exhibited before me, and from that to regulate 
my opinions respecting the divine purposes. If I find what 
God does in the government of the world, for what ends 
he does it, and in what order ; I learn what was the plan 
of the divine mind from eternity. If the acts of the divine 
administration are holy, just, and good ; equally holy, just, 
and good is the divine purpose respecting those acts. So 
that whatever there may be in our doctrine which is 
exceptionable, it cannot be our believing that God has a 
purpose, or that his purpose is eternal and immutable. 
For if the thing purposed, that is, the divine administra- 
tion is wise and benevolent ; the purpose also is wise and 
benevolent. And it is surely far enough from being a 
dishonour to God, that he should eternally and unchange- 
ably entertain a wise and benevolent design. Nor can 
our doctrine be excepted to, because we maintain that 
the purpose of God relates to all events which take place. 
For if all events do in fact take place in such a manner 
as is consistent with the perfections of God ; then clearly, 
his purposing that they should take place in just such a 
manner is equally consistent with his perfections. It is 
then altogether unreasonable to object to the declaration 
in the Catechism, that God has " foreordained whatsoever 
comes to pass that is, that his purpose extends to all 
events in his administration. For if every part of his 



153 



administration is right ; his having purposed every part is 
right. There is then no danger of carrying the doctrine 
of the divine purposes, properly understood, to too great 
an extent. For it is as proper for God to determine all 
his own acts, and all that shall result from them, as to 
determine a part, if all are as wise and good as a part. I 
say then, that no man in his senses can think we carry 
the doctrine too far, when we assert that God predeter- 
mines every thing which is comprised in his whole admin- 
istration. There is indeed something faulty in our doctrine 
of the divine purposes, if we say that God determines 
any particular thing, which in fact he never does deter- 
mine, and which never takes place ; or if we say he 
determines it in a different manner from that in which it 
actually takes place ; — in other words, if we give a 
representation of the divine purposes, which, in one 
respect or another, does not agree with the divine 
administration. For example ; if we should maintain 
that God determined to save Judas, or to cast off Paul ; 
we should be chargeable with an error, in maintaining 
that God determined what in fact he did not determine, 
and what never took place. Or if we should say, God 
determined to cast off and punish Judas for any reason, 
but for his wickedness ; we should be chargeable with 
misrepresenting the proximate reason of that particular 
purpose. And our mistake would be of the same nature, 
if we should maintain that God determined to bestow the 
rewards of heaven upon Paul, without any regard to his 
holy character and actions. And as to his character, we 
should mistake, if we should maintain, that God deter- 
mined it should be formed in any way, except that in 
which it was really formed. My inquiry is, how was the 
character of Paul and of Judas actually formed? Under 



154 



the influence of what causes, or series of events ; and 
in what circumstances? The actual formation of charac- 
ter in such circumstances, and under such an influence, 
exactly answers to the divine purpose ; and the divine 
purpose, to be stated correctly, must be stated as agree- 
ing, in all respects, with what thus actually occurs in 
the course of divine providence. By fixing our thoughts 
in this manner on the things which really come to pass, 
and on the order and manner in which they come to pass, 
we may arrive at a view of the divine purposes, which 
is liable to no uncertainty, and no difficulty. 

These remarks are as applicable to the purpose of 
God, which is called Election, as to any other. I have 
represented Election, in a general view, as the purpose 
of God to do just what he actually does in saving sinners. 
and to do it in the manner in which he actually does it. 
To this Dr. Ware thinks there is no objection. He al- 
lows then, that there is an eternal, immutable purpose 
of God respecting human salvation. And he must al- 
low that God eternally purposed all which he actually 
does in the work of salvation. We cannot make God's 
purpose either too extensive or too particular, if we 
make it agree entirely with his work. Now God does 
in fact save a certain number of human beings. At the 
judgment day, Christ will say to the multitude on his 
right hand, consisting of a certain, definite number of indi- 
vidual believers, " come, ye blessed of my Father, inher- 
it the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of 
the world." God must have eternally designed to do 
just what he does in the present life, and what he will 
do at the judgment day ; that is, he must have designed 
to save that same definite number of individuals. And 
if we thus represent the divine purpose as agreeing 



155 



with the divine acts, no one can have the least reason 
to object to our doctrine, because we assert that God 
eternally designed to save just such a number of human 
beings, and just such individuals. For is it not granted 
that God's purpose and his acts perfectly agree ; or 
that he eternally purposed to do just what he actually 
does in time ? Now God actually saves a definite num- 
ber of individuals. He saves that definite number, and 
no more, or less. He must then have determined to do 
it. If any man denies this, he must say, either that God 
does not in fact save a certain definite number of indi- 
viduals, or that he does this without previously intend- 
ing to do it. 

By these remarks I wish to make it clear to every 
reader, that there can properly be no dispute respect- 
ing the doctrine of the divine purposes, taken by itself. 
The controversy really respects the divine administra- 
tion. The proper inquiry is, what God actually does. 
If we agree in this, we shall of course agree as to his 
purposes. By conducting the controversy in this way, 
we shall simplify the subject of inquiry, and free it at 
once from more than half its perplexity. 

My object in this chapter is not to attempt a partic- 
ular and full discussion of the subject, but merely to ex* 
hibit, in its outlines, the manner in which I think the 
doctrine may be satisfactorily stated and defended, and 
in which it may be effectually guarded against the diffi- 
culties which are supposed to attend it, and the miscon- 
structions often put upon it. If we take care first to 
learn from scripture and observation, what God actually 
does, and in what manner he does it ; we can have no 
difficulty in passing from this to a correct and satisfacto- 
ry view of his purposes. In thi* way it is easy to correct 



156 



various mistakes which have been made in stating the 
doctrine. Do you ask whether the doctrine of Election 
implies, that only a small part of mankind are chosen to sal- 
vation f To make out a proper answer, we first inquire 
whether there is any thing in the word of God, which 
shows this. And here we do indeed find some passages, 
which declare the small number of good men who lived at 
particular times ; but none which declare that there will 
be only a small number saved, in reference to the whole 
human race from the beginning to the end of the world. 
The word of God plainly teaches the contrary. Second- 
ly. We inquire what our own observation and the histo- 
ry of past ages teach. Here we think the evidence 
clear, that, through all generations past, only a small 
part, comparatively, of the human species, have been 
saved from sin. But this proves nothing as to the pro- 
portion that will be saved, of our whole race. There 
is abundant reason to believe that, in the ages to come, 
it will be exceedingly different from what it has been 
heretofore. Hence we conclude that the Scripture doc- 
trine of Election does not imply, that only a small part 
of mankind are chosen to salvation. It is therefore a 
manifest error, to state the doctrine thus. And any one 
who gets advantage against it from such a view, gets it 
unfairly. And any one who justifies the representation 
often made of our doctrine in this respect, justifies what 
may justly be called religious calumny. 

Again. Does the Scripture doctrine of Election im- 
ply, that the elect will be saved, let them do what they 
will ; that is, whether they repent, and obey the gospel, 
or not ? Here, according to our general principle, we 
consult the Scriptures to learn what God actually does. 
The question must be considered in two views. First ; 



157 

making salvation mean the blessedness of heaven, we 
inquire whether God admits men to this, without any 
regard to their character and conduct. Every thing in 
the Bible stands against such a notion. Heaven is grant- 
ed only to the penitent, the obedient, the holy. Sec- 
ondly ; salvation may denote the regeneration or first 
conversion of sinners. Agreeably to this view, the ques- 
tion stands thus ; does God renew sinners, or begin the 
work of salvation in them, on account of their previous 
character or conduct ? The Bible and observation both 
teach that he does not. Men possessing all the varieties 
of character which the world has exhibited, have been 
converted, or brought to repentance. If I should name 
Saul of Tarsus as an instance, my opponents might object, 
and say, it was am«Vac/e. My reply would be, that God 
works no miracle, which violates the principles of a just 
administration of government ; and that Paul makes no 
such distinction between himself and others, but express- 
ly represents his case, as a pattern to others who should 
afterwards believe. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16. So that his dec- 
laration is obviously just, in regard to Christians generally, 
that God first calls them and saves them from sin, "not 
according to their works but according to his own pur- 
pose and grace." This we consider as a universal truth. 
Whenever God first makes men holy, he must do it 
without regard to any goodness in them. He can look 
at no " works of righteousness which they have done," 
but must act from the impulse of his own infinite love. 
And we are to view the purpose of God in relation to this 
subject, as in all respects corresponding to the manner of 
his acting. It seems then perfectly clear, that God did 
not determine to regenerate men, or make them holy, 
from any foresight of repentance, faith, or good works, 
21 



158 



" as conditions or causes moving him thereunto." The 
first production of holiness cannot surely have respect to 
any previous holiness. But I could not say, in the same 
sense, that God determined to give men the blessedness 
of heaven, without any foresight of repentance or good 
works, as conditions; because the Bible represents repen- 
tance and good works, and perseverance in them, as 
necessary conditions of final happiness. And if God now 
in fact makes them conditions, he must have regarded 
them as such, in his eternal purpose. That act of di- 
vine grace which, so far as the conduct of sinners is con- 
cerned is wholly unconditional, is, as I understand it, the 
first formation of a holy character, or the commence- 
ment of real goodness in the heart. Without enlarging 
here, I would just say, in accordance with the general 
principle laid down above, and more fully expressed in 
my Letters, that the divine purposes are just as condi- 
tional, and in the same sense, as the divine acts. 

If then there is any objection against our doctrine 
of the divine purposes, the objection must in reality lie 
against what we assert to be matter of fact in the divine 
administration. The two things, which seem to be re- 
garded as particularly objectionable, are, 1, That the 
conversion and salvation of men is a matter of mere 
grace, all regard to personal merit being excluded ; 2, 
That the grace of God in the conversion of sinners is 
distinguishing ; in other words, that it is so dispensed, 
that of those who are equally unworthy of favour, and 
equally deserving of punishment, some are renewed, and 
others not. 

The proper way to dispose of the first of these par- 
ticulars, is to place it by the side of those texts, which 
describe the moral character and state of all men, as 



159 



by nature entirely sinful, and those which represent 
the death of Christ, as the grand procuring cause of all 
the good conferred on human beings, and those which 
declare, that salvation is wholly of grace, to the exclu- 
sion of all works of righteousness. To these texts, I 
might add others which show the actual views of good 
men respecting themselves ; and then might refer to 
the feelings of Christians generally. 

As to the second point, namely, the difference among 
men equally undeserving ; — it is clear that w 7 e cannot 
properly decide against it; because with our limited and 
obscure views, we cannot possibly determine that infi- 
nite wisdom may not see it to be necessary to make such 
a difference in order to the highest interests of the uni- 
verse. To say that, because we can see no reasons for 
it, therefore there are none, would ill become creatures 
like us. It is easy to show from Scripture, that such a 
difference has been made, and from common observa- 
tion, that it is now made. That divine grace, actually 
makes a difference among those who are equally sinful, 
renewing some and not others, is a plain, historic fact, 
just as well attested, as that God makes a difference, 
with respect to longevity, among men who live in the 
same climate, and possess equal vigor of natural consti- 
tution. 

I am fully aware of the objection, that making such a 
difference is unjust. My first remark in relation to this 
objection is, that if it is in fact unjust to make the differ- 
ence, it cannot be admitted that God would ever do it 
in a single instance. For God will no more do injustice 
in a single instance, than in ten thousand instances. But 
I think it is generally admitted by my opponents, that a 
difference like what I have asserted, has been made in 
some extraordinary instances, as that of Paul and Mary 



160 



Magdalene. But can they mean to admit that God does, 
in any instance whatever, commit an act of injustice ? 

But to whom is it unjust for God to make such a dif- 
ference ? To those who are saved ? Our opponents will 
not say this. The injustice which they allege, must re- 
late to those who perish. But how is the bestowment of 
gratuitous blessings on others, any injustice to them} I 
might rather say, how can it be unjust to inflict on them 
an evil w T hich they deserve, or to withhold a favour 
which they deserve not ? 

Dr. Ware endeavours to show that the method of 
designating the heirs of salvation, which the doctrine of 
Election implies, can neither be reconciled with our 
natural notions of the moral government of God, derived 
from the use of the faculties he has given us, and our 
observation of his conduct in the government of the 
world, nor with what he has made known to us of his 
character, and purposes, and government in the Christian 
revelation." 

His first objection is from our natural conceptions and 
feelings. " Following," he says, " the light of our reason 
and the natural impulse of our feelings, we find it impos- 
sible to imagine, that the Author of our being can regard 
and treat his offspring in the manner, which the doctrine 
in question attributes to him." 

This argument it is evident can have no weight, if it 
is found, that our natural conceptions and feelings are 
so disordered, as not to be a safe guide. Human reason, 
when freed from wrong bias, and properly instructed, 
and the feelings of the heart, when sanctified by the 
divine Spirit, do, in my apprehension, perfectly approve 
every thing contained in the doctrine of Election. That 
reason, disordered as it is by sin, should mistake on this 
subject, is no more strange, than that it should mistake 



161 



on a thousand other subjects. And that the feelings of 
a world, which lieth in wickedness, should rise up against 
the purpose of God in respect to salvation, is no more 
strange, than that they should rise up, as they do, against 
various dispensations of divine providence. " The fool- 
ishness of man perverteth his way ; and his heart fret- 
teth against the Lord." I allow, indeed, that the doc- 
trine of Election, as set forth by Dr. Ware, p. 59, admits 
of no defence. He represents it as implying, that with- 
out any foreseen difference of character and desert in 
men, God regarded some with complacency and love, 
and others, with disapprobation and hatred and wrath 
that is, that God regarded with complacency that same 
character in the elect, which, in the non-elect, he regard- 
ed with disapprobation and hatred. This representation 
has no resemblance to the Orthodox doctrine. It is an 
imagination, a shadow. Any man will be convinced of 
this, who examines what Dr. Ware quotes from my 
Letters, or from the Westminster Divines. Our doctrine 
is, that God regards those sinners who are to be saved, 
not with approbation, or complacency, but with that 
benevolence, or compassion, which is perfectly consistent 
with the highest disapprobation ; that he chooses them 
to salvation through sanctification of the spirit ; that he 
determines to renew them, and so to make them objects 
of his complacency ; they being naturally objects of his 
strongest disapprobation. We maintain that God regards 
things just as they are. And any representation of our 
opponents, different from this, is at variance with our 
doctrine. 

I must make similar remarks on another clause, p. 59, 
in which we are represented as holding that, " without 
any reference to the future use or abuse of their nature, 
God appoints some to everlasting happiness, and the rest 



162 



to everlasting misery ; and that this appointment, entire- 
ly arbitrary, is the cause, not the consequence of holi- 
ness in the one, and of the defect of holiness in the other." 
Our doctrine does not imply, that God appoints some to 
happiness and others to misery, without any reference 
to their future conduct. We maintain that God does, 
indeed, give the blessedness of heaven to his people, as 
an unmerited gift, — that is, without seeing any thing in 
their character which renders them deserving of such a 
gift ; but not without a regard to that holiness in them, 
which is a necessary qualification for heaven. He does 
not admit them to heaven, as impenitent, unholy. He 
first makes them holy ; and then receives them to heaven. 
In his purpose he determines things in the same order. 

As to the non-elect, God will actually doom them to 
punishment, not without reference to their character and 
conduct, but because they have been workers of iniquity. 
He will do it for this reason, and for this only. And for 
this same reason, he predetermines to do it. So the 
Westminster Divines. " The rest of mankind God was 
pleased to ordain to dishonour and wrath, for their sin" 
If it is proper for God to inflict such an evil upon men 
for their sin, it is proper that he should previously 
determine to do it. No man can deny this. Yet we, 
who assert this, are charged with making God a monster 
of malevolence and caprice. And to give this charge 
some colour of truth, we are represented as asserting, 
that God appoints men to everlasting misery without 
any regard to their conduct ;— a thing as far from our 
belief, as atheism. 

It really excites no small degree of surprise, that Dr. 
Ware should assert what follows, as though it were 
something different from the belief of the Orthodox and 
incompatible with the doctrine of Election. He says, 



163 



p. 64, "The final distinctions that are to be made be- 
tween men, we are again and again told, are to be wholly 
according to the difference of moral character. It is 
that these are righteous, and those wicked ; these have 
done well, and those have done ill." — This is a view of 
the subject upon which I have insisted a thousand times, 
with more zeal than upon almost any other. This I con- 
sider to be one of those plain truths of revelation, which 
ought to limit and regulate our conceptions of other sub- 
jects, and I make it a rule, not to admit any views of the 
doctrine of Election or of salvation by grace, or of any 
other doctrine, inconsistent with this. 

It would be aside from my present purpose to en- 
large on this topic. The difficulty, at which Dr. Ware 
and others stumble, seems to arise from their not tak- 
ing into view the whole subject. The Westminster 
Divines and the Orthodox generally say, that God not 
only appointed the elect to glory, but appointed all 
the means thereunto. This is the same as saying, 
that those whom he purposed to save, he purposed first 
to sanctify ; or in the language of Scripture, he chose 
them to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit. 
How, and in what order does God actually proceed in 
saving sinners ? First, he provides for them a Redeem- 
er and invites them to accept him. Secondly, he calls 
them with a holy calling, leads them to repentance, par- 
dons their sins, and by an effectual discipline prepares 
them for heaven ; and then he shows his approbation 
of them, and graciously rewards them. Their holiness 
is a condition, and on their part, the only condition of 
their title to heaven. Such is the order of God's acts 
in the salvation of sinners. Exactly answerable to this 
is the purpose of God. His purpose, perfectly wise and 
benevolent, is the exact counterpart of his administra- 



164 



tion. And as in his administration, the propriety of one 
event depends entirely upon its connexion with another; 
so it does in his purpose. And it is altogether unjust to 
represent that God predetermines any event whatever, 
without regard to its connexion with other events. It 
is neglecting that order and connexion of things, on which 
the character of the divine administration essentially de- 
pends. But it is from overlooking or denying this order 
and connexion, that the opposers of our doctrine get 
all their advantage against it. With these views, wc 
cordially subscribe to the following declaration of Dr. 
Ware, though he seems to think our belief very differ- 
ent. " So far are the reasons of the final distinction to 
be made between those who are saved and those who 
perish, from being concealed in the divine mind, that no- 
thing is more distinctly made known. The New Tes- 
tament is full of it." I will only add, that it is, in my 
apprehension, revealed with equal clearness, that God 
makes a difference among men in respect of character, with- 
out making known the reasons of what he does. 

But some of Dr. Ware's positions on this subject de- 
serve more particular consideration. He says, p. 64, 
that " in the appointment of men to privileges and 
means, God has indeed given no account of his motives, 
nor assigned his reasons for the infinite variety that ap- 
pears. He has exercised an absolute sovreignty, of 
which no account is given, and the reasons of which we 
are not competent to understand." And p. 76, he ex- 
presses his approbation of " a free and unconditional ap- 
pointment to the participation of privileges." Now if 
Dr. Ware will look through this subject, as he has stat- 
ed it, he may possibly discover as formidable difficulties, 
as those which attend our doctrine. For what is the 
tendency and use of means and privileges ? Does not 



165 

their whole value consist in their influence upon the 
character ? The word of God, which is the greatest 
and best of our privileges, and which makes the princi- 
pal difference between Christians and heathens, is the 
means of turning men from sin, and bringing them to 
love and obey God. " Sanctify them through thy truth; 
thy word is truth." When God, in the exercise of that 
absolute sovereignty, which Dr. Ware ascribes to him, 
appoints one part of the human race, say the inhabitants 
of New England, to the enjoyment of the Scriptures 
and other religious means, he doubtless does it to pro- 
mote virtue and piety, or to render men holy. And 
the actual consequence of these privileges is, that many 
become penitent and holy. Now does Dr. W r are see 
no difficulty in asserting that God, by an act of " ab- 
solute sovereignty," grants to some in distinction from 
others, privileges which are designed to produce, and to 
a certain extent, do in fact produce, a sanctifying effect 
upon their character ? — privileges without which, ac- 
cording to the apostle, Rom. x, men cannot believe ? 
In regard to the general difficulty, where is the differ- 
ence between Dr. Ware's doctrine, and ours ? We say, 
God determines to bring some men to repentance, and 
make them holy, and therefore gives them those means 
which, by his blessing, will produce the effect. Accord- 
ing to Dr. Ware, God in the exercise of his absolute sove- 
reignty, appoints some men in distinction from others, o 
the participation of those means, by which they a:* in 
fact, formed to holiness. Their holiness is the real and 
proper effect of the means which God gives them. 
And he would doubtless allow too, that God gives them 
these means, knowing infallibly what will be the conse- 
quence, and intending that just such a desirable conse- 
quence shall take place. Now is not this, in effect, 
22 



166 



making a difference among men in respect of character, 
as well as of means and privileges ? If means and priv- 
ileges do not tend to make a difference in respect of 
character, of what value are they ? Why are they be- 
stowed ? Dr. Ware would doubtless go as far as we, in 
extolling the happy consequences of the Christian reve- 
lation upon those communities which enjoy it. Those 
consequences respect moral and religious character 
chiefly. To give that revelation is to contribute direct- 
ly, and in many cases effectually, to the formation of a 
holy character. And a previous determination to give 
that revelation is, in effect, a determination to make men 
holy. On the other hand, to withhold the Sacred Ora- 
cles and the other means of religion, is to leave men 
without any reasonable prospect of being brought to re- 
pentance. The truths and precepts and promises of 
Scripture are the only medicines, which can cure the 
moral diseases of men. To withhold the Scriptures is 
to leave men to the fatal influence of those moral dis- 
easeSj thus rendered incurable. Had the inhabitants of 
Tyre and Sodom enjoyed the same means with those, 
who were favoured with the Scriptures and the personal 
ministry of Christ ; " they would have repented." The 
means would have been, to a greater or less degree, ef- 
fectual. If those means had been afforded to the in- 
habitants of one of those places, and not of the other ; 
a difference between the inhabitants of those two places 
in point of moral character would unquestionably have 
been the consequence. In Great Britain and America 
there is a large number of enlightened and sincere 
worshippers of God, while among other equal portions 
of the human race in Asia and Africa, none can be 
found. How can this be accounted for ? According to 
Dr. Ware, it must be ascribed to difference of circum- 



167 



stances. And difference of circumstances is traced by 
him to "the absolute sovereignty of God." Thus then 
his scheme stands. In 64 the exercise of absolute sove- 
reignty," God has given some men and not others, the 
Scriptures and other means. These means are given 
for the very purpose of producing an effect on the char- 
acter; and to a great extent they actually accomplish 
this purpose. The character, thus formed, determines 
the condition of men in the future world. In all the in- 
stances, in which men are thus turned from sin, and fit- 
ted for the kingdom of heaven, these things make a con- 
nected series ; — means of moral culture, — formation of 
character, — condition in the future world. Condition in 
the future world depends on character ; character, on 
the enjoyment of means ; and the enjoyment of means, 
according to Dr. Ware, on " the absolute sovereignty of 
God." Now just so far as these things are connected, 
if God appoints one, he does in effect appoint the other ; 
especially as the connexion itself, whatever it is, depends 
wholly on his will. And yet Dr. Ware objects strong- 
ly to considering God's appointment as relating either to 
men's character, or to their future condition. But why 
should he object? What difficulty can he feel in ad- 
mitting that the appointment of God relates to all these, 
— and relates to them just in the order and manner in 
which they take place ? The position which I would 
defend in relation to this subject, is, that the purpose of 
God exactly agrees with the acts of his administration. 
This is the faith of the Orthodox, though expressed in 
different ways. Some choose to say that God, by a sove- 
reign act, first appointed the eternal condition of the 
elect; and then " appointed all the means thereunto;" 
that is, purposed to give them his word, and, by means of 
that word, to make them holy, and thus prepare them 



168 



for heaven. Others prefer a different order, and say, 
that God first determined to give men his word and 
make them holy, and then to bestow the rewards of ho- 
liness. But both come to the same thing. For accord- 
ing to the first, the design of God to receive men to 
heaven must be connected with a design to make them 
holy, and that must be connected with a design to give 
them the means of holiness. And according to the other, 
his design to give them the means of religion must be con- 
nected with a design to produce, by those means, a prop- 
er effect upon their character ; that is, to make them 
holy ; and his design to make them holy must be con- 
nected with his design to make them happy in his king- 
dom. Thus things are connected in fact ; and thus, ac- 
cording to both statements, must they have been re- 
garded in the divine purpose. 

If with Dr. Ware and others, we should assert a 
conditional purpose of God, in regard to men's charac- 
ter ; how should we be less encumbered with difficulty? 
God determined to make men holy on condition of their 
faithfully using the means he should afford them. But 
in respect to those, who will actually be saved, he knew 
that the condition would be performed. And he knew 
it would be performed, not as a matter of chance, but 
under the influence of proper causes, — causes of a moral 
nature,— causes wholly under his control, and deriving 
all their efficacy from him. Or thus. He determined 
to put them in such circumstances, to hold up such mo- 
tives, and to exert such an influence, as he knew would 
persuade them, as moral agents, to use their privileges 
aright, and to obey the gospel. Now this is substantial- 
ly, though not in form, the same with the doctrine of the 
Orthodox. They maintain, that God purposed to admit 
to heaven a certain number of our race. But how ? As 



169 



unsanctified sinners ? No ; but in consequence of their 
previous deliverance from sin, and their preparation for 
heaven. Their possessing real holiness is an essential 
prerequisite to their being admitted into heaven ; and, 
in this sense, must be regarded as a condition of their 
final happiness. The Orthodox maintain too, that God 
determined to make his people holy. But how? By a 
physical influence, operating upon them as machines ? 
No ; but by an influence suited to their moral na- 
ture. He determined to sanctify them through the 
truth. Now this statement of the subject is as honoura- 
ble to God, as conformable to reason, scripture, and fact, 
and as free from difficulty, as the other. 

The doctrine of Election is represented by my oppo- 
nent as not reconcileable with the notions of the divine 
character, " which we derive from our observation of his 
conduct in the government of the world that is, it is 
not reconcileable with what we learn from fact. But 
my apprehension is, that fact helps to prove the doctrine. 
For what is fact ? A difference really exists among men 
in respect of character. How is this difference to be 
accounted for ? If it is original, or if it springs from any 
thing original in our nature, it must be traced to the 
purpose and agency of the Author of our nature. This 
Dr. Ware would by no means allow ; and of course must 
say that the good and the bad are originally of the same 
character. I ask then for the cause of the present 
difference. Is it owing, as Dr. W are in another place 
suggests, to education, example, and other outward cir- 
cumstances ? All these circumstances are ordered by 
divine providence. In the appointment of men to these, 
Dr. Ware asserts, that God "exercises an absolute sove- 
reignty." And if it is more or less owing to means, 
privileges, and outward circumstances, that some men 



170 



are holy, while others are not ; the difference is, in the 
same degree, to be traced to what Dr. Ware calls the 
" absolute sovereignty of God." But the characters of 
men, who have the same outward privileges, differ; and 
it will be said by Dr. Ware, that this difference depends 
on the manner in which they use the means afforded 
them. Some men voluntarily use their faculties and 
privileges aright, and so acquire the habits of real good- 
ness ; while others abuse their faculties and privileges, 
and exhibit the marks of obstinate wickedness. Suppose 
now this voluntary conduct to be the proximate cause of 
the difference existing among men in regard to character, 
and that a part of the human race become holy, because 
they rightly use their privileges. This right use of their 
privileges is, then, a fact, — and a fact on which their 
everlasting interest depends. How is this fact to be 
accounted for ? Is it owing to the influence of any causes, 
either physical or moral ?— Does it result from their dis- 
position or choice ? How then is this disposition or choice 
to be accounted for ? The Scripture accounts for it by 
the divine influence. It represents God as working in 
men both to will, and to do. If Dr. Ware is satisfied 
with this mode of accounting for the fact, the controversy 
is ended. But if he should say, that the gracious influ- 
ence of God is always granted on the condition of men's 
having previously some right desire, or choice, or con- 
duct ; I would ask again, how we are to account for that 
desire, choice, or conduct, which is not produced by the 
spirit of God ? Where shall we look for the cause ? Is 
the right desire or choice owing to the influence of 
motives ? And is it not God, who has given men a mind 
suited to be influenced by motives ? And does he 
not so order things in his providence, that those motives 



171 



shall be presented before them, which will effectually 
excite such a choice or desire ? 

Thus common observation first leads us to notice 
what exists in fact, — what God does in his providence 
with respect to the characters, and consequently with 
respect to the future condition of men ; and from this 
we infer what his design was. 

To the following remark of Dr. Ware it is hardly 
necessary to make any additional reply. He says, that 
according to our doctrine, what men are to be and how 
they are to act, is determined beforehand, without any 
reference to their exertions. A strange notion truly, 
since it is impossible to conceive that men should be any 
thing, or act in any way whatever, without including their 
exertions. 

Dr. Ware thinks that God's sovereign appointment 
of the everlasting condition of men is " inconsistent with 
all that implies the influence of motives." But he could 
not have thought so, if he had only considered the divine 
purpose as agreeing exactly with fact ; and, finding it a 
fact that moral agents are, and from the nature of the 
case must be, influenced by motives, had concluded, that 
God's appointment was, that they should be influenced by 
motives just as they are. The position of our opponents 
if well examined, will evidently amount to this, — that 
God's determining that men shall act from motives, hin- 
ders them from acting in this manner ; that his deter- 
mining that they shall be moral, accountable agents, 
makes it impossible they should be so. Whereas we' 
have been very much inclined to think, that God's deter- 
mination, if it has any influence, must tend to accomplish 
the thing determined, not to prevent it. 

This subject is placed in a very clear light by those 
texts which show, that men have acted with perfect 



172 



freedom and voluntariness, while fulfilling the divine 
purpose. The apostles declare, Acts iv. 26, 27, 28, that 
the murderers of Christ did what the hand and counsel of 
God determined before to be done. But did they act 
without motives ? Here is a plain case. In those very 
actions, which were predetermined, they were influenced 
by motives, and were in all respects moral, accountable 
agents. Nor is this a singular case. So far as our 
subject is concerned, it is on a level with a thousand 
other instances of wickedness, — yea, with all the instan- 
ces which have ever occurred. From the single case of 
Pharaoh, the Apostle draws arguments to establish a 
general principle ; that is, he considers the conduct of 
God in respect to Pharaoh, as proving that the same 
conduct would be proper in respect to others. So I 
reason here. If God predetermined the actions of those 
who crucified the Saviour, he must have predetermined 
the actions of other sinners. This none can reasonably 
deny, unless they can offer some satisfactory reason why 
God should determine the actions of Christ's enemies, 
but not of others. And if the enemies of Christ, whose 
actions were predetermined, were still influenced by 
motives, and were in the highest degree moral agents ; 
so may others be, whose actions were predetermined. 

In some respects, Dr. Ware well illustrates the 
general principle for which I contend, in a passage of his 
Fourth Letter, p. 78. Speaking of the design of God 
in raising up Pharaoh, he says ; " How did God actually 
show his power in him, and make him the instrument of 
his glory ? It was by giving him the opportunity to act 
out his character; by allowing him full scope for dis- 
playing the incorrigible obstinacy of his disposition, and 
by then inflicting upon him exemplary punishment for 
the instruction and warning of mankind ; thus making 



173 



him the instrument of promoting some of the best pur- 
poses of heaven, in the free and voluntary exercise of 
his power." Here the perfect consistency of free and 
voluntary action with the accomplishment of God's pur- 
pose is fully asserted. 

It will be seen then, how little reason Dr. Ware has 
for what he has written, p. 61, 62, in which he repre- 
sents the Orthodox doctrine as inconsistent " with all 
that implies the influence of motives" — " with all that 
implies guilt, ill-desert, blame-worthiness in the disobedi- 
ent" — " and with all those promises, threatenings, warn- 
ings, &c. which imply in those to whom they are address- 
ed, a power of being influenced." — If the divine purpose 
leaves men, I should rather say makes i\iem, free, moral 
agents, as we see is implied in the case of Pharaoh and 
the murderers of Christ ; they are certainly capable of 
being influenced by motives, so that promises, threats, 
warnings, &c. are proper and useful ; and if guilt can 
exist in any case, it may here. 

Dr. Ware says, p. 62, that this doctrine " represents 
God as unjust,— exacting endless punishment for sins com- 
mitted in following the nature which he had given us, 
and acting in pursuance of his decree." I reply. If sin 
exists, it must be committed in following our dispositions, 
or the propensities of our nature. And I have before 
shown, that the circumstance of our dispositions or pro- 
pensities being natural or original, cannot render them, 
or the actions resulting from them, less criminal. As 
to the other part ; can Dr. Ware, after giving the expla- 
nation, above quoted, of the divine conduct respecting 
Pharaoh, think it unjust for God to punish men for sins 
they commit, while acting in pursuance of his purpose ? 
Did not Joseph's brethren, though their hearts meant 
Rot so, act in pursuance of God's purpose ? Did not 
23 



174 



those who carried the Israelites into captivity, and 
those who murdered the Prince of life, act according 
to God's purpose ? And was God unjust and cruel in 
punishing them ? 

I regret that Dr. Ware has made use of expres- 
sions and arguments like those above recited. They 
are such as men of liberal minds, who examine sub- 
jects profoundly, and judge without prejudice, ought 
never to employ. It would be easy enough, by means 
equally plausible, to oppose those doctrines of Scripture, 
which Dr. Ware believes, and to discredit the Scripture 
itself. 

I will allow myself here to turn aside from the book, 
to which I am attempting a reply, just to notice the 
ravings of one of the most able opposers of the doctrine 
of Election. To those who assert this doctrine, he says ; 
" You represent God as worse than the Devil ; more 
false, more cruel, more unjust. But you say, you will 
prove it by Scripture. Hold ! What will you prove by 
Scripture? that God is worse than the Devil ?"-"Upon 
the supposition of this doctrine, one might say to our 
adversary the Devil, thou fool, why dost thou roar about 
any longer ? Hearest thou not that God hath taken thy 
work out of thy hands, and that he doth it more effec- 
tually ?" — " Oh how would the enemy of God and man 
rejoice to hear these things were so ! How would he lift 
up his voice and say, to your tents, O Israel ! flee from 
the face of this God. — But whither will ye flee? Into 
heaven ? He is there. Down to hell ? He is there also. 
Ye cannot flee from an omnipresent, omnipotent tyrant.' 9 
My apology for introducing these extracts from 
Wesley is, that the Reviewers in the Christian Disciple 
for Nov. and Dec. 1820, profess to have perfect fellow- 
ship, on this subject, with one, whom they consider 



175 



as mad with enthusiasm, and call this strain of violent 
misrepresentation, scurrility, and outrage, " an over- 
whelming flood of eloquence as well as argument." 

Our opposers are much inclined to look at the diffi- 
culties and objections, which attend our doctrine of the 
divine purpose respecting the characters of men. Why 
will they not pay equal attention to the difficulties, which 
attend the denial of this doctrine ? If they deny that 
the characters of men exist in accordance with the eter- 
nal purpose of God ; they must maintain either that 
God had no design at all in regard to their characters, 
or else that he designed they should be different from 
what they really are. Will you say, God had no deter- 
mination respecting the moral characters of men ? Then 
he could have had no determination respecting any of 
those natural or moral causes, which contribute to form 
their character. And if so, then he could have had no 
determination respecting " the privileges, means, and ex- 
ternal condition" of men, to which it is perfectly obvi- 
ous their characters are generally owing. But Dr. Ware 
asserts that God has appointed men's privileges, means 
and external condition, with absolute sovereignty. So it 
comes to this; he has appointed every thing, which can 
operate as a cause or means of moral character — every 
thing to which the formation of character can be traced, 
but has carefully abstained from determining what the 
character shall be. And why ? Because his determining 
what it shall be would be inconsistent with its being 
what he determined. 

But if you say, God had a determination respecting 
the characters of men, but that his determination was 
that they should be different from what they are ; then 
God is disappointed. But every disappointment must 



176 

be owing to some defect of wisdom or power, and of 
course must belong to an imperfect being. Let any man 
who denies our doctrine, take which position he pleas- 
es, — either that God has no design at all respecting 
men's characters ; or, that he designed they should be 
different from what they are in fact ; and let him com- 
pare the difficulties attending either of these positions 
with those which attend the only remaining position, 
namely, that of the Orthodox above stated. 

I pass over many things in Dr. Ware's Letters, of 
the same general nature with those on which I have al- 
ready remarked, and proceed to notice the manner in 
which he attempts to invalidate my arguments from 
Scripture. 

My first argument was founded on those passages, 
particularly in John xvii, in which Christ speaks of a part 
of mankind, as given him of the Father. As an exam- 
ple I quoted verse 2. " As thou hast given him power 
over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many 
as thou hast given him." The sense which I gave to 
the text was this ; that the Father has given to Christ 
a part of the human race, and that those who are thus 
given to Christ, are the persons who shall have eternal 
life. 

Dr. Ware thinks our Saviour could not have meant 
to assert the common doctrine of Election in this text, 
because in Chapter xv, " he addresses the same persons 
of whom he here speaks as given him of the Father, in 
language implying that they might abide in him and 
bring forth fruit, or failing to abide in him, might be 
taken away," &c. " But," he says, " according to the 
doctrine in question, there could be no such contingency 
in the case." The reasoning is this. If God had a real 
design to save those particular persons, whom he finally 



177 



does save, Christ could not have exhorted his disciples 
as he did, to abide in him, and enforced his exhortation 
by telling them the plain truth as to the consequences of 
their faithful adherence to him, and the consequences of 
their forsaking him. Which is the same as saying, if God 
does certainly determine to save a particular number of 
human beings, he cannot speak to them in the language 
of direction, exhortation, and warning, — cannot address 
them with motives, — cannot do any thing to excite their 
hopes or fears, or persuade them to obedience. And all 
this seems to me to be the same as saying, — if God de- 
termines to train up a certain number of men for eter- 
nal life, he cannot use proper means to carry his deter- 
mination into effect. I must confess that all the reason, 
which it has pleased God to give me, leads to a conclu- 
sion directly opposite. If God really determines to 
guide a certain number of men in the way to heaven, it 
seems reasonable to expect, that he will use the means 
best suited to accomplish his determination. And ad- 
mitting those who are to be saved, to be moral agents, I 
should think that God would of course, make use of all 
those precepts, warnings, promises and threats, by which 
moral agents are most effectually influenced. What 
would Dr. Ware say, if we should apply the reasoning 
he relies upon in this case, to events in the natural 
world. The reasoning would stand thus. If God cer- 
tainly determines to give us an abundant harvest, it will 
be altogether inconsistent for him to cause the sun to 
shine or rain to descend, or to use any other means to 
secure that harvest which he has determined to give. 
And I am sure it is equally absurd to reason thus in re- 
gard to the moral world. If God determines to accom- 
plish an event of a moral nature, I ask whether it is con- 
sistent that he should use any means whatever ; and 



178 



then, whether it is consistent for him to use those which 
are suited to moral agents. The remaining question 
would be, whether warnings, exhortations, promises, and 
threats, are suited to influence moral agents. It must 
be perfectly obvious, that they can be influenced in no 
other way ; and that if God determines to bring a larg- 
er or smaller number of men to serve him faithfully, and 
so prepare them for future happiness, he must influence 
them to do it by such means as those above mentioned, 
or not at al! ; — unless men cease to be moral agents, and 
become capable of being moved like senseless machines. 
We see then, that the very thing which Dr. Ware thinks 
conclusive against the doctrine of Election, naturally and 
necessarily results from it, supposing it to be true. We 
see also, that all the contingency, which is implied in 
the use of exhortations, conditional promises, and threats, 
is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of Election. 

If it were necessary still farther to defend the posi- 
tion I have taken in regard to the use of means, I 
could easily adduce particular instances, in which it 
appears from Scripture, that God has actually determin- 
ed the characters and actions of men, and yet, in those 
very instances, has made use of all the means suited to 
moral agents, and made use of them in such a manner 
as to carry his determination into effect. 

Those who urge the above-named objection against 
our doctrine, commit one great mistake ; that is, they 
do not consider that the divine purposes, like all parts 
of the divine administration, respect men, as moral agents, 
and are accomplished by a system of moral means, 
exactly suited to operate upon such agents. Did they 
not lose sight of this plain principle, they could not help 
seeing, that it is just as consistent with our doctrine for 
God to use warnings, exhortations, promises and threats 



179 



to influence his people, as to give them commands, or to 
use proper means to accomplish any of his designs. 

Another argument which Dr. Ware urges against my 
reasoning from the passage in John xvii, is, that in a 
previous chapter, we meet with the following sentence ; 
" For the Father himself loveth you, because ye have 
loved me," &c. John xvi. 27. "Here," Dr. Ware says, 
44 the love of God is represented, not as the cause, but 
as the consequence of the faith and love of the disciples." 
This view is admitted, so far as the meaning of this 
particular text is concerned. But if we would understand 
the subject fully, we must compare this text with others, 
particularly with two passages from the same writer ; 
1 John m 10, 19. 44 Not that we loved God, but that 
he loved us." 44 We love him because he first loved 
us." Dr. Ware thinks if our doctrine of Election or 
distinguishing grace is true, 44 it is impossible to see with 
what propriety it could be said of the elect, that God 
loved them, because of their love to Christ ; for his 
distinguishing love was, by that supposition, the cause of 
their love." I contend that in a most important sense, 
it ivas the cause ; and that in the two texts last quoted, 
it is clearly represented in this light; though in another 
sense, it is as represented in the passage cited by Dr. 
Ware ; that is, God's love to Christians does, in the 
order of nature, follow their love to him. Now to avoid 
a contradiction between the different passages above cit- 
ed, we must refer to a very obvious distinction between 
the different significations of the word love, as used in 
these passages. When we speak of the love of God in 
the sense in which it is used in the texts quoted from the 
Epistle, and elsewhere, that is, as benevolence towards sin- 
ners, operating powerfully for their salvation, we must con- 
sider it as the cause of their love to him. vea. the cause of 

7 j 7 



180 



every thing excellent in their character, and every thing 
happy in their condition. And is it not common for devout 
Christians, of all denominations, to attribute all good in 
creatures to the benevolence or goodness of God ? The 
love of God in this sense is mere good-will, kindness, 
compassion ; and is exercised towards men, considered 
as sinners, or enemies. Of course, it implies no appro- 
bation of their character, no complacency in them. But 
the word, as used John xvi. 27, evidently denotes corn- 
placency, or approbation, and actions expressive of it> and 
so necessarily presupposes moral good in those who are 
its objects. They enjoy the divine approbation, because 
they love Christ. The love of God, thus understood, is 
the reward of our faith and piety ; but it has no respect 
to the doctrine of Election; and the passage in John 
xvi. 27, can no more disprove the doctrine, than any 
other passage in the Bible. Thus the error, which lies 
at the bottom of Dr. Ware's reasoning on this subject, 
becomes obvious. He says ; " If by those who are given 
to Christ we are to understand all to whom Christ will 
actually give eternal life, and this appointment to Chris- 
tian faith and eternal life is wholly independent of any 
thing in them as the ground of this distinction from the 
rest of the world ; it is impossible to see with what 
propriety it could be said, that God loved them, because 
of their love to Christ." But how impossible ? God's 
love, here spoken of, most evidently does not signify his 
original act in choosing men to salvation, but his appro- 
hation of them and his peculiar favour towards them, in 
consequence of their faithful attachment to Christ. But 
how did he regard them before they had any love to 
Christ, and when they were enemies ? Did he not look 
upon them with benevolence and compassion, and send his 
Son to die for them, and his spirit to renew them ? It is 



181 



impossible for any one to show the least incompatibility 
between God's originally exercising infinite benevolence 
towards a part of mankind, and choosing them to holiness 
and salvation, independently of any thing in them as the 
ground of this distinction, and his regarding them after- 
wards with complacency, and manifesting himself to them 
as their friend, on account of their love and obedience to 
Christ. 

Dr. Ware has another passage, p. 68, which must 
not pass without notice. He represents " coming to 
Christ, believing on him, &c. as events not flowing from 
a sovereign appointment of God, but the result of the 
faithful use of means, in the exercise of a right disposi- 
tion, and that the difference of character thus appearing 
between Christians and others, is the ground, not the 
consequence of their being given to Christ." Now I ask 
whether it is not a doctrine clearly taught in many parts 
of the Bible, that believing in Christ, and the possession 
of a right disposition and character, are fairly to be 
ascribed to the divine influence as the cause ? And if so, 
whether the effectual operation of that cause, being a 
divine act, must not have been before settled in the 
divine mind ? Nothing can be more evident, than that 
the text, John vi. 37, represents coming to Christ as the 
consequence of being given to Christ. " All that the 
Father giveth me, shall come to me." Their coming 
follows as the consequence of their being given. So this 
mode of expression always means. There is an instance 
of it in the same verse. " Him that cometh unto me I 
will in no wise cast out." His not being cast out, i. e. 
his being accepted, is the consequence of his coming to 
Christ. And it is equally evident from this passage, that 
men's coming to Christ is the consequence of their being 
given to Christ. The mode of expression, here used, 
24 



182 



always denotes, that the second thing mentioned is the 
consequence of the first. Thus we say, those who 
repent, shall be forgiven. All who seek God, shall find 
him. All who are pure in heart, shall see God. Who- 
soever believeth, shall have life. In all such cases, the 
meaning is undoubted. And so I think Dr. Ware would 
understand the phrase in John vi. 37, if instead of forc- 
ing the passage to agree with a preconceived opinion, he 
would attend to the established principles of interpreta- 
tion. Suppose we should find in any book the following 
declaration ; all who hear the gospel, shall he converted. 
Or this ; all who are born in a christian land, shall be saved. 
Could we doubt that the writer meant in each case to 
assert that the latter would follow as the consequence 
of the former, and that the former would have a special 
influence in producing the latter. But Dr. Ware inverts 
the two parts of a sentence just like these, and makes 
that which is set forth as the consequence, to be the 
antecedent, or cause. The text is ; " All that the 
Father giveth me, shall come to me." Dr. Ware's sense 
of it is ; all who come to me, the Father shall give me. He 
says, " those only are given him of the Father, who come 
to Christ." 

I would just remark that the construction which Dr. 
W r are has put upon the text quoted, p. 70, at the bottom, 
overlooks the idiom of the New Testament, as might 
easily be shown. 

The next passage I cited to prove the doctrine of 
Election, was Eph. i, 3 — 11. On supposition that the 
Apostle actually believed the doctrine as we do, it is 
inconceivable that he could have asserted it more 
plainly and emphatically, than he does in this passage. 
He teaches us that God had a purpose, or choice, 
respecting those who are saved ; and he teaches us what 



183 



the purpose or choice was. " He hath blessed us, &c. — 
according as he hath chosen us in him, that ice should be 
holy — having predestinated us to the adoption of children, 
S,"c" Here also we learn the date of the divine purpose ; 
" before the foundation of the world." 2 Tim. i. 9, is of 
the same general import. " Who hath saved us and 
called us, not according to our works, but according to 
his own purpose and grace." 

As the principle concerned in the interpretation of 
these passages must be considered of great consequence, 
and must determine the sense of other passages also, in 
relation to the same subject; I ask the attention of the 
reader to a particular investigation. 

Dr. Ware undertakes to prove that the passage in 
Ephesians has no relation to the doctrine of Election. 
And one argument which he adduces to prove this, is, 
that the passage refers not to individuals as such, but to 
the Christian community, 

I will begin the examination of this subject by admit- 
ting what Dr. Ware supposes, namely, that the passage 
relates to the Christian community, or, to Christians taken 
collectively. Now does this supposition remove any 
difficulty ? If it is inconsistent for God to choose individ- 
uals to holiness and salvation ; it is surely not less incon- 
sistent for him to choose to the same blessings a large 
society of men. If any purpose or conduct relative to 
individuals is improper ; certainly it cannot be less 
improper, because it relates to a community, comprising 
a large number of individuals. So that whatever the 
purpose or conduct, which Dr. Ware supposes to be 
ascribed to God in this passage ; that same purpose or 
conduct must be as just and proper in regard to individ- 
uals, as in regard to a community. It seems to me 
impossible that any man should doubt this. On this 



184 



account it has long appeared to me utterly irrelevant, 
for the opposers of our doctrine to introduce this distinc- 
tion between the choice of individuals, and the choice of 
a community. If in any respect a divine purpose in 
relation to individuals, is improper ; that divine purpose 
is, in the same respect, equally improper in relation to a 
community. There is no principle in ethics or theology, 
according to which an act of injustice or partiality 
towards individuals, changes its character when directed 
towards a community. 

The fact that a distinction is made, occasions cer- 
tainly as great difficulty, when considered in relation to 
a community, as in relation to individuals. It is indeed 
an affair of great magnitude for particular persons to be 
chosen to enjoy important blessings, while others are 
passed by, and left without those blessings. But cer- 
tainly it is an affair of no less magnitude, for a commu- 
nity, or large society of men to be chosen to enjoy those 
blessings, and yet other communities be left without 
them. Whether the blessings intended are temporal or 
spiritual, the distinction which the divine purpose makes 
must occasion as great difficulty, when it relates to com- 
munities, as when it relates to individuals ; — as great 
surely, when it relates to the larger object, as when it 
relates to the less. I confess I should much sooner 
think of objecting to the purpose of God, or any distinc- 
tion he makes in his providence respecting large bodies 
of men, than respecting individuals. I say then that 
whatever may be the nature of that eternal purpose of 
God which is spoken of in the text, and whatever bless- 
ings it secures to some in distinction from others ; it is 
wholly without use for Dr. Ware to say, that purpose 
relates to communities, not to individuals ; since upon 
any supposition the same divine purpose or conduct can- 



185 



/ 



not be less objectionable, when it relates to communities 
or nations, than when it relates to individuals. It is the 
opinion of* Dr. Ware, that the divine purpose or choice 
spoken of, refers to temporal blessings, or to religious 
privileges, means and opportunities. Be it so then, just 
as he supposes. I ask what occasion he can have to 
represent it as relating to communities, and not to indi- 
viduals ; since he must be as well satisfied, as I am, that 
such a divine purpose may with perfect propriety relate 
to individuals. And on the other hand, if the divine 
purpose spoken of by the Apostle is to be under- 
stood as securing the actual bestowment of spiritu- 
al blessings, that is, sanctification, pardon, and eternal 
life, upon those who are its objects ; then surely Dr. 
Ware- must find as many difficulties in supposing, that 
such a purpose relates to a community, as to individuals. 
Why then has this distinction been made ? What end 
does it answer ? And why is it so much relied upon by 
Dr. Ware and others in their reasoning against the doc- 
trine of Election ? 

Thus 1 have endeavoured to show that if the purpose 
of God mentioned above, should be understood to refer 
not to individuals, but to the Christian community ; it 
would still be of no use to Dr. W r are's argument. But 
there are reasons, which seem to me quite conclusive 
against this. 

First. , A community is a collection of individu- 
als, who retain perfectly their individual existence, 
properties, and relations. Now is it possible, that 
any purpose or conduct of God should refer to a com- 
munity, or society of men without referring to the indi- 
viduals of whom that society is composed ? I9 it possi- 
ble, for example, that a community should be visited 
with sickness or famine, and yet the individuals, who 



186 



compose that community, escape ? Is it possible that a 
community should receive any blessing, and yet the indi- 
vidual members continue destitute of it ? Is it possible 
that any law should be obligatory upon a public body of 
men, which yet is not obligatory upon the individuals 
composing that body ? Is it possible that we shoufd love 
a society, or that we should promote the welfare of a so- 
ciety, without loving its members, and promoting their 
welfare ? How then could Dr. Ware think it proper 
to assert, that the purpose of God mentioned in the pas* 
sage under consideration, relates not to individuals, but 
to the Christian community ? 

Nor can it be of any use to Dr. Ware's argument, 
for him to say, that this divine purpose does not relate 
" to individuals, as such that is, to individuals, as indi- 
viduals, or in their individual capacity. Suppose we 
admit this. What then ? The divine purpose does 
not refer to them in their individual capacity; still it 
must refer to them, as members of the body, or in their 
collective capacity. Now do men cease to be men, by 
being collected together in society ? Do they lose any 
of their intellectual or moral powers ? Does their ex- 
istence or their happiness become less important ? Do 
they not stand in the same relation to God ? Have 
they not as good a title to a just and proper treatment 
from God in their collective, as in their individual capac- 
ity ? If any purpose or act of God, which relates to 
men as individuals, is liable to a charge of injustice or 
partiality ; certainly it is not less liable, if it relates to 
them as collected together in society ; since after being 
thus collected, they retain all their relations to God, 
and have an undiminished right to expect from him all 
that is just and equal. 

That the purpose of God referred to, could not af- 



187 



feet men as members of a community, without affecting 
them as individuals, will appear very evident, if we con- 
sider the nature of that divine purpose, and to what kind 
of blessings it related. The Apostle here speaks of 
Christians being chosen in Christ, that they should be holy, 
— predestinated to the adoption of children, — having re- 
demption through Chrisfs blood, the forgiveness of sins, 
and having obtained an inheritance. This is the nature of 
the divine purpose or choice. These are the blessings to 
which it related. Now of which of these blessings can 
it be said, that it respects Christians not as individuals, 
but as a community^ Is not a man holy in his individual 
capacity ? Is he not adopted to be a child of God, as an 
individual? Do not a man's sins belong to him as an in- 
dividual 5 and must not forgiveness respect him as an indi- 
vidual ? And is it not as an individual, that a man is re- 
deemed, and made an heir of heaven ? There is no bless- * 
ing here spoken of, which is of such a nature, that it 
can relate to men in any other capacity, than as individ- 
ual moral agents. 

But Dr. Ware says, the passage now before us, re- 
fers " not to final salvation, but to Christian privileges." 
It is indeed true that being made 64 holy," " forgiveness," 
and "redemption through the blood of Christ," are 
Christian privileges. But they are privileges connected 
with " final salvation," and evidently involving it. And 
in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, the Apostle express- 
ly mentions salvation, as the blessing secured by the di- 
vine purpose, — a salvation attained through sanctifica- 
tion of the spirit. "God hath from the beginning chos- 
en you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit 
and belief of the truth." Does not this refer to final 
salvation ? And does not the predestination spoken of. 



188 



Rom. viii. 29, 30, refer to final salvation ? Let the read- 
er examine for himself. 

But we must attend to the arguments, by which Dr. 
Ware proves, that the passage under consideration re- 
fers not to final salvation, but to Christian privileges. 
His first argument is, " that the Epistle is addressed to 
the whole Christian community at Ephesus, without 
any intimation that any expressions in it are applicable 
to some, and not to others/' And where would have 
been the propriety of intimating that any of the expres- 
sions were applicable to some ar>d not to others, when 
the whole community was made up ot those, who had 
openly renounced their sins, and, in the face of persecu- 
tion and death, boldly professed their faith in Christ. A 
Christian community then was not what we generally 
call so now. The population of Ephesus, before the in- 
troduction of Christianity, were " without God in the 
world "-atheists. It was among such a people, that Paul 
gathered a Church, that is, a society of those whom God 
had "quickened," and " made nigh by the blood of Christ," 
and " sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise whom, in 
short, he had made entirely different from what they 
were by nature. The rest of the Ephesians remained 
as they were, " enemies to God by wicked works." Ac- 
cordingly, the Christian community among the Ephe* 
sians comprised those who were apparently quickened> 
saved by grace, holy. But what is called a christian com- 
munity among us, comprises all, both saints and sinners, 
who live together in any place or country, where the 
Christian religion has been established. If any man 
should proceed in his reasoning, on the supposition that 
a church, or Christian community among the Ephesians 
was the same, as what we call a Christian community 
here ; he would betray great want of attention to facts. 



189 



and would disregard one of the most important helps 
to a right understanding of the Scriptures ; namely, that 
we carefully consider the circumstances of those who 
wrote them, and of those to whom they were written. 

But Dr. Ware proceeds in his argument ; " That this 
choice or predestination was not that of individuals to 
eternal life, but of all who received the Christian faith, 
to the profession and privileges of the gospel — appears 
still farther from other expressions addressed in the 
same manner. It is for these same persons, saints, chos- 
en, &c, that the Apostle thought it needful very earn- 
estly to pray to God, 6 that they might be strengthened 
with might by his spirit, — that Christ might dwell in 
their hearts by faith ; that they might be rooted and 
grounded in love;' very suitable to be addressed to pro- 
fessed believers as a promiscuous body ; but such as we 
should hardly expect, if the persons designated, were 
by the very designation understood to be those only 
who were certainly chosen to eternal life, and were 
already grounded in love, &c." 

Nothing can be plainer than that this reasoning of 
Dr. Ware does not answer his purpose. For every 
Christian on earth, however advanced he may be in 
holiness, and however strong his hope of heaven, does 
offer up just such prayer as that above mentioned, for 
himself. And is it not perfectly suitable that he should ? 
And if it is suitable that the true Christian should pray 
thus for himself, it must be suitable that he should pray 
thus for other true Christians. Although the Christian 
has repented, and believed, and is holy ; his repentance, 
faith, and holiness are but begun. He prays that they 
may be continued and increased, by the constant influ- 
ence of divine grace. The prayer is perfectly consist- 
ent with the attainments of the best man on earth. It 
25 



190 



is plain then, that Dr. Ware's attempt to prove, from 
the nature of the Apostle's prayer, that he did not mean 
to address the saints at Ephesus as being true Christians, 
already grounded in love, is entirely unsuccessful ; since 
no prayer could have been more proper, on supposition 
of their being true Christians. 

Dr. Ware allows that the prayer, above referred to, 
is very suitable to be offered up for " professed believ- 
ers as a promiscuous body." He doubtless means the 
whole body of professing believers, including the sincere 
as well as the hypocritical. Certainly he cannot mean 
that sincere Christians are to be excepted. But if they 
are not to be excepted, then the prayer is suitable in 
relation to them. Prayer cannot be properly offered up 
for a promiscuous body, unless those, who compose that 
body, have something in common, on account of which 
the same prayer is suited to them all. In the case be- 
fore us, those for whom the prayer was offered, had 
common wants. Whether they were all sincere Chris- 
tians or not, they all needed what the apostle supplicat- 
ed for them. So that the prayer would have been per- 
fectly proper, had they all been truly sanctified. And 
none the less proper surely, on supposition they were 
" certainly chosen to eternal life." Could such a choice 
prevent their needing the blessings of the gospel ? If 
because men are chosen to eternal life, they do not 
need the blessings mentioned in the apostle's prayer; 
then they do not need conversion, or faith, or any oth- 
er blessing, — not even that very eternal life, to which 
they are chosen. What dream of Antinomianism or 
fatalism was ever so strange as this ? 

But Dr. Ware says, the apostle " thinks it proper to 
exhort these same persons to walk worthy of their vo- 
cation, to put off the old man, and put on the new man. 



191 



and not to grieve the Spirit." — " Very suitable to be ad- 
dressed to the promiscuous body of professing Christians; 
— very suitable, if by saints, chosen, predestinated, this 
only were meant ; but certainly not so, if by these terras 
were designated persons chosen from eternity to final 
salvation, and already saints and faithful in the highest 
and literal sense. Such, as distinguished from the rest 
of the world, are not proper subjects cf exhortation 
to walk worthy of the Christian vocation." 

But I ask why they are not proper subjects of such 
exhortation ? Is it not the duty of all men to walk wor- 
thy of the Christian vocation? And can it cease to be 
the duty of any, because they are already real saints, 
and are chosen to salvation? God has chosen them, 
that they should be holy. Can this release them from the 
obligation to be holy ? The grace of God in choosing 
men to salvation, and in making them saints, is represent- 
ed by the apostles, as a new motive to duty, not as a 
reason for neglecting it. Now if walking worthy of 
their vocation is the duty of those who are chosen to 
salvation and are already saints; then clearly it is prop- 
er that they should be exhorted to walk thus. For to 
what can the Scriptures more properly exhort men, than 
to do their duty. 

But we may take another view. If God has deter- 
mined to bring men to final salvation, he has de- 
termined to do it by certain means. These means are 
repentance, faith, and increasing, persevering holi- 
ness. But these are active duties of rational moral agents. 
Men must perform them, as moral agents. And as mor- 
al agents they must be excited to perform them. But 
how are moral agents excited to perform duty, but by 
exhortations, commands, promises, and threats ? Now 
do men cease to be moral agents, because they are " al- 



192 



feady saints in the literal sense ?" Dr. Ware's reason- 
ing implies that they do. If he would allow that they 
continue to be moral agents, he must allow it to be prop- 
er that they should be treated as moral agents, and be 
exhorted and commanded to do their duty. — He thinks 
" they cannot be exhorted to be renewed, — because by 
the supposition their renewal is already certain." But 
suppose it is certain that they are renewed, that is, that 
their renewal is begun ; is it not necessary that it should 
be continued and increased ? Because they have begun 
to obey, is their increasing, persevering obedience un- 
necessary ? But if persevering obedience is necessary, 
they must be influenced to it, and must be influenced by 
motives. 1 spoke of active duties. To put off the old 
man, and put on the new man, to be strengthened by the 
Spirit in the inner man, &c. is to love God with in- 
creasing ardor, and obey with increasing constancy and 
delight. What in the creation can be more active than 
this ? But Christians cannot be active without active 
powers ; and they cannot exert their active powers in 
doing their duty, without motives ; and what better mo- 
tives can be used with them, than the exhortations and 
-warnings of Scripture ? 

Dr. Ware says, renewal, being certain, " is what 
they have no power either to prevent, or to bring about" 
But does it follow, that because it is certain a man has 
acted or will act in a particular way, he has no power 
to act thus, and no power to act otherwise ? Christ's 
word rendered it very certain, that Peter would deny 
him, and Judas betray him. But did that certainty take 
away their power to do what they did, or to refrain from 
it ? Dr. Ware asks, " And with what propriety can 
such," that is, those who are already saints, and chosen 
to eternal life, " be exhorted not to grieve the Spirit of 



193 



God ?" I answer, with the same propriety that they 
can be exhorted to avoid any sin, or perform any duty. 
I answer again, that the Apostle makes the very consid- 
eration, that those, whom he addresses, are holy, and 
that they are the objects of God's special favour, a mo- 
tive to enforce such exhortations. He tells them they are 
the temple of the Holy Ghost ; that they are the mem- 
bers of Christ, and are not their own ; and makes use of 
this as a reason for glorifying God by a pure and holy 
life. See 1 Cor. vi. 15—20. 2 Cor. vi, 16, 17. So in a 
multitude of places, the very consideration, that men are 
Christians indeed, and that God has conferred so great a 
blessing upon them as to make them heirs of heaven, 
is urged as a powerful motive to gratitude and obedi- 
ence. And a powerful motive it must surely be, if our 
being real Christians, and heirs of an eternal inheritance, 
is to be regarded as a divine favour. 

The farther I proceed, the more am I satisfied of the 
total mistake of Dr. Ware in supposing that the divine 
purpose, which makes any future character or action of 
men certain, is inconsistent with their moral agency, or 
with the proper influence of motives. This supposition, 
which mixes itself more or less with the reasoning: of all 
who oppose the doctrine of the divine purposes, may be 
proved, and has been proved, both false and absurd, by 
arguments which I think no man is able to invalidate. 

Reasoning from Rom. ix. 

Dr. Ware thinks that a similar method of investiga- 
tion to that which was applied to the passage in Ephe- 
sians, will convince his readers, " that this passage has 
no relation to an Election to eternal life." The candid 
reader must decide whether his method of investigation 
serves his purpose, in respect either to that passage or 



194 



this. In relation to Rom. ix, I have scarcely any 
thing to add to ray reasoning in my Letters, which, in its 
main points, Dr. Ware has not even attempted to con- 
fute. Most of what he says about the general scope 
of the first part of the Epistle is doubtless correct. 
What then? Does that disprove the doctrine of 
Election? No more than it disproves any thing else. 
As to national distinctions, and religious privileges, I 
have already expressed my views. If Unitarians will 
consider the real influence of religious privileges, and 
the momentous consequences of the distinction which 
God has made respecting them, upon the character 
and future condition of men ; they may find as great diffi- 
culty in what Dr. Ware has said respecting Jacob 
and Esau, p. 76, 77, as in the Orthodox doctrine. 

Dr. Ware admits what I advanced in ray Letters, that 
the reflection of the Apostle, on the case of Jacob and 
Esau, v. 16, implies a general principle of the divine 
government, but thinks it must be confined to cases 
similar to that of Jacob and Esau, and that it cannot 
relate to final salvation. But it seems clear to me, that 
the whole reasoning of the Apostle makes it relate to 
final salvation, and that, without such a relation, his 
reasoning is weakness itself. For he shows, as Dr. Ware 
remarks, that those distinctions on which the Jews valu- 
ed themselves, were done away. If the particular distinc- 
tion he speaks of had been of the same nature with these, 
he would have said at once, it is ended. But he shows 
that a real distinction is still made among men, and justi- 
fies God in making it. What was that distinction ? Not a 
national one— not one in regard to religious privileges ; for 
that we are informed, was done away. It must have been 
a distinction, then really existing,— a. distinction, with which 
the Jews would find fault, but which Paul would justify. 



195 



It must have been, a distinction, which would answer the 
account the Apostle gave of it, a distinction between the 
children of the flesh and the children of God ; between 
those who were fitted to destruction, and those prepar- 
ed unto glory. What distinction was this ? I hope when 
Dr. Ware shall find time to review his remarks on this 
subject, he will keep in mind, that the Apostle spoke of 
a distinction then really existing, a distinction offensive 
to the Jews, but which he meant to justify. He first 
brings the distinction into view, v. 6. " They are not all 
Israel who are of Israel." This distinction between true 
saints, and those who had merely the name and external 
privileges of saints, he illustrates and justifies by the 
distinction once made between Isaac and Ishmael, and 
between Jacob and Esau ; and then by what God said 
to Moses, asserting his sovereign right to have mercy on 
whom he will, in another case ; v. 15, referring to Exod. 
xxxiii. 19 ; and again by what he said of Pharaoh, 
affirming that he raised him up for the purposes of his 
glory, as Dr. Ware sets forth, p. 78. — Now mark well, 
it is immediately upon this, the Apostle affirms, that God 
exercised the right of hardening whom he would, and this 
in opposition to showing them mercy. This he repre- 
sented as a distinction then actually made, and against 
which he knew the Jews would raise such objections as 
he mentions, v. 19, though they would be far enough 
from raising them against that external, national distinc- 
tion, which they had always gloried in, but which was 
then done away. This was the very distinction, which 
the Apostle defends in the following verses, where he 
speaks of God's making of the same lump, some vessels to 
honour, and others to dishonour, and where, with his eye 
upon the same subject, he speaks of vessels of mercy 
prepared unto glory j and vessels of wrath fitted to desfructt'on^ 



196 



And let me say, finally ; it was to this distinction, then 
actually existing, — then objected to by the pride of Jews, but 
defended by the Apostle, — it was to this distinction, the 
Apostle applied that general principle of the divine 
administration which he vindicated, by referring to dis- 
tinctions of another character, formerly made. 

With these remarks, I leave this interesting passage 
to the consideration of the attentive reader, especially 
the discerning biblical critic. 

As to the difference, which Dr. Ware mentions, 
between my statement of the doctrine of Reprobation, 
and the statement generally made by the Orthodox, I 
have but a word to say. I did not mean to state it in 
the same terms. But to what does the difference amount? 
I represented the decree of Reprobation to be, " the 
determination of God to punish the disobedient for their 
sins, and according to their deserts" The Assembly of 
Divines say, in regard to the non-elect, "God was pleased, 
according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, &c. 
to pass by them, and to ordain them to dishonour and 
wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice." 
If it is to the praise of his justice, it must be, as I stated, 
not only for their sin, but according to it. Now, in real- 
ity, what difference is there between God's determining 
to punish the finally disobedient for their sins, and his 
passing by the same persons, and ordaining them to 
dishonour and wrath for their sins ? 

The last paragraph of Letter iv, displays a frankness 
and kindness of heart, which I love to acknowledge and 
to honour in my opponent, and which I will ever strive 
to copy ; though in this case, their exercise is attended 
with misapprehension. Dr. Ware seems to suppose that 
I shrink from the doctrine of Reprobation, because I 
find it cannot be defended consistently with the moral 



197 



character of God, or that I think it desirable to keep 
out of view the most offensive feature of Calvinism. But 
this is not exactly the case. I do indeed think the doc- 
trine has often been stated injudiciously and harshly, and 
that it is very liable to be understood in a manner, which 
really makes it inconsistent with the character of God. 
And this is the reason why I deem it necessary to state 
it with peculiar caution. A subject may be put into 
such a posture in the minds of those whom we address, 
that whatever we say concerning it, will be in danger of 
being perverted, or misapplied. When we are apprised 
that this is the case, w 7 e ought certainly to be very guard- 
ed in our language, and to take special care to bring into 
view those parts of the subject, which are apt to be 
overlooked. This is what I have attempted to do. My 
object is not to conceal the truth, but to make an exhibi- 
tion of it, which shall be just and scriptural, and which, 
at the same time, shall, if possible, be so well guarded, 
that men can find nothing in it to oppose, except the 
truth itself. 

• i am happy that Dr. Ware exhibits none of the vio- 
lence, bitterness, or scurrility, with which many oppose 
this doctrine • though he is not wanting in zeal. But 
when I soberly consider the real nature of the doctrine 
against which he and others make such strenuous oppo- 
sition, I hardly know what to say. It would seem as 
though creatures of yesterday, as we are, instead of 
wishing to limit the extent of Jehovalrs dominion, would 
rejoice in the highest degree of sovereignty which he 
can exercise. 'Tis true, there are reasons enough against 
our committing our eternal or even our temporal inter- 
ests absolutely to the will of man. But is not the infi- 
nite perfection of God sufficient to secure our implicit 
and unlimited confidence in his administration ? And if 



198 



he tells us in his word, that he hath mercy on whom he will 
have mercy ; that is, exercises a sovereign control over 
our character and destiny ; why should we not say, Amen, 
fully persuaded that a Being of infinite wisdom and good- 
ness will, in all respects, do right? Why should we not 
cheerfully say, the Lord reigneth, and doeth all things af- 
ter the counsel of his own will? since the more extensive 
his dominion, the safer are the interests of the universe. 



CHAPTER X. 

ATONEMENT. 

All that I can do on this subject is to give a state- 
ment of Dr. Ware's scheme, and make a few general 
remarks upon it. 

Doctrine of redemption, as held by Dr* Ware. 

" Christ was our Redeemer by those miracles, which 
proved him to be a messenger and teacher from God ; 
by those instructions and that example, which were to 
remove our ignorance, and deliver us from the slavery 
of sin ; by those high motives to repentance and holiness, 
which are found in the revelation of a future life and 
righteous retribution, and the persuasive efficacy given 
to his example by his sufferings, &c." p. 92. " Christ's 
sufferings are the means of delivering us from punishment, 
only as they are instrumental in delivering us from the 
dominion of sin. They are the grounds of our forgive- 
ness, only as they are the means of bringing us to re pen- 



199 



tance, only as they operate to bring us to that state of 
holiness, which has the promise of forgiveness, and qual- 
ifies us for it, p. 93. — " Christ's being made a curse for 
us redeemed us from the curse of the law, by its influ- 
ence in bringing us back to repentance." p. 97. 

The same views are expressed in a sermon of Dr. 
Ware, and still more largely in Dr. John Taylor's trea- 
tise on the atonement. 

Although this notion of atonement, redemption, &c. 
is affirmed with as much confidence as it could be, if it 
were supported by the strongest evidence, and were 
perfectly free from difficulty ; I must be allowed to pause 
a while before receiving it, and to state briefly some of 
the objections which seem to lie against it. 

First, Dr. Ware's scheme assumes, that there is nothing 
to hinder the forgiveness of sinners, but their continuance in 
sin ; that it is an established principle of God's moral 
government, that repentance shall put an end to the 
consequences of sin. 

Now I ask, in the first place, whether the divine law 
supports such a principle. The law promises a reward 
for obedience, and threatens a penalty for disobedience. 
But where does it give us the least hint, that repentance 
will set aside the penalty? — Should we expect this, from 
considering the nature of the case ? Suppose transgressors 
repent. Does that alter the guilt of their past transgres- 
sion ? Does God therefore cease to look upon past trans- 
gression with displeasure ? " We may as well affirm," 
says a learned Divine, " that our former obedience atones 
for our present sins, as that our present obedience makes 
amends for antecedent transgressions." But if the guilt of 
past transgression remains the same as before, and God 
looks upon it with the same displeasure ; how will he do 
justice to his own character, or to the principles of Im 



200 



moral government, if in his conduct he shows no displeas- 
ure ? How is it with a civil government ? Does it hold 
out to criminals the prospect of pardon, in case they 
repent? What would be the consequence, if it should? 
But the consequence of such a principle in the divine 
government would be as much more dreadful, as the 
interests of the divine government are more important, 
and require to be more watchfully guarded, than those 
of any human government. 

We may learn something on this subject from the 
analogy of God's government in the present world. " In 
the common occurrences of life, the man who, by the 
practice of vice, has injured his character, his fortune, 
and his health, does not find himself instantly restored 
to the full enjoyment of these blessings on repenting of 
his past misconduct. Now if the attributes of the Deity 
demand, that the punishment should not outlive the 
crime, on what ground shall we justify this temporal 
dispensation ? The difference in degree, cannot affect the 
question in the least. It matters not, whether the pun- 
ishment be of long or short duration ; whether in this 
world or in the next. If the justice or the goodness of 
God, require that punishment should not be inflicted, 
when repentance has taken place ; it must be a violation 
of those attributes to permit any punishment whatever, 
the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail 
to say, that the evils of this life attendant upon vice, are 
the effects of an established constitution, and follow in 
the way of natural consequence. Is not that established 
constitution itself the effect of the divine decree ? And 
are not its several operations as much the appointment 
of its Almighty framer, as if they had individually flowed 
from his immediate direction ? But besides, what reason 
have we to suppose that God's treatment of us in a f«- 



201 



ture state, will not be of the same nature as we find 
it in this ; according to established rules, and in the 
way of natural consequence ?"* Is it then consistent 
with reason and propriety to assume, without proof, 
that nothing could ever hinder the forgiveness of sin, 
but impenitence ? Were there no appearances di- 
rectly against this assumption, 1 should think it alto- 
gether unsafe to adopt it, without positive evidence in 
its favour. For even if civil government could always 
grant forgiveness to offenders on their repentance ; and 
if under the divine administration in the present life 
repentance should be found to put an immediate end to 
the visible consequences of particular sins ; how could 
we certainly conclude that the Governor of the world 
will not judge it best to guard the everlasting inter- 
ests of his kingdom by higher sanctions ? How could 
we certainly conclude, that rebels would find no oth- 
er obstacles, besides their impenitence, in the way of 
final impunity ? I should certainly charge myself with 
inexcusable temerity, if, without the best evidence, I 
should venture to decide on a subject so vast and incom- 
prehensible. And further; if we would be secure 
against a wrong judgment in this case, we must not for- 
get, that we ourselves are transgressors, and as such, are 
extremely liable to be blinded by self-interest, and to 
adopt any opinion favourable to our wishes, though ever 
so destitute of evidence. 

I have not intended by any thing which has now 
been advanced, to admit, that repentance could ever 
have actually taken place under the moral government 
of God, if no atonement had been made. Indeed there 
is no more reason to think that any instance of repen- 
tance would have been found among apostate men, than 
* Magee. 



202 



among the apostate angels, had not salvation been pro- 
vided through an atonement. The supposition of re- 
pentance, without regard to an atonement, has been 
intended merely to assist in the investigation of prin- 
ciples. 

Second objection. Dr. Ware's scheme assumes, that 
the words redemption, sacrifice, fyc. have the same significa- 
tion when applied to the work of Christ, as they have in the 
few passages he has selected, where they relate to other sub- 
jects, and are obviously used in a very different sense. Dr. 
Ware finds a few places, where redemption denotes mere 
deliverance from temporal judgments, without any price 
being paid. And these examples of the use of the term, 
he says, "may lead us to some just notions of its meaning, 
when it is said, we have redemption by the blood of 
of Christ." — " He redeemed us by his blood, as the 
children of Israel were redeemed by the mighty power 
of God." See pp. 90, 91, 92. Now is it consistent with 
sound principles of interpretation, to take it for granted, 
that because the word redeem is sometimes used in this 
secondary and imperfect sense, in relation to the deliv- 
erance of men from temporal evils, it is used in the same 
sense in regard to the eternal salvation of sinners? Is 
this to be taken for granted, when the Bible itself makes 
a. most obvious and important difference, representing 
the deliverence of men from temporal bondage to be 
effected by the mere exercise of God's power, but rep- 
resenting expressly, and in various forms r that redemp- 
tion from eternal destruction by divine power is through 
the blood of Christ, through the death of a Mediator, and 
ascribing the whole of salvation to this, as the great 
means of procuring it ? How can we reason from one 
case to the other, when the Scripture represents them 
as so widely different ? 



203 



I have the same general remarks as to sacrifice. I 
admit the word is sometimes used in a very imperfect 
sense, denoting a mere offering to God of prayer, praise, 
or obedience, or a mere act of kindness. But upon 
what principle can Dr. Ware draw from this unusual and 
imperfect sense of the word, the broad conclusion, that it 
is in a similar sense, u that sacrifice is applied to what- 
ever was done by Jesus Christ for our benefit ?" Be- 
cause such is the meaning sometimes, does it follow that 
it is so here? This, then, I state as a serious objection 
against the scheme of my opponent; that it overlooks 
entirely the proper method of determining the meaning 
of the words redemption, sacrifice, &c, as they are appli- 
ed to the work of Christ, and rests on the assumption, 
that their meaning here is similar to what it is, not gen- 
erally in the Scriptures, but in a few texts, where the 
words have a very unusual and imperfect sense. 

My third objection to the scheme is, that it denies 
the obvious sense of many passages of Scripture which re~ 
late to the subject, and gives them a meaning, in a high de- 
gree unnatural and forced. Without supposing that Uni- 
tarians have a preconceived opinion which they wish to 
support, it is impossible for me to account for it, that 
they should interpret the word of God as they do. The 
passages which assert a real atonement are too many to 
be repeated here. The Scriptures declare that Christ 
is " the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the 
world ; that he hath given himself for us an offering 
and sacrifice to God ; that he is the propitiation for our 
sins ; that he died for us ; that he redeemed us from the 
curse, being made a curse for us ; that we are forgiven 
through his blood, &c." If such declarations as these 
do not teach the doctrine of the atonement, as it is com- 
monly held, nothing can. These texts assert it in Ian- 



204 



guage as plain, express, and emphatic* as any which can 
be imagined. To say, they do not teach the doctrine, 
seems to me about the same as saying, the inspired wri- 
ters could not teach it, if they would. B ii this scheme 
not only denies the plain meaning of Scripture, but 
gives it a meaning exceedingly unnatural and forced. 
When the Scripture declares that we have tC redemp- 
tion through Christ's blood, even the forgiveness of 
sins Unitarians make it mean, that his blood pro- 
motes our repentance. When the Scripture declares 
that Christ died for us, and is the propitiation for our 
sins ; Unitarians make it mean merely that his suffer- 
ings confirmed his doctrines, and are instrumental in de- 
livering us from the dominion of sin. When the Scrip- 
ture declares, that Christ became a curse for us to re- 
deem us from the curse of the law ; Unitarians will 
have it, that this is only asserting its influence to bring 
us back to repentance. Now let men of sober sense 
collect the passages of Scripture which relate to the 
work of redemption by Christ, and set them down on 
one side ; and the passages from Dr. Ware's Letters, 
which exhibit the Unitarian doctrine, and set them 
down on the other side ; and then compare them, and 
see if they are of like signification. Let men of patient 
research and critical acumen do this, and see if there is 
any likeness between them. 

My fourth objection is, that this scheme takes away 
the difference which the Scripture uniformly makes between 
the sufferings of Christ, and of his apostles. If the suf- 
ferings and death of Christ are really nothing more than 
Dr. Ware makes them; they are in no sense distinguish- 
able from the sufferings and death of Paul. Who can 
say, that Paul did not give as much and as valuable in- 
struction, as Jesus did? or that he did not as really con- 



205 



firm his doctrines by his miracles, his sufferings and 
death ? Dr. Ware says, " Christ was our redeemer by 
those miracles which proved him to be a messenger and 
teacher from God ; by those instructions and that exam- 
ple which were to remove our ignorance, and deliver us 
from the slavery of sin ; by those High motives to re- 
pentance and holiness, which are found in the revelation 
of a future life and righteous retribution ; and especially 
by the confirmation his doctrines and promises received, 
and the persuasive efficacy given to his example by his 
sufferings, his voluntary death, and his resurrection." 
Now in all these ways, except resurrection, Paul was as 
really a redeemer, as Jesus Christ. Why then is it not 
proper to speak of the redemption that is in Paul, to 
celebrate the efficacy of his death, and to ascribe to it 
the forgiveness of sin ? There is in tact, according to 
the statement of Dr. Ware's opinion just quoted, not a 
single point of dissimilitude between the work of Christ 
as redeemer, and the work of Paul, excepting the resur- 
rection. And if Dr. Ware's opinion is true, I am unable 
to see why it would not be as proper to say e>f Paul, as 
of Christ ; " Behold the Lamb of God which taketh 
away the sin of the world ; — he is the propitiation for 
our sins ; — we have redemption through his blood." But 
the Bible does not speak thus of Paul. And why does 
it not ? Can any answer be found, but in the peculiari- 
ties of the Orthodox doctrine ? 

This general argument acquires great weight, when 
We attend particularly to the manner in which the Scrip- 
ture speaks of Christ, compared with the manner in 
which it speaks of prophets and apostles. Here we 
have a test of truth — a test of special importance, and 
less liable to be misapplied, than perhaps any other. 
Suppose I doubt as to the meaning of those passages, 

27 



206 



which assert in direct terms, that Christ offered himself 
a sacrifice for sin ; that he died for us, redeemed us by 
his blood, &c. I go then to other passages of the in- 
spired writers, particularly those, in which they freely 
express their feelings with respect to Christ, their grat- 
itude for his kindness, their estimation of the work he 
performed, their reliance on his death, and their ascrip- 
tions of glory to him as a Redeemer. From such pas- 
sages I learn what were the habitual feelings of the 
writers. I then ask, whether this expression of feeling 
on the part of prophets and apostles agrees best with 
the views of the Orthodox, or of Unitarians, respecting 
the other passages? Does it agree best with the notion, 
that. the influence of Christ's death was like the influence 
of Paul's death? or with the Orthodox doctrine, that 
Christ's death was vicarious, and had an influence essen- 
tially different from that of any other ? 

My fifth objection, and the last I shall now state, 
arises from a comparative view of the moral influence pro- 
duced by the two systems. Dr. Ware ascribes a certain 
influence to the death of Christ. But the death of 
Christ as we understand it, has that same influence, and 
lias it in a still higher degree, than according to his scheme ; 
and besides this, answers other important ends, to which, 
according to his scheme, it has no relation. Dr. Ware 
says, Christ's sufferings " are instrumental in delivering 
us from the dominion of sin — " they are the means of 
bringing us to repentance ;" — " they operate to bring us 
to that state of holiness, which has the promise of for- 
giveness, and qualifies us for it." My position is, first, 
that Christ's sufferings and death, as the Orthodox regard 
them, have the same influence. According to the scheme 
of Unitarians, Christ's sufferings and death confirm his 
doctrines and promises, and give a persuasive efficacy to his 



207 



example. They do the same according to our views. 
And Orthodox writers have described this influence 
abundantly, and with great force. 

But my position goes farther. The sufferings of 
Christ, according to our scheme, have the same moral 
influence in a far higher degree. I mean, that the suffer- 
ings of Christ, as apprehended by the Orthodox, have a 
much more powerful influence to lead sinners to repen- 
tance, than as they are apprehended by Unitarians. What 
are the motives, which lead sinners to repentance ? 
Certainly one of these is, the evil of sin, and (he 
abhorrence with which God regards it. But these 
are made to appear much greater according to our 
scheme of the atonement, than according to the other. 
The sufferings of Christ, as we view them, are a direct 
and unequalled display of the evil of sin, and the abhor- 
rence with which God regards it. They are intended 
primarily for this very purpose. And we believe they 
really answer this purpose in as high a degree as would 
have been answered, by God's inflicting upon sinners the 
whole penalty of the law. But as viewed by Unitarians, 
they are intended for no such purpose, and answer no 
such purpose. Now surely that scheme of the atone- 
ment which gives the highest view of the evil of sin, and 
the displeasure of God against it, must have the most 
powerful tendency to lead men to repentance. This is 
too plain to need any illustration. I might say the same 
in regard to the penalty of the law, or the punishment 
which sin deserves, as set forth by the death of Christ. 
To those who receive the Orthodox doctrine, the death 
of Christ shows the dreadfulness of that punishment, 
in the most striking light possible. But to Unita- 
rians it does not show it at all. Again ; to those 
who receive the Orthodox doctrine, the death of Christ 



208 



exhibits a far higher degree of divine love and mer- 
cy, than to Unitarians. These acknowledge indeed, that 
the death of Christ showed divine love by giving 
confirmation to his doctrines, authority to his precepts, 
and a persuasive influence to his example. But accord- 
ing to our views of the subject, the divine love was much 
more gloriously displayed. For there was, as we ap- 
prehend, a mighty obstacle in the way of forgiveness, 
which no penitence, obedience, or suffering of sinners 
could ever remove. But God, "for the great love where- 
with he loved us," removed that obstacle by providing 
a vicarious sacrifice, or by sending his son to die for us. 
At such a vast expense, the love of God purchased our 
forgiveness. This divine love, so often celebrated in the 
Scriptures, is a grand motive to repentance. While it 
shows sinners their inexcusable wickedness, it forbids 
their despair, encourages their hopes and their efforts, 
melts their hearts with pious grief, and attracts them to 
obedience. In such ways as these, which I can only hint 
at, it becomes perfectly ob viouSj that our doctrine invests 
the sufferings of Christ with a power to lead sinners to 
repentance, greatly superior to any which can be derived 
from the doctrine of Unitarians. Thus the death of 
Christ, according to our doctrine, has the same kind of 
moral influence, which it has according to Dr. Ware's 
scheme, and has it in a far superior degree ; besides 
all the other and higher ends which it answers, in rela- 
tion to the perfections and government of God, and the 
interests of his universal empire. This then is my objec- 
tion, that even in regard to that influence, which Dr. 
Ware considers as the only thing of any consequence in 
Christ's Death, his scheme is much inferior to the Or- 
thodox. It takes away half the power of the cross to 
bring men to repentance. 



209 



After this general view, I shall think it wholly un- 
necessary to remark on all the particular passages in 
Dr. Ware's fifth Letter, which seem to me erroneous. 
I shall merely glance at a few of the principal. 

I have been not a little surprised at Dr. Ware's say- 
ing, that I have not explained the figurative language, 
commonly used respecting the work of Christ. But I 
have been most of all surprised, that he should charge 
me wit!) mixing the literal with the metaphorical sense, 
especially in the following case. He says, " When 
by a price paid by some friend, a captive is restored to 
liberty, or the punishment of a criminal is remitted; 
there is redemption in the original and literal sense of 
the word. In the same manner, if Christ delivers us 
from punishment by suffering an evil, which was equiv- 
alent, so far as the ends of the divine government are 
concerned, to the execution of the curse of the law upon 
transgressors ; that is a literal redemption, and that, and 
the other correspondent terms, such as bought and ran- 
somed, are applied in the literal sense" p. 89. But can 
this be correct ? The restoration of a captive by the 
payment of a pecuniary price, is indeed redemption in the 
literal sense. But the procuring of a sinner's spiritual 
deliverance and restoration by an expedient of a moral 
nature is redemption in a metaphorical sense. To make 
the sense of the word metaphorical, it is not necessary 
surely, that the spiritual restoration should be procured 
without any mea?is whatever, nor without means which are 
equivalent, in a moral view, to the execution of the pen- 
alty of the law. Nor is it necessary that the means us- 
ed should have a less intimate connexion with the spir- 
itual deliverance procured, than the payment of money 
has with the deliverance of a captive from temporal 
bondage. It is sufficient to make a perfect metaphor, if 



210 



a transaction of a moral nature is represented under the 
similitude of a pecuniary or civil transaction. Christ re- 
deemed sinners, by paying a price equivalent, in a moral 
view, to their punishment. Here is no mixture of a lit- 
eral with a metaphorical sense. The redemption spok- 
en of is of a moral nature ; and the price paid is of a mor- 
al nature ; and so the words redemption, price, pay, are 
all used in a metaphorical sense. 1 said in my Letters ; 
"as the debtor is freed from imprisonment by the friend 
who steps forward and pays his debt ; so are sinners 
freed from punishment by the Saviour, who shed his 
blood for them." On this Dr. Ware says, " the pay- 
ment is as literal in the one case as in the* other." But 
how so ? The deliverance of sinners from punishment 
by the death of Christ is represented under the simili- 
tude of a debtor's deliverance from prison by the pay- 
ment of his debt. It is this representation of the moral 
transaction in language derived from a common transac- 
tion in civil life, which constitutes the metaphor. Just 
so the representation of God's pouring out his Spirit, or 
raining down righteousness, is a metaphor taken from 
the pouring out of rain upon the earth. The metaphor 
in both cases is perfect. — If in the case above referred 
to, Dr. Ware had said, the payment in one case is an 
important reality, as well as in the other, he would have 
said the exact truth. All the doctrines of religion are 
often expressed in metaphorical language. And this lan- 
guage is so far from rendering their meaning obscure 
and doubtful, that it gives them, and is designed to give 
them, greater clearness and force. 

My respected opponent expresses a serious objection 
to our using the metaphorical language which the Scrip- 
tures use, and other similar language, on the subject of 
redemption, because it has been the occasion of mistake. 



211 



But I think, on further consideration, he must be satisfi- 
ed that his objection is not valid, and that, with our best 
efforts, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
on such a subject, to avoid the use of metaphors. And 
if we should succeed in our efforts to do this, it would 
certainly have a most unhappy effect. The fact is, that 
in most cases, if we confine ourselves to language which 
•is wholly free from a figurative sense, we cannot convey 
the truth, so as either to correspond with our own 
feelings, or to make a just impression on the minds 
of others. The importance and necessity of metaphorical 
language on moral and religious subjects, result; from the 
very constitution of our nature. And Unitarians have no 
more right to expect that we shall lay aside t he use of 
metaphors on the subject of redemption, than on other 
subjects in religion. It is admitted, that some men will 
misunderstand the metaphorical language now under con- 
sideration. They will also misunderstand the metaphors 
by which other divine truths are illustrated. Even the 
texts which represent God as having hands and eyes, 
have by some men been understood literally, and are 
often understood so now, especially by children. But 
shall we on this account cease to speak of the hand of 
God, to denote his active power, or the eyes of God to 
denote his knowledge ? And shall we cease to pray, 
" forgive us our debts," because our sins are not 
debts literally? Or when we use such metaphors in re- 
ligious discourse, or in prayer, must we always stop to 
explain them? 

Dr. Ware, p. 85, speaks of our " charging Unitarians 
with denying or explaining away the doctrine of atone- 
ment, for the very reason that they explain the language 
in question as figurative." But he has quite mistaken 
our meaning. We do not charge Unitarians with error, 



212 



because they explain the language as figurative, but be- 
cause they do not give to the figurative language its true 
and obvious sense. Just so we should do in other like 
cases. When the Scriptures assert that " the eyes of 
God are in every place," we say the language implies 
that God is omniscient. But if, because it is a metaphor, 
any one should deny that it denotes a knowledge or dis- 
cernment in God, answering to natural vision in us ; we 
should charge him with denying an important truth, not 
because he considered the language metaphorical, but 
because he denied the obvious meaning of the figure. In 
explaining those texts which speak of our being bought 
with a price, we assert that they denote something in the 
work of redemption by Christ, which really answers to 
the price which is paid for the deliverance of a slave or 
captive ; and we become very confident in our explana- 
tion, when w r e find that the Bible, in various ways, de- 
scribes to us the very thing which is called the price, that 
is, the death of Christ, and that many texts both of a fig- 
urative and literal sense, represent that death as of the 
utmost importance in the work of redemption, and as the 
means of forgiveness and salvation to sinners. The 
texts above referred to, must denote something which 
fairly answers to the price paid for the deliverance of a 
captive, and which may justly be represented by it ; 
that is, the death of Christ must be the consideration 
in the moral government of God, on account of which 
sinners are saved ; as in the other case, the price paid 
is the consideration, on account of which a captive is de- 
livered, not merely a means of preparing him to receive 
deliverance, — though such preparation must be includ- 
ed, as a necessary circumstance. 

In my Letters I signified, what I very honestly ap- 
prehended to be true, that the denial of the doctrine 



213 



of atonement is " contrary to the humble spirit of 
Christian faith." Dr. Ware, p. 102, seems to think it 
would follow from this, that " it is unsafe to allow our- 
selves to inquire about the doctrine." But how would 
this follow? He would doubtless unite with us in say- 
ing, that the denial of the divine existence is contrary 
to the humble spirit of Christian faith, and clearly 
shows the want of moral virtue. But would this im- 
ply, that it is unsafe to inquire into the subject of 
the divine existence ? We should certainly deem it 
proper in such a case, to persuade men to inquire with 
the greatest diligence ; though we should set it down as 
conclusive evidence against them, if they were not convinc- 
ed. So we consider it contrary to the humble spirit of 
Christian faith to deny the authority of the Scriptures. 
But is it therefore unsafe to inquire into the subject ? 
Free inquiry, properly conducted, is important as well 
as safe, on all subjects ; because it is the only eifectuai 
means of discovering the truth. But when, after all, 
the truth fails of being discovered ; it becomes a seri- 
ous question, whether the failure is owing to the want 
of evidence, or to something wrong in the state of the 
mind. 

In pp. 103, 104, Dr. Ware has expressed an opinion 
which I cannot pass over unnoticed, though it is the 
same, substantially, with a principle which I controvert- 
ed in my Letters. He says, that the Scriptures, " witbk 
out any reference to any kind of atonement, refer the 
forgiveness of sin solely to the mercy of God, by which 
he is ready to accept reformation and a return to vir- 
tue." His meaning undoubtedly is, the Scriptures do 
this in many instances. And so the reasoning is briefly 
this. The Scriptures, in many places, speak of God as 
merciful, and ready to forgive the penitent, without ex- 

28 



214 



pressty referring to any atonement ; therefore forgiveness 
rests solely on the mercy of God and the repentance of 
sinners, and the atonement has nothing to do with it, 
except as it may be conducive to repentance. But what 
would Dr. Ware say, if I should reason in the same man- 
ner ? Thus. The Scriptures in some places speak of 
the death of Christ as the cause or means of our for- 
giveness, without any mention of repentance or holiness 
in us ; therefore the death of Christ is the sole cause or 
means of our forgiveness, and neither our repentance ? 
nor the mercy of God has any thing to do with it. Or 
thus. In some passages the Scriptures attribute our 
forgiveness and salvation to faith, without mentioning 
either the mercy of God, or the blood of Christ ; there- 
fore faith is the only cause or foundation of our forgive- 
ness, and neither the mercy of God, nor the blood of 
Christ has any thing to do with it. To just such con- 
clusions shall we be led, if we attempt to learn the whole 
truth on the subjects of religion, from any particular 
passages, while we disregard other passages containing 
additional information on the same subjects. 

There are indeed many texts, which declare God's 
readiness to forgive those who repent. But we find too 
that a propitiation for sin was appointed from the be- 
ginning, and that the appointed propitiation, which was 
set forth in the Mosaic law by various sacrifices, had 
the same influence respecting human salvation before 
the coming of Christ, as after. What that influence 
was, we learn most ciearly from the New Testament. 
When all parts of Scripture are taken together, it be- 
comes perfectly clear, that every declaration of God's 
readiness to forgive the penitent, presupposes the pro- 
pitiation or atonement, made by the death of Christ. 
Now it is certainly a violation of every just princi- 



215 



pie of reasoning, to separate the declaration of God's 
readiness to forgive from the consideration of that 
atonement, which he appointed from the beginning 
as the medium of forgiveness. Whether the two 
things are always mentioned in the same passage or not, 
thejfc.are mentioned, and connected together in the holy 
Scriptures. These Scriptures we receive entire ; and 
we learn from them, first, that the infinite love of God 
was the original fountain of salvation ; secondly, that the 
sacrifice of Christ was the grand expedient adopted by 
the Governor of the world, to render human salvation, 
which would otherwise have been wholly inadmissible, 
consistent with law and justice ; and thirdly, that the re- 
pentance of sinners is indispensably necessary to their 
enjoying the salvation thus graciously provided. So 
that when we assert that the bh>od of Christ is, in one 
respect, the sole ground of forgiveness, we do not, as 
Dr. Ware supposes, forget those texts which attribute 
forgiveness to the free and boundless love of God, nor 
those which represent repentance as an indispensable 
condition of forgiveness. 

From p. 106, 107, it seems that Dr. Ware has mis- 
apprehended my meaning as to the entire worthlessness 
of all the good works and dispositions of men. What I 
said related simply to justification. But because good 
works and good dispositions are worthless in regard to 
this single point, we do not consider them worthless in 
other respects. Although we believe, what Paul abun- 
dantly teaches in his Epistles, that our good works must 
never be named in the presence of God, as the merito- 
rious cause of our justification I am confident we con- 
sider them of as high value, and enforce them by as ma- 
ny and as powerful motives, as any of our opponents ; — 
and with perfect consistency too. For it can never be 



216 



shown, that, because our personal holiness is of no ac- 
count as a ground of our justification, it is therefore of 
no estimation in the sight of God, and not worth our pur- 
suit. Does our denying the value of a thing in one par- 
ticular respect, certainly prove that we deny its value 
in all other respects ? We not only reject with abhor- 
rence the licentious consequence, mentioned by Dr. 
Ware at the close of his fifth Letter, but we assert that 
it does not by any means follow from the doctrine we 
maintain ; nay, we think ourselves able to show, that 
our doctrine guards against it far more effectually, than 
any other. 



CHAPTER XL 

ON DIVINE INFLUENCE. 

Most of what Dr. Ware has said, Letter VI, in regard 
to the use of means and motives, is perfectly agreeable 
to the faith of the Orthodox. And let me here inquire, 
-what reason he has to suppose, that the special, the 
efficacious, or even the supernatural influence of the 
Spirit, which we believe to be concerned in regeneration, 
has any less connexion with means and motives, than that 
divine influence which he asserts. We make the pecu- 
liar character which we attribute to the divine influence, 
to consist, not at all in its setting aside the use of means 
and rational motives, but in its giving them their proper 
effect, or producing its own proper effect by them. And one 
"would think, that a divine influence, which renders means 



217 



and motives effectual to bring men to repentance, must 
at least be more highly valued, than any influence which 
falls short of this. It seems to me to be indeed very 
strange, that any man should not see at once, that the 
influence of God's spirit must be desirable and excellent, 
in proportion to its efficacy, or in proportion to the cer- 
tainty, with which it produces its effect. 

Dr. Ware very justly and fairly represents our dif- 
ferent views respecting divine influence, as intimately 
connected with our views respecting the natural state of 
man, p. 122, and elsewhere. Now if our views of man's 
depravity are admitted to be correct, our opponents must, 
I think, be satisfied, that just such a divine influence as 
w ? e assert, is necessary to his renovation, and that no 
influence short of this would answer the purpose. They 
now think a less powerful influence sufficient, because 
they think man less depraved. Should they ever be 
convinced, that man has that degree of moral corruption 
which we attribute to him, they would at the same time 
be convinced, that he cannot be brought to a holy life, 
without a divine influence sufficient to overcome a strong 
and total opposition to holiness, and to effect a new 
moral creation. 

In a variety of passages, Dr. Ware asserts that our 
notion of divine influence is inconsistent with human lib- 
erty and activity, — inconsistent with the moral character 
of God — with those texts which complain of the sins of 
men, — with the commands of the gospel to repent and 
believe, and with the sincerity of all the exhortations 
and encouragements given to men. But of this inconsis- 
tency, in any of the instances mentioned, what evidence 
has he produced? And what evidence can he produce? 
As to its inconsistency with human liberty and activity ; 
I refer to the views I have already advanced. Our 



218 



doctrine is, that the divine influence effectually directs and 
regulates the liberty and activity of those who are saved ; 
that it induces them to use their voluntary and moral 
powers in a right manner. Now is it setting aside their 
liberty or activity, for the Spirit of God to direct it, 
and regulate its operations, or induce them properly to 
use it ? Dr. Ware says, that " in those, upon whom this 
influence is exerted, its effects take place without any 
agency or cooperation of theirs, for they are wholly 
passive." But although something like this seems, in 
not a few instances, to have been maintained by Ortho- 
dox men ; I can by no means assent to it. The subjects 
operated upon by the divine Spirit, are active, moral he* 
ings ; and the effects produced in them are, primarily, 
right moral affections, and secondarily, correspondent ex- 
ternal actions. How can these " effects take place, with- 
out any agency of theirs/' when the effects are in fact 
their agency itself, properly directed ? 

And how can it be supposed to be inconsistent with 
the moral character of God, for him to exert an influence 
upon sinners, which will certainly secure their repentance 
and salvation ? Should we not rather think, that a Be- 
ing of infinite goodness would choose to exert an influence, 
so important to the highest interests of men ? Indeed, if 
there is any considerable difficulty in the case, it is the 
fact, that so desirable an influence is not actually impart- 
ed to all. But as to this, I hardly need to remark, that 
no blessing which God bestows, is ever thought to lose 
its value, because it is not granted to all. Nor, on the 
other hand, is there any room f or those who are left 
destitute, to find fault, unless they can present a just 
claim to the blessings withheld. So far at least this 
subject is very plain. 

Again. Is our doctrine "inconsistent with those 



219 



texts, which complain of the sins of men ?" The reason 
which Dr. Ware assigns to prove such an inconsistency 
is, that, if our doctrine is true, " men act according to 
the nature given them, and could not act otherwise, 
without an influence which is not given them." The 
first part of the reason which is here assigned, and which 
has a pretty obscure relation to the subject, is, that on 
the supposition that our doctrine is true, " men act ac- 
cording to the nature given them." — And how do they 
act, on supposition the Unitarian doctrine is true ? Is 
there any other way in which any accountable being in 
the Universe can act, but according to his nature, wheth- 
er that nature be good or bad ? — The other part of the 
reason is, that "men could not act otherwise, without an 
influence which is not given them." They " could not 
act otherwise." But are men destitute of any power 
which is necessary to moral agency, because they are not 
made holy ? If they are not, then this reason has no 
force. If they are, then none, who are not holy, have 
the power which is necessary to moral agency : which 
is the same as to say, no sinners can be moral agents, 
And this is the same as saying, that no moral agents can 
be sinners ; and if so, there can be no sin in the universe. 

It is said, that our doctrine is inconsistent with the 
commands of the gospel to repent, believe, &c. But how 
does this appear ? Why, because " they have no power 
to do this, till almighty power is exerted to make them 
willing." But surely we are not to consider men as 
wanting the power that is necessary to moral agency? 
because God does not actually bring them to repent and 
believe. Though they are sinners, and dependent on 
the spirit of God for sanctification, they are moral agents- 
Their being sinners necessarily implies moral agency. 
And if they are moral agents, it is most clearly their 



220 



duty to repent, believe, and obey. And is it not prop- 
er that the gospel should command them to do their 
duty? 

Finally ; Dr. Ware signifies that our doctrine is in- 
consistent with the sincerity of the exhortations and en- 
couragements of the gospel to exertion, since it supposes 
men incapable of willing to perform their duty ; that it 
is not of themselves to will any thing good, &c. But 
our doctrine makes men no otherwise incapable of wil- 
ling to perform their duty, than as they are indisposed 
or disinclined to perform it. And must the exhortations 
to duty contained in the gospel, and the promises to those 
who perform it, be considered insincere, because men are 
not inclined to perform it? If so, there is but little sin- 
cerity in the Bible. 



Dr. Ware's last Letter is a reply to mine, on the 
moral influence of Orthodoxy compared with the influ- 
ence of Unitarianism. To many of the remarks contain- 
ed in this Letter, I cordially subscribe ; but not to all. 

"Love to Christ," Dr. Ware says, " will depend on 
our view of the nature and value of the benefits we re- 
ceive through him, and not at all on the rank he holds 
in the scale of being." p. 127. This is saying, that our 
love to Christ will be the same, both in kind and degree, 
whether he be possessed of mere human perfection, or 
of divine perfection. And this is saying, that human 
perfection is entitled to as high a regard, as divine. And 
this is the same as to say, a perfect man may properly 
be the object of as high an affection, as God. And if this 
is true, it is of no practical consequence, whether we 
consider the Supreme Being as any thing more than a 
holy angel, or a holy man; as our "love to him will not 



221 



depend at all on the rank he holds in the scale of being." 
Of course, all the labour of the inspired writers to invest 
his character with divine glory is of no value, as it can 
have no effect upon our feelings. Indeed, if Dr. Ware's 
remark is true, it is no more proper to require us to love 
God with all the heart and soul and mind and strength, 
than to require us to love a perfectly holy man in this 
manner • and the distinctions constantly made between 
Jehovah and all inferior ranks of beings are of no impor- 
tance. For, whether he holds a higher or lower rank, 
our love, our confidence, our veneration, our worship will 
all be the same. On this principle, the practice of the 
Romish church in rendering divine worship to the mother 
of Jesus, and other saints, is not so faulty as Protestants 
have supposed. For those departed saints, being per- 
fectly holy, may justly be regarded as objects of the 
highest religious affection, inasmuch as the propriety of 
this affection " depends not at all on the rank they hold 
in the scale of being." Such is the favourite position of 
Dr. Ware, and others ; — a position hastily adopted by 
them, I am sure, — and confounding things which differ as 
much, as any one thing can, by the whole length and 
breadth of infinity, differ from another. What effect 
must it have upon us, to be told in earnest, that it is a 
matter of no practical consequence, whether our Saviour 
is the creator of the heavens and the earth, or a mere 
creature, — God over all, or a mere child of Adam ; that, 
whether he is the one or the other, our love to him is to 
be the same, — our confidence and our worship the same ? 
Certainly Unitarians have made the assertion, above 
quoted, rashly ; and if they consider well what it implies, 
they will not be fond of repeating it. 

But I have a word more on this point. If Unitari- 
ans do indeed think that "love to Christ depends not 

29 



222 



at all on the rank he holds in the scale of being ;" why 
do they charge us with giving him too high a place in 
our affections ? Why do they charge us, as they often do, 
with idolatry? According to Dr. Ware's position, Christ 
deserves as high an affection, as if he were exalted to the 
rank of divinity. To say he does not, is to say, the de- 
gree of our affection must depend on his rank in the scale 
of being. Indeed, Dr. Ware himself makes it depend on 
this. He tells us, that Unitarians cannot give Christ the 
"supremacy of affection, which is due to God only ;" and 
that they cannot do this, because they ascribe to Christ, 
44 only derived excellences, and a subordinate agency." 
And this is the same as if he had said, they cannot give 
him their supreme affection, because he holds the rank of 
a mere creature; thus making our love to him depend, 
directly and essentially, on the rank he holds in the scale 
of being. They justify themselves in not giving him 
their supreme affection, by alleging that he has only 
the rank of a derived, dependent being. And they 
are indeed justified, if that is his rank. On the oth- 
er hand, our supreme affection is due to him, if he pos- 
sesses supreme excellence. So that nothing can be more 
contrary to reason and to fact, than the position that 
"our love to Christ, depends not at all on the rank 
he holds in the scale of being." The question between 
us and Unitarians respecting the character of Christ, is, 
in effect, a question respecting the degree of love and 
veneration which is due to him. And every effort of 
Unitarians to disprove the proper Deity of Christ, is, in 
plain truth, an effort to convince us, that we have exer- 
cised towards him too high a degree of veneration and 
love. But for ourselves, we are satisfied thai in this 
respect, our great danger is that of falling below the 
affection, which his glorious attributes demand, and which 
the precepts and examples of the Apostles inculcate. 



223 



Dr. Ware asks upon what ground T can speak " of a 
future reward to be obtained by virtuous efforts," since 
I have said that no works of ours must be named in the 
presence of God, and that we must rely on the blood of 
Christ, as the sole ground of forgiveness. But can there 
be any difficulty here ? May not an undeserved favour, 
a mere gift, which has been procured for us by the kind- 
ness of another, be proposed to us, on conditions which 
we are to fulfil ? The rewards of heaven are the re- 
wards of grace — procured wholly by the merit of Christ. 
But may not our diligent exertion be the means of ob- 
taining them? Suppose a man has servants, who owe 
him a just debt to a large amount, but, through their own 
fault, are rendered unable ever to make any payment. 
And suppose he is moved by compassion to forgive the 
debt, and besides this, to provide a charity fund to be 
disposed of for their benefit. May he not encourage 
good conduct in them, by making it still depend upon 
their own exertions, whether they shall receive the gra- 
tuity offered them ? May not the gratuity be held up as 
a reward of their good conduct ? And if they obtain the 
reward, must not their hearts be constantly turned to- 
wards the generosity of their disinterested benefactor ? 
Deep in debt as they are, and depending on the mere 
kindness of another, will they ever name their exertions, 
as giving them any claim to their reward, or as making 
it, in any proper sense, a purchase ? 

At the bottom of p. 130, Dr. Ware says, that a mor- 
al inability is in fact, to all practical purposes, the same 
as a natural inability." A moral inability is an inability 
which results from moral causes. Thus a man's strong 
disinclination to do any particular duty constitutes a mor- 
al inability. But is this strong disinclination the same, 
as an inability consisting in the want of physical power? 



224 



As to K practical purposes," these two kinds of inability- 
are extremely and totally different. The one constitutes 
blame-worthiness ; the other frees from it. We are 
criminal in proportion to the one, and exculpated in pro- 
portion to the other. 

On the reasoning of Dr. Ware, pp. 131, 132, I have 
several remarks to offer. The reasoning relates to the 
moral influence of punishment in preventing sin, and in 
reclaiming men from it. I had represented, in my Let- 
ters, that the salutary influence of the punishment 
threatened must be in proportion to the greatness of the 
evil which we apprehend to be involved in it ; and up- 
on this principle, had endeavoured to show, that the 
view which the Orthodox entertain of the inexpressible 
greatness and endless duration of future punishment must 
have the most powerful tendency to deter men from 
the commission of sin. The argument which Dr. Ware 
arrays against this reasoning is, in brief, that such a pun- 
ishment is obviously disproportioned to the demerit of 
sin, and so cannot be firmly believed ; that the " terror" 
it excites is so " vague and indistinct, and so mingled 
with incredulity," as to "destroy its practical effects." 
But has not Dr. Ware entirely mistaken the real ques- 
tion in debate ? When we would ascertain the influ- 
ence of any particular sentiment, we do not surely look 
to those who disbelieve and reject it, nor to those who 
half-believe it. Who ever attempted to honour Chris- 
tianity, by showing its happy influence upon Mahome- 
tans or infidels ? When Dr. Ware speaks of the influ- 
ence of the Unitarian doctrine, does he mean to speak 
of its influence upon those who reject it, or upon those 
who receive it ? No doctrine can produce its proper 
effect in any other way, than by being cordially believed. 
The influence which any doctrine has, is the same thing 
as the influence which the belief of it has. Let Dr. 



225 



Ware then come to the question, and inquire, what will 
be the influence of our doctrine upon those who serious- 
ly believe it. Let him look into the minds of those, who 
have so deep an impression of the evil of sin, that end- 
less punishment appears to be its just desert; who as 
certainly believe that such punishment will be inflicted 
on the wicked, as that endless happiness will be confer- 
red on the righteous. And let him inquire what will be 
the proper eifect of the doctrine, thus cordially be- 
lieved. 

But Dr. Ware seems to think it impossible to believe 
the doctrine of endless punishment. Doubtless he speaks 
of an impossibility which Unitarians feel ; for he surely 
would not charge us with insincerity, when we profess 
to believe the doctrine. Now I admit that Unitarians 
may find it difficult or impossible to bring themselves to 
believe the doctrine of endless punishment. With the 
same habits of thinking on religious subjects which they 
have, I should find it impossible too. But there can be 
no doubt that this doctrine would become perfectly credi- 
ble to Unitarians, if their views of the law and govern- 
ment of God, and the evil of sin, should be like those 
which the Orthodox entertain. And if they should 
come really to believe the doctrine, they could easily 
judge of its influence. 

In p. 135, and elsewhere, Dr. Ware represents the 
obvious sense of any passage, as being the same with the 
literal sense • whereas in a thousand cases, the figurative 
sense is the obvious one. 

Dr. Ware speaks of the " little success, which has 
attended all endeavours in modern times to extend the 
bounds of Christianity by missions for the conversion of 
barbarous pagan nations." If Dr. Ware could have the 
pleasure of being fully acquainted with all the facts 
which are before the public, and which have been the 



226 



subject of so much joy, and so much thanksgiving to 
God, I am persuaded he would adopt language very 
different from this. And if he had known the character 
of Missionaries as well as some of us do, he would hardly 
have descended to notice, except with a sharp rebuke, 
the disgust or the uncandid surmises of those, who are 
unfriendly to the cause of missions. See pp. 142, 143. 

To all that Dr. Ware says, pp. 148, 149, of the hap- 
py influence of Unitarian sentiments to bring the learn- 
ed, the wealthy, the refined, and those in exalted sta- 
tions to be " efficient friends, and serious professors" of 
religion, I have only this to reply ; that I should most 
heartily rejoice in such an influence, and wish it increased 
and perpetuated, could I be well satisfied, that the re- 
ligion, thus promoted in the higher classes of society, is 
indeed the religion which the inspired pages teach, and 
which will bear the inspection of him, who will judge 
the world at his coming. 

Near the close of his Letters, Dr. Ware expresses 
some surprise, that I should speak of the Unitarian sys- 
tem as "indeed another gospel " But why should he be 
surprised ? Does not every thing I have said in the 
controversy imply a serious conviction of this? And 
have not the more bold and decided Unitarians in Eng*- 
land and America given up all thought of any compro- 
mise, and all desire of any alliance, between the two 
systems ? And does not Dr. Ware himself, in his last 
sentence, plainly signify, that one and only one of these 
systems is to be considered as the true gospel ? "Chris- 
tians," he says, " will venture to judge between the rival 
systems, and will take the liberty to decide, each one for 
himself, whether the gospel, as it is held by Unitarians, 
or as it is held by Trinitarians and Calvinists, be the gospel 
of Christ." Now we only ask for ourselves the liberty, 
which belongs to all. Unitarians judge that their sys- 



227 



tern is the true gospel. We adopt a conclusion directly 
opposite. In regard to this subject, on which we have 
opinions so totally diverse, it would be inconsistent with 
plain truth to pretend that we agree, or to do any thing 
implying an agreement. On other subjects we may 
agree, and ought to agree. Let there be no interrup- 
tion of the advantages or pleasures of civil, social, or lit- 
erary intercourse ; no interruption of the offices of kind- 
ness, or of the feelings of benevolence. But in regard to 
the great subject of controversy between us, let us re- 
vere conscience and be faithful to the truth. If Unita- 
rians soberly declare, that they regard us as guilty of 
idolatry in the honour and worship we render to Christ, 
and that they can have no communion with us ; instead of 
crying out against them for bigotry, we cheerfully allow 
them the rights of conscience and private judgment, and, 
in this case, give them the credit of a manly consistency. 
So on our part, if we declare our serious conviction, that 
their system is another Gospel, and that it is inconsistent 
with our allegiance to Christ to have any fellowship with 
them in the peculiarities of their faith and worship 
we request them to extend to us the exercise of the 
same indulgence and candour, and to suffer us, without re- 
proach, to serve God according to our own consciences. 

If Dr. Ware were not very distant from the boast- 
ing, which has characterized some Unitarians, I should 
be disposed to animadvert upon a few passages in p. 
132, where he says not only that the moral influence of 
the Unitarian doctrine is "far more certain, and power- 
ful, and salutary, and purifying," than the influence of 
Orthodoxy, but that the virtue of Unitarians " is of a 
more pure, generous, and elevated kind," than that of their 
opponents. I cannot bring myself to contest this last 
point with Unitarians. I doubt whether I ought to 
bestow upon any virtue, which we are conscious of pos- 



228 



sessing, the shining honours, which Dr. Ware here seems 
willing to bestow upon the virtue of Unitarians. But af- 
ter all, the language he generally uses on this subject, is 
humility itself, compared with the inflated encomiums, 
which some of his brethren have bestowed upon them- 
selves, and upon one another. And let me add here, 
because I love to honour my opponent, that the severest 
censures he casts upon us, are, as to manner, courtesy 
and mildness itself, compared with the spirit and lan- 
guage of some, who boast of liberality and candour. Let 
me be excused for one more remark in this place, and 
that is, that I shall think I have not written or lived in 
vain, if I may contribute in any measure to diminish the 
incivility, and violence, and, I was ready to say, barbari- 
ty, with which religious controversy has too generally 
been carried on, and to promote a spirit of benevolence, 
and kindness, and forbearance among those, who differ 
from each other. Let it not be supposed, however, that 
I wish, in any measure, to promote that timid, time-serv- 
ing policy, which would either conceal the truth, or treat 
it as though it were of little consequence. The Lord 
deliver every friend of Orthodoxy from this. But I would 
still remember the rebuke, which our blessed Saviour 
administered to those, who in a moment of resentment 
and impatience, wished for divine judgments upon some 
who did not favour their cause. And I would ever im- 
press upon my memory and my heart, the admonition of 
the Apostle, that " the servant of the Lord must not 
strive, but be gentle unto all men," even opposers. And 
if in any thing which I have written in this controversy, 
I have violated this excellent precept, the Lord forgive 
such an offence against the spirit of love. 



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